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Re-readings and Misreadings:
Slaughter-House, Privileges or Immunities,
and Section Five Enforcement Powers
BY JAMES W. Fox JR.
INTRODUCTION
T he Supreme Court has inspired mountains of commentary with
recent decisions in two separate areas of Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence. On the one hand, the Court has suggested in Saenz v. Roe'
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may
be re-opened as a source of constitutional rights. On the other, the Court
has repeatedly and forcefully sought to restrain congressional powers to
interpret and enforce the Fourteenth Amendment under the Enforcement
Clause of Section Five. While each of these areas of Fourteenth Amend-
ment analysis has seen its share of commentary, little has been said by
either the Court or the commentators about the connections between these
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Article contends that the
historical background of the framing and the early application of the
Fourteenth Amendment reveal an intimate and arguably essential connec-
tion between the proper interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and congressional enforcement powers under Section Five of the
United States Constitution.
Assistant Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. J.D. 1990,
University of Michigan Law School. Copyright © 2002 James W. Fox Jr. All rights
reserved. I owe special thanks to my colleagues: Michael Allen, Robert Batey,
Robert Bickel, Mark Brown, and Peter Lake, who commented on early drafts of
this Article, Richard Aynes, Michael Kent Curtis, Michael McConnell, William
Rich, and Bryan Wildenthal, whose work inspired my efforts and who provided
excellent advice on short notice, and my colleagues at Stetson who allowed me to
refine ideas in our Faculty Workshop Series. I also thank my research assistant
Kelley Cramer, the Stetson faculty support staff, and staff of the Stetson Law
Library. Finally, my work on this project was supported by the Stetson University
College of Law Research Grant Program.
' Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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A common focal point for discussions about the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause is the Slaughter-House Cases The long and widely held view
of Slaughter-House is that Justice Miller's opinion for the Court eviscer-
ated the Privilege or Immunities Clause and that the Clause has been a
nullity ever since. Two scholars have recently attempted to explode this
reading of Justice Miller's opinion. Kevin Newsom, through a close
reading of Justice Miller's opinion and a detailed examination of Miller's
jurisprudence, argues that Justice Miller in fact supported selective
incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.' Professor Bryan H. Wildenthal presents a similar reading of
Miller's Slaughter-House opinion and argues that such a reading was the
baseline of contemporaneous interpretations of the Clause in 1873 when the
case was decided."
This Article contends that these revisionist interpretations of Slaughter-
House, even if partially correct as an interpretation of the Court's opinion
on the issue of incorporation, wrongly perpetuate Justice Miller's
misreading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Revisionists focus on
the wrong misreading: while it may be that scholars have gotten Slaughter-
House wrong, the more important problem is that Slaughter-House got the
Privileges or Immunities Clause wrong.
The revisionists' misreading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
stems, in part, from their failure to grapple with the ambiguities of the
historical evidence surrounding the Clause. For example, revisionists
contend that the Clause does not encompass natural rights.5 Yet there is
2 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
3 Kevin Christopher Newsom, Settinglncorporationism Straight: A Reinterpre-
tation of the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 649 (2000).
" Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Under-
standing in Court and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1051(2001) [hereinafter Wildenthal, The
Lost Compromise]. See also Bryan H. Wildenthal, How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love the Slaughter-House Cases: An Essay in Constitutional-
Historical Revisionism, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 241 (2001) [hereinafter
Wildenthal, How I Learned to Stop Worrying]. For an earlier, less developed
exploration of the revisionist view, see Robert C. Palmer, The Parameters of
Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-House,'Cruikshank, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1984 U.,ILL. L. REv, 739.
' Of the revisionists, Professor Wildenthal is the most willing to acknowledge
that some of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed it encompassed
natural rights, but he still advocates a limited enumerated-rights interpretation. See
infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
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significant evidence to the contrary that the revisionists do not adequately
address. More importantly, based on a reading of the historical materials
surrounding the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment and its implementa-
tion by the Reconstruction Congresses, this Article contends that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and the enforcement powers of Section
Five were thought to operate in unison, enabling Congress to determine
some of the content of the privileges and immunities of national citizenship
beyond a mechanical application of the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Bill of Rights. Ultimately, the revisionists fail to grasp that the
historical record reveals a range of possible interpretations of the Clause
and its enforcement, a range that modem interpreters need to confront in all
its complexity and, ambiguity.
Scholars investigating the Court's interpretation of Section Five, to the
extent they explore its historical background, tend to focus on the
contemporary connection of the Section to other portions of Section
One--the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses--and do not consider
the possibility that the more appropriate, and perhaps intended, connection
is with the Privileges or Immunities Clause.' Moreover, the Supreme Court,
6 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on
Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1127, 1158-65 (2001) (discussing historical
support for interpreting Section Five consistently with the Necessary and Proper
Clause); Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REv. 653, 662-64
(2000); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Powers of Congress Under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment After City of Boeme v. Flores, 32 IND. L. REv. 163, 169
(1998). Important recent exceptions include William J. Rich, Privileges or
Immunities: The Missing Link in Establishing Congressional Power to Abrogate
State Eleventh Amendment Immunity, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 235 (2001)
[hereinafter Rich, Privileges or Immunities: The Missing Link] and Rebecca E.
Zietlow, Belonging, Protection and Equality: The Neglected Citizenship Clause
and the Limits of Federalism, 62 U. Prrr. L. REv. 281 (2000). Professor Rich
focuses on the effect of the Enforcement Clause on the abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment Immunities, which is central to some of the recent Supreme Court
cases but is not an issue that I address here. Professor Zietlow focuses on the
importance of the Citizenship Clause in supporting congressional actions, and
emphasizes that the Citizenship Clause played a role in the Saenz decision. See also
Akhil ReedAmar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REv. 747,824 (1999) [hereinafter
Anmar, Intratextualism] (briefly suggesting the possibility that Congress was
intended to have the power to define privileges of citizenship); Michael W.
McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 174-81 (1997) [hereinafter McConnell,
Institutions and Interpretation] (criticizing the Boerne Court's historical analysis
of Section Five and suggesting a congressional role in interpreting the Privileges
2002-2003]
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in a series of recent decisions beginning in 1997 with City of Boerne v.
Flores7 and continuing through 2001 with Board of Trustees v. Garrett,
8
has narrowly interpreted the scope of congressional powers to interpret and
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, the Court initially relied
on poor historical analysis in Boerne and has, for the most part, simply
compounded its mistake by repeated cross-citations to Boerne.9 The
historical investigation presented by this Article suggests first that the
Enforcement Clause be interpreted more broadly than the five-Justice
majority of the current Court has allowed. Second, and perhaps more
significantly, if it is true that Congress was understood to play an important
role in developing the contours of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, then
actions by Congress that are based on its understanding of the Clause
should be accorded more deference than the current Court seems willing to
grant. Ultimately, this historical exploration suggests that by re-uniting the
historical understandings of the Privileges or Immunities Clause with the
or Immunities Clause); William J. Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities"
Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2002) (draft on file with author) [hereinafter Rich, Taking
"Privileges or Immunities" Seriously]; Brent E. Simmons, The Invincibility of
Constitutional Error: The Rehnquist Court's States'Rights Assault on Fourteenth
Amendment Protections of Individual Rights, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 259,
352-63 (2001).
' City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
'Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). The other cases comprising
the Section Five parade are Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). For an excellent analysis
of the Court's aggressive and hostile approach to congressional actions in these
recent cases, see Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH.
L. REv. 80 (2001). For two interesting critiques of Morrison, which also present
productive ways to re-think Section Five as applied to women and sex discrimina-
tion, see Zietlow, supra note 6 (advocating use of the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for congressional action such as the Violence
Against Women Act, ruled unconstitutional in Morrison); and Reva B. Seigel, She
the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family,
115 HARV. L. REv. 947 (2002) (arguing that the Nineteenth Amendment supports
an understanding of Fourteenth Amendment protections specifically adapted to sex
discrimination and supportive of congressional actions such as the Violence
Against Women Act).
9 See, e.g., Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 638. For an excellent critique of the
Boerne Court's historical analysis, see McConnell, Institutions andInterpretation,
supra note 6, at 153.
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Enforcement Clause modem interpreters might find a plausible but
overlooked constitutional basis for congressional actions aimed at
protecting the rights of groups such as women, individuals with disabilities,
and religious minorities.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I presents the arguments of the
revisionists and their re-reading of the Slaughter-House Cases. Critiquing
the revisionists on their own terms, I find that they provide an overly
charitable reading of Justice Miller's opinion on the incorporation
question.' 0 Part II addresses what I regard as the more important issue: The
revisionists' adoption of Justice Miller's misreading of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to exclude natural rights interpretations and to restrict
the role of Congress in developing the interpretive content of the Clause."'
This issue is addressed by concentrating on historical evidence from
congressional debates about both the Fourteenth Amendment and contem-
poraneous legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 186612 and the
Freedmen's Bureau Act. 3
Part ImI pursues this analysis with a close reading of some of the
congressional actions throughout Reconstruction, and demonstrates first
that the Thirty-ninth Congress (which drafted the Fourteenth Amendment)
adopted an aggressive understanding of its parallel enforcement powers
under the Thirteenth Amendment through enactment of the Civil Rights
Act 14 and Anti-Peonage Act, 5 and second that Congress fully compre-
hended that its enforcement power included the power to interpret and
define the content of the Reconstruction Amendments.' 6 Part II then goes
on to explore congressional debates over the Enforcement (Anti-Klan) Act
of 1871 " and the Civil Rights Act of 1875's in an effort to understand the
congressional interpretations of the content of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause and the Clause's relationship to Section Five's enforcement
powers. 9 This Article argues that Congress took a fairly broad view of the
Clause and its own powers prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
1o See infra notes 22-68 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 69-179 and accompanying text.
12 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
13 Freedmen's Bureau Act, 14 Stat. 173 (1866).
14 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
1" Anti-Peonage Act, 14 Stat. 546 (1867).
16 See infra notes 180-304 and accompanying text.
17 Enforcement Act, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
1 Civil Rights Act, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
19 See infra notes 305-35 and accompanying text.
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Slaughter-House, including the power to define national privileges and
immunities with reference to the Bill of Rights, the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause, and rights considered "fundamental" based both on common
law and on developing conceptions of democratic citizenship. Part m also
discusses how the Slaughter-House decision partly re-directed congressio-
nal discourse away from a more expansive, fundamental rights interpreta-
tion of the Clause, and toward a more constrained equality-of-rights
interpretation. Finally, Part IV discusses the final blow to congressional
development of the Privileges or Immunities Clause: The Civil Rights
Cases.2" With the Court's restrictive interpretation of the state action
language of the Fourteenth Amendment, authored by Justice Bradley, one
of the Slaughter-House dissenters, there remained little chance for
congressional exploration. Such restrictions need not continue, however,
and Part IV also suggests some avenues through which Congress could
develop the Privileges or Immunities Clause.2'
I. WHAT IS SLAUGHTER-HOUSE REVISIONISM?
Scholars and courts have long viewed the Slaughter-House Cases22 as
having eviscerated the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 23 This "standard" twentieth century interpretation of
Slaughter-House posits that the Court interpreted the Clause into redun-
dancy. The Court achieved this, it is argued, in two stages: First, the Court
held that by distinguishing between national and state citizenship in the
first sentence of Section One, and then specifically protecting only the
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," the Amendment
meant to distinguish the privileges and immunities encompassed by each
type of citizenship. Second, the Court determined that the privileges and
20 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
21 See infra notes 305-35 and accompanying text.
22 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
23 The Amendment reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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immunities of national citizenship amounted only to those privileges
otherwise secured by the Constitution.24 Thus, according to Professor
Tribe's 1988 treatise, "[tlhe Slaughter-House definition of national rights
renders the [F]ourteenth amendment's privileges or immunities clause
technically superfluous; rights preexisting in 'the Federal government, its
National character, its Constitution, or its laws,' were by definition already
shielded from state infringement by [the Constitution and constitutional
principles]."25
The revisionists challenge this reading. They contend that Justice
Miller's opinion for the Court in Slaughter-House, while rejecting broad
interpretations of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, such as those put
forth by the dissents, may actually support incorporation of the Bill of
Rights. The revisionists set forth several important considerations in their
effort to resurrect Miller's opinion. As discussed below, I find their reading
of the Bill of Rights incorporation into Miller's opinion to be intriguing but
strained. But that is not the focus of my criticism. I am concerned that these
incorporationist readings of the case evidence a deeper problem: the
revisionists' acceptance of Miller's de-federalization of the fundamental
rights theory of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Before addressing
these issues, however, it is helpful to summarize briefly the Slaughter-
House Cases.
24 E.g., LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § § 7-2,7-3 (2ded.
1988). See also Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 521 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Slaughter-House Court effectively read the Clause out of the Constitution); AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 212-13 (1998)
[hereinafter AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS]; CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH
OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED 39, 55 (1997); MICHAEL
KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 175 (1986) [hereinafter CURTIS, NO
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE]; Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom:
Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70
Cal.-KENT L. REv. 627, 653-55 (1994) [hereinafter Aynes, Constricting the Law
of Freedom]; Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth
Amendment: The Unfulfilled Promise, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1143, 1144 (1992);
Jeffrey Rosen, Translating the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1241, 1241 (1998). I have also previously adopted this view. See James W.
Fox Jr., Citizenship, Poverty, and Federalism: 1787-1882,60 U. PrrT. L. REv. 421,
545-51 (1999). See also sources cited in Newsom, supra note 3, at 648 n. 15; and
Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra note 4, at 1063 n.41. Professors Tribe
and Curtis have been influenced by the revisionist articles discussed herein and
now accept the possibility of a different reading.25 TRIBE, supra note 24, § 7-4 (quoting Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at
2002-2003]
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A. Slaughter-House
The Slaughter-House Cases arose in New Orleans as an anti-monopoly
dispute. Louisiana, like many states and cities of the period, enacted a law
banning slaughter-houses within and around New Orleans, except for those
operated by a state-sanctioned company in a designated area, in which
slaughter-house butchers could ply their trade for a fee.26 Several butchers
challenged the Act as an unconstitutional restriction of their rights under
common law and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. 7 On behalf
of the butchers, John Campbell argued that the Act created an illegal
monopoly that prevented the butchers from using their own land and
wrongly restricted their freedom to conduct a legal trade. He loosely
associated this right to labor with the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.2"
This mixing of civil rights, federalism, and monopoly issues created a
host of ironies throughout the Slaughter-House decision. Justice Bradley,
along with Judge (and future Justice) Woods, found in favor of the butchers
when one portion of the case came before the United States Circuit Court;
Bradley then found himself being overturned by the Supreme Court decision,
2 See ROBERT KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, 144
(1985) [hereinafter KACZOROWSKI, POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION]
(discussing growing use of slaughter-house regulations for public health and
safety). Kaczorowski notes that the Louisiana regulations were heavily influenced
by corrupt politics and were more severe in their treatment of the butchers than the
regulations in other states. For an excellent historical analysis of the background
of Slaughter-House and Justice Miller's motivations---often at odds with
Kaczorowski's views-see Michael A. Ross, Justice Miller's Reconstruction: The
Slaughter-House Cases, Health Codes, and Civil Rights in New Orleans, 1861-
1873, 64 J.S. LEGAL. HIST. 649 (1998). See also Aynes, Constricting the Law of
Freedom, supra note 24, at 632-34. For a detailed history of the cases, see
generally Mitchell Franklin, The Foundations andMeaningof The Slaughterhouse
Cases, 18 TUL. L. REv. 1 (1943).
27 See generally Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 45-57; see also Brief
for Plaintiffs, Slaughter-House (Nos. 475-480), reprinted in 6 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 535 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975)
2 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 54-56; LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 27, at 570-72. The bulk of Campbell's argument recounted the impermis-
sibility of monopoly and the right to labor under his reading of the Anglo-American
common law; he did far less expository work on the Reconstruction Amendments
and the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
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to which he dissented.29 John Campbell, a former United States Supreme
Court Justice and states-rightist who resigned from the Court to support his
home state of Alabama in the Civil War, eloquently argued, on behalf of the
butchers, the position favoring national citizenship and its privileges,
supporting federal judicial power, and rejecting state legislative authority.
Republicans--the party of nationalism---represented the state in its states'
rights argument. One of Louisiana's attorneys, Senator Carpenter, had just
two weeks before he argued in favor of a broad view of the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect Myra Bradwell's right to practice law, and had also
recently supported civil rights legislation in the Senate.3" The alignment
of Carpenter and Campbell reflected how the infusion of anti-monopolism
and Republican politics produced a complicated mixture of issues and
positions.3
The Court, per Justice Miller, held for the state. Miller asserted that the
"one pervading purpose" of the Reconstruction Amendments was "the
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom,
and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppres-
sions of those who had formerly exercised dominion over him."32 While
Miller noted that the amendments were not necessarily limited in application
to former slaves, he still urged that interpretation of the amendments must
consider the emancipation purposes behind their adoption.33 Against this
29 KACZoRoWsKI, POLITICS OF JUDICIALINTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 145.
The lower court case is Live-Stock Dealers'and Butchers ' Ass 'n v. Crescent City
Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649 (C.C. La. 1870).
3See infra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
31 KACZOROWSKI, POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at
146-48.
32 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 71.
33 Id. at 72. Newsom makes much of Miller's caveat to claim that Miller did not
mean to limit the scope of the Amendments to African-Americans: "[Miller] went out
of his way to make clear" that the amendments were not limited to blacks. Newsom,
supra note 3, at 683-85. Newsom's point is to reject the traditional reading-that
Miller's "pervading purpose" argument shows that Miller did not intend to incorporate
the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment. Unfortunately, Newsom's reading
clings to Miller's caveat while downplaying his extensive discussion ofemancipation.
Notably, immediately after his caveat, Miller emphasized the necessity of interpreting
the amendments in light of their purpose in emancipating black slaves. Slaughter-
House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 72. So while Miller may have "gone out of his way," he
quickly returned to the interpretive path which saw emancipation as the guiding
principle for the amendments. The dominant effect of this portion of the opinion is to
overly particularize the Fourteenth Amendment, which ultimately supports a
restrictive, non-incorporationist reading.
2002-20031
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background, Miller then moved to the thrust of the opinion, the interpretation
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
As mentioned above, it is Miller's reading of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause that occasioned the debate taken up by the revisionists.
Scholars seem to agree, however, that Miller intended to distinguish federal
and state citizenship and the privileges and immunities attaching to each.
Both the traditional reading of the opinion and the revisionists' reading also
understand Miller to have limited fundamental rights to state citizenship
and therefore placed those rights outside the scope of the federal govern-
ment's powers. Miller is clear about this. He, like many others on the Court
and in Congress, recognized the existence of fundamental rights and
privileges that exist at the state level, such as the right to property,
happiness, and safety.34 Unlike others on the Court and many in Congress,
he then expressly held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not. bring such
rights within the purview of the federal government, but left them to the
states to regulate and protect.35 In this way, the Court, per Miller, prevented
the butchers from claiming federal constitutional protection for a right to
labor and left Louisiana free to regulate slaughter-house operations through
creation of a state-sanctioned monopoly.
B. Slaughter-House and Incorporation of the Bill of Rights
The revisionists do not stake their claim on this removal of fundamental
rights from the scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Instead, they
concentrate on the argument that Miller's limitation did not include the Bill
of Rights. First, they point out that the incorporation of the Bill of Rights
was not even an issue in the case and that there is simply no holding on the
matter by the Slaughter-House Court. Surely they are right to emphasize
this point. Many of us have a tendency to over-read language in a case, to
perpetuate prior over-readings, and to forget the points at issue. The
revisionists clear out the malformed growth of such readings.
With their next step, revisionists move to shakier ground. They argue
that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Slaughter-House opinion can
best be read to include the Bill of Rights in the listing of federal privileges.
Actually, there are at least two approaches to this point.36 The first, and
34 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 76.
31 Id. at 77-78. The Court also held that the Equal Protection Clause was
inapplicable to the case. Id. at 80-81.
36 For both positions, see Newsom, supra note 3, at 683 ("[T]here is nothing in
Slaughter-House that precludes a reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
as incorporating the Bill of Rights. In fact, viewed in proper context, Miller's
(VOL. 91
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more cautious, approach is to point out that Miller, in listing the federal
privileges and immunities, included some first amendment privileges: the
"rights to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances.""
Based on this evidence, revisionists argue that Miller could not have
intended to reject incorporation, especially since application of the Bill of
Rights was not an issue necessary to the case.
The second, and more difficult, step is the revisionists' claim that
Miller's opinion not only permits incorporation, but affirmatively
contemplates incorporation.38 As Newsom observes, Miller expressly
provided only a suggestive list of federal rights.39 Revisionists thus argue
that the first amendment rights Miller cites suggest that other rights in the
Bill of Rights are also federal privileges. This is not what Miller says. It is
not at all clear from his list what the privileges of federal citizenship are
beyond those listed in Slaughter-House. Miller's first asserted right is the
right to travel to the seat of government and to seapors, a right he himself
wrote into law prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Crandall v. Nevada." This right is not textually based and Miller may have
felt somewhat insecure about his prior invocation of the right; he may have
seen Slaughter-House as an opportunity to rest the Crandall right on the
firmer basis of the new amendment. Miller also cited, inter alia, rights to
protection on the high seas, to use the navigable waters, to become a citizen
of any state, and to be free of racial discrimination in voting as protected
by the Fifteenth Amendment. It is hard to see what these rights "suggest"
beyond a limited right to travel and the express language of the Constitution
already applicable to the states.41 Thus the bulk of the "suggesting" done
by the list, according to revisionists, is to bring in all of the Bill of Rights
on the thin reed of the reference to assembly and petition and, perhaps, to
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Others have read Miller's listing of petition, assembly, and habeas
corpus to be limited to interactions with the national government. 2
majority opinion ... seems quite possibly to contemplate incorporation.").
37 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79.
38 See Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra note 4, at 1063 ("[Miller's
opinion] was at worst ambiguous, and at best powerfully supportive of total
incorporation.").
" See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79; Newsom, supra note 3, at
683.
40 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (16 Wall.) 35, 44 (1867).
4' Wildenthal readily admits the weakness of this portion of Miller's list. See
Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra note 4, at 1098-99.
42 See, e.g., KACZOROWSKI, POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note
26, at 152; Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 24, at 652-55.
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Professor Wildenthal counters that this reading renders the list redundant
because such rights were protected by Crandall and Miller had already
listed Crandall's rights.43 This pushes the opinion too far in the other
direction. While Miller's quote from Crandall does list a right "to come to
the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that govern-
ment," it does not so clearly encompass all assembly and petition of the
national government. Crandall, after all, involved the right to travel across
state lines without taxation, and Miller, writing for the Court, grounded this
right on the right to travel to the seat of government "to assert any claim"
on the government and to transact government business." Neither the facts
of the case nor Miller's justification for the right to travel clearly involved
a right to assemble and petition for national purposes within a state. 45 It is
quite plausible that, rather than incorporating the entire Bill of Rights,
Miller meant for his reference to petition and assembly in Slaughter-House
to expand or clarify the Crandall rights by emphasizing the right to petition
and assemble for national purposes without travelling across state lines.
Similarly, his invocation of habeas corpus could have been intended to
require the right as against federal officers within one's own state.
Moreover, most of the specific rights Miller lists that surround petition,
assembly, and habeas are rights that depend on a person's "character as a
citizen of the Unites States" and the structure of the government."6 They are
rights based on the citizen's interaction with the federal government. The
reference to petition, assembly, and habeas are surrounded immediately by
the right to protection on the high seas and the right to use the nation's
navigable waters.47 It is only at the end of this listing of specific rights that
Miller posits very generally other possible national rights--"[t]o these may
13 Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra note 4, at 1100.
44 Crandall, 73 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 44.
41 Miller wrote that a United States citizen:
[H]as the right to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may
have upon that government, or to transact any business he may have with
it. To seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its
functions. He has a right to free access to its sea-ports, through which all
the operations of foreign trade and commerce are conducted, to the sub-
treasuries, the land offices, the revenue offices, and the courts ofjustice in
the several States, and this right is in its nature independent of the will of
any State over whose soil he must pass in the exercise of it.
Id. At most, one could conclude from this language that a citizen has a right to go
to the offices of government and to seaports. Perhaps the former might include a
right to petition, but the right to assemble seems absent from this listing.
46Id.
47 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1872).
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be added the rights secured by the [T]hirteenth and [F]ifteenth articles of
amendment, and by the other clause of the [F]ourteenth...'-4 -and he
does not articulate whether the rights of the Reconstruction Amendments,
whatever they are for him, protect citizens when exercising the rights
outside the context of relations to the national government. The placement
of petition, assembly, and habeas within a list of very specific rights of
citizens relating to their national government just as easily suggests that
these rights from the Bill of Rights only protect the citizen in her relation
to national government as it does that the Bill of Rights applies to relations
with the states.49
The revisionists also confront the problem that Miller's effort to bury
and obscure the reference to even a limited set of the Bill of Rights appears
willful when contrasted with Bradley's dissent.5" Justice Bradley specifi-
cally listed a wider range of rights from the Bill of Rights in his dissent and
quite clearly asserted that these national rights were protected against state
interference by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.5 Bradley's language
needs no feats of interpretive archeology to locate the hidden
incorporationism. If Miller had meant to agree with Bradley on this portion
of the analysis, he could have done so clearly. Instead he submerged in a
list of relatively insignificant privileges the rights to petition, to assemble,
and the right to habeas corpus. Newsom responds that Miller's shorter
listing is simply an acknowledgement that he did agree with Bradley and
that the disagreement between them was on the inclusion of fundamental
rights beyond the Bill of Rights.52 This is a remarkably charitable reading
of the text. It seems far more sensible to read Miller the way his text asks
to be read-as an oblique reference which contrasts with Bradley's clear
and grand incorporationist statement precisely in order to inhibit such a
reading. If Miller is to be credited with any intent here at all (it is possible
Miller simply was not being careful in this listing), it should be the intent
to do what he in fact did: use ambiguous language and structure because he
knew the passage could be interpreted in either direction by future courts.53
48Id. at 80.
49See Aynes, Constricting the Law ofFreedom, supra note24, at 653-55 (rights
cited by Miller are structured and consistent with Crandall).
5 See id. at 639-42 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
5' Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 11849.
52 Newsom, supra note 3, at 679-81.
13 On the issue of incorporation; Miller's opinion may in fact be a "classically
transitional judicial opinion, filled with ambiguities sufficient to make any future
legal development possible." MORTON HORWiTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF-
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 39 (1977) (commenting on Tyler v. Wilkenson, 24 F.
Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827)).
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This seems especially plausible in light of the revisionists' observation that
the incorporation issue was dicta for the issues raised in the case; whereas
ambiguity may be unacceptable in a holding, it is often essential in dicta if
the Justices remain uncertain about how they plan to develop the legal
issues in future cases.
Ultimately, the revisionist reading of Miller's "incorporationist"
passage is no less strained than the relations-to-national-government
reading to which they respond. The revisionist reading relies too heavily on
implications from a thin reference to petition, assembly, and habeas to do
all the work of incorporation that the revisionists ask of it. Miller's scant
references contrast too sharply with Justice Bradley's clearer incorpor-
ationist language. It is in fact quite odd that revisionists such as Newsom,
who credit Justice Miller with clarity and caution in his writings
generally, 54 would seek an interpretation of his opinion that asks readers to
view Miller as not really being in control of his own obfuscations."5
Revisionists face a similar problem with Miller's misquoting of Article
IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause. Miller, in arguing that natural or
fundamental rights had long been understood as rights of state citizens and
should continue to be so interpreted, misquoted Article IV as protecting
rights of "citizens of the United States" rather than "citizens in the several
states."56 Dean Aynes and Professor Tribe have argued persuasively that
this misquote may have been designed to avoid an interpretation that those
natural rights were rights of United States citizens who were in the states,
an interpretation arguably adopted by Representative Bingham and others.57
While Newsom acknowledges their point" he does not adequately address
it or explain why, in the face of such misquoting, Miller's opinion should
continue to be read generously.5
54 Newsom, supra note 3.
" For another view supporting the revisionist reading (written before the
Newsom and Wildenthal pieces), see Earl M. Maltz, The Concept ofIncorporation,
33 U. RICH. L. REv. 525, 528-29 (1999) [hereinafter Maltz, The Concept of
Incorporation].
56 Miller made the same mistake in quoting the leading case on Article IV's
Clause, Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 550 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
57 See TRIBE, supra note 24, § 15-2; Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom,
supra note 24, at 636, 646-48. See also Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at
117-18 (Bradley, J. dissenting).
58 Newsom, supra note 3, at 653-55.
9 Newsom refers to Miller's similar partial quote of Corfield, which omitted
"the enjoyment of life and liberty" from Corfield's list of privileges, as "careful
pruning." This a very charitable reading of what otherwise appears to be a
purposefully misleading and disingenuous technique of Miller's to rewrite prior
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Despite what I find to be their overly charitable reading of Miller's
opinion, the revisionists provide some important evidence and arguments.
In particular Professor Wildenthal offers an excellent examination of
congressional views on incorporation after Slaughter-House, arguing
convincingly that incorporation of the Bill of Rights was the conservative
baseline of meaning understood for the Privileges or Immunities Clause
within Congress.' Kevin Newsom also advances our historical understand-
ing by presenting a detailed examination of Justice Miller's judicial
philosophy, which may well have supported incorporation.6' My critique
of their incorporationist readings notwithstanding, I agree that these articles
present good arguments on that point.
Yet, even if we accept the revision of Slaughter-House, fundamental
problems remain. First, it is not clear what the reinterpretation achieves.
The Bill of Rights is largely incorporated already.62 The main achievement
of the re-reading of Slaughter-House is the possibility of using it as
precedent for shifting incorporation from the Due Process Clause to the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. The revisionists expend an enormous
amount of energy, and adopt an exceptionally generous reading of Miller's
opinion, to achieve a simple shift in the constitutional source for an already
accepted doctrine.63
Newsom responds to this with three important points. First, Newsom
quotes John Hart Ely's trenchant observation: "[T]here is simply no
avoiding the fact that the word that follows 'due' is 'process.' . . . [W]e
apparently need periodic reminding that 'substantive due process' is a
contradiction in terms--sort of like 'green pastel redness.' ",6 The impurity
cases. Given Miller's more conservative personal position on Reconstruction, see
Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 24, at 659 nn. 222-24, it
seems odd to refuse to see his Slaughter-House rhetorical "pruning" as intentional
implementation of a conservative re-reading.
60 See generally Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra note 4.
61 See generally Newsom, supra note 3.
62 Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Road to Twining: Reassessing the Disincorpor-
ation of the Bill of Rights, 61 OHIo. ST. L.J. 1457, 1525 (2000) [hereinafter
Wildenthal, The Road to Twining] (only three of the twenty-four rights in the Bill
of Rights remain unincorporated).
. 63 One could argue that, quite apart from any shift in constitutional doctrine, re-
reading Slaughter-House is an important historical exercise in its own right. I
agree. But this leads directly to my criticism below that the revisionists are mis-
reading the historical background of the very amendment that Slaughter-House was
interpreting.
64 Newsom, supra note 3, at 737 (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980)).
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of accepting an oxymoronic reading of the Due Process Clause in order to
achieve incorporation deeply bothers Newsom, as it has many others, 65 and
may on its own be reason enough to move us back to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Second, Newsom argues that the framers of the
Amendment did not believe in substantive due process and we should not
perpetuate this inconsistency with the framers' intent.' Third, Newsom
adopts Professors Aynes' and Richards' argument that a blatantly imper-
missible textual reading renders the resulting Supreme Court doctrine
subject to public disrespect.67
Were a mere re-arrangement of the source for current doctrine the only
consequence of the proposed re-readings of Slaughter-House, it would
seem worthwhile considering the gain of linguistic sensibility, a stronger
rhetorical stance for the Court, and greater acceptance of incorporation by
Americans generally. But there is more lurking in the reinterpretations than
meets the reader's eye. On one level, there may be problems with a shift in
the overall doctrine once its foundation is moved: will the incorporation of
the Bill of Rights through the Privileges or Immunities Clause result in any
significant changes to those incorporated rights? Because of the Clause's
focus on citizens rather than persons, non-citizens might not retain Bill of
Rights' protections. The most obvious consequence of this would be the
diminishment of constitutional protections for aliens. But also significant
would be the effect on corporations, including news corporations which
might lose First Amendment protections if the Supreme Court applies to the
Fourteenth Amendment its Article IV holding that corporations are not
65 See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 106 (1997).
66 Newsom, supra note 3, at 738-40. Newsom's allegiance to the intent of the
framers here conflicts with his failure to fully credit their natural rights perspectives
on the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
67 DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION 199 (1993);
Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 24, at 687. Richards argues
that such disrespect has "discredited the very idea of the nationalization of human
rights." RICHARDS, supra, at 201. For Richards, substantive due process has been
a source for a somewhat haphazard implementation of human rights on a national
scale; he thinks the Privileges or Immunities Clause could do this work more
effectively and with more rhetorical legitimacy and success. Id. Newsom is
"somewhat uncomfortable" with Richards' framing of the issue as one of human
rights, Newsom, supra note 3, at 740 n.473, which is consistent with Newsom's
general discomfort with natural rights theories of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Indeed, Newsom comes close to a Bill-of-Rights-only approach to the
Privileges or Immunities Clause that is rejected by Richards. RICHARDS, supra, at
202-04.
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citizens for the purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.6" We cannot
necessarily foretell the variety of changes possible in established incorpora-
tion doctrine should the Court begin evaluating each right anew as a
privilege of United States citizenship. Such changes may be worthwhile,
but they are not the stated motivations of those who advocate the revisionist
readings and further discussion and consideration of the costs and benefits
of the changes are warranted.
However, there are deeper flaws in the re-interpretation of Slaughter-
House. Scholars have already suggested shifting incorporationist arguments
to the Privileges or Immunities Clause completely independent of any re-
reading of Slaughter-House. So long as the potential doctrinal changes are
adequately confronted and addressed, such a move seems reasonable. Then
why revisit Slaughter-House? The reason seems to be an effort to adopt
Justice Miller's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment with the gloss
of incorporation. Reinterpretation here is a means of modernizing the case
to comport with currently accepted notions of constitutional justice, while
leaving undisturbed the sleeping monsters of Justices Field and Bradley's
fundamental rights.
By focusing on a re-reading of Slaughter-House that preserves
incorporation, the revisionists sidestep the fundamental question of the
legitimacy of the Court's reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Even if we assume that Justice Miller would have accepted the incorpora-
tion of the Bill of Rights through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, does
his division of citizenship into two realms, state and federal, and his
steadfast relegation of the protection of fundamental rights to state
citizenship, withstand analysis? Is it consistent with the understanding of
the amendment within the congresses that drafted and then implemented the
Amendment during Reconstruction? Is it the best interpretation, even in the
context of when it was written? And if not, what impact did the Court's
opinion have on the development, or lack thereof, of alternate readings of
the Clause? The revisionists' focus on incorporation tends to distract them
from dealing fully with these questions and their analysis of these issues is
ultimately unsatisfactory.
Moreover, by focusing a modem interpretation of Slaughter-House on
the incorporation issue, the revisionists are--whether intentionally or
68 On both of these points, see Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges
or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Without Exhuming
Lochner: IndividualRights and Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L.REv. 1, 102-03
(1996) [hereinafter Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges]. On the exclusion of
corporations from the Privileges and Immunities Clause, see Paul v. Virginia, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 178 (1869).
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not--perpetuating a potentially flawed reading of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and its history. There is far more ambiguity in the Amendment and its
history on the issue of fundamental rights than the revisionists allow, and
as we enter a stage of potential judicial reinterpretations of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, the ambiguity should not be downplayed for the sake
of saving an incorporationist reading of a nonetheless flawed opinion.
II. REVISIONISM AND THE MULTIPLE HISTORICAL
MEANINGS OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
There are primarily two interpretive routes that Slaughter-House
obstructs and the revisionists are unwilling to re-open. First, as one of the
revisionists has observed, there is a strong argument that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended the Clause to encompass far more than
mere incorporation of the Bill of Rights; they may well have intended to
constitutionalize some version of a natural rights philosophy.69 Second, the
framers may also have intended to enable Congress, through Section Five's
enforcement powers, to interpret Privileges or Immunities in particular
contexts and so give substance through legislation tO the vague generalities
of the Clause in ways broader than simple enforcement of the Supreme
Court's definition of the Bill of Rights.7"
Both of these (not mutually exclusive) options are worth exploring, yet
none of the Slaughter-House revisionists addresses them fully.7' The
69 Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra note 4, at 1112 (Expansive review
of Privileges or Immunities "is strongly supported by the legislative history.").
Wildenthal ultimately rejects such an interpretation. Id. at 1112-15.
70 For recent discussions regarding Section Five in this context, see Amar,
Intratextualism, supra note 6, at 818-26; Caminker, supra note 6, at 1127; Stephen
A. Engel, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boerne
v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section Five, 109 YALE L.J. 115
(1999); McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation, supra note 6, at 153.
. Some scholars argue for a revival of the Privileges or Immunities Clause but
do not necessarily agree with the revisionists. For instance, David Richards
proposes that the courts develop the natural rights approach to Privileges or
Immunities. See RICHARDS, supra note 67, at 217-32. Most of these scholars focus
on the judicial development of rights and privileges. Professor Rich raises the
possibility of congressional development. See generally Rich, Privileges or
Immunities: The Missing Link, supra note 6, and Rich, Taking "Privileges or
Immunities" Seriously, supra note 6. I would be remiss not to say that I certainly
do not expect scholars to address every possibility for the Privileges or Immunities
Clause in each Article. Exploration of an alternative reading of Slaughter-House
is a large enough chunk to chew; Newsom and Wildenthal each do an excellent job
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problem with focusing on incorporation issues generally, and focusing in
particular on Slaughter-House, is that we blind ourselves to the possibility
that a little-used, underdeveloped Clause of the Constitution that is
grounded in the concept of citizenship may well have potential far different
from a jurisprudence conceived around substantive due process. What it
means to be a citizen, and which political body should properly define and
elaborate the privileges of citizenship, may not parallel the issues raised by
due process and equal protection.
A. Revisionist Fears of the End of Federalism
Because Newsom's re-reading of Slaughter-House most clearly rejects
a fuller exploration of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, I will turn to it
first. Newsom essentially adopts Justice Miller's false dichotomy between
a restrictive interpretation of the Clause and a no-holds-barred grant to the
judiciary to impose its own pet rights under the guise of a natural rights
philosophy.72 As mentioned above, Newsom does a nice (if occasionally
overstated) job illustrating that Miller's opinion does not necessarily box
the Privileges or Immunities Clause into a trivial restatement of pre-
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Despite the hints in the opinion that Bill of
Rights freedoms remain viable as national privileges and immunities,
Justice Miller was clearly bothered by the free-ranging alternative he read
in the dissents. He expressed concern about both the destruction of
traditional federalism and judicial activism. He explicitly feared congres-
sional power to "pass laws in advance" of state violations of the Amend-
ment and the Court's power to become a "perpetual censor" over state
legislation. 3 While he admitted that "[t]he argument.., is not always the
addressing the topics they set out to investigate. However, the revisionists' general
downplay of Natural Rights readings and their omission of the potential role of
Congress need to be explored.
72 Newsom asserts that he in fact rejects a false dichotomy interpretation of
Slaughter-House. Newsom, supra note 3, at 666. Newsom argues that most
scholars read Miller's opinion as choosing between a trivial interpretation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and a" 'self-executing source of a full panoply of
legal rights (including business freedoms). . . ."' Id. (citation omitted). While
Newsom may be right that Miller did not view the Privileges or Immunities Clause
as trivial, his reading of Miller's opinion-probably the most charitable reading
possible-nonetheless sets forth a dichotomy between possible incorporation of
some of the Bill of Rights and far-ranging judicial creation of rights. By portraying
his own reading as the middle ground, Newsom ignores the large tract of land
between his poles of interpretation.
73 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77-78 (1872).
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most conclusive which is drawn from the consequences urged against the
adoption of a particular construction of an instrument[,]" he asserted that:
[W]hen, as in the case before us, these consequences are so serious, so
far-reaching and pervading, so great a departure from the structure and
spirit of our institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the State
governents by subjecting them to the control of Congress, in the
exercise of powers heretofore universally conceded to them of the most
ordinary and fundamental character; when in fact it radically changes the
whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each
other and of both these governments to the people; the argument has a
force that is irresistible, in the absence of language which expresses such
a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.
74
For Miller, the only option other than his restrictive view of the Clause was
one that destroyed federalism and dangerously empowered the Court. The
very starkness of the alternatives, argued Miller, enabled him to accept
what he considered an otherwise weak ("not always most conclusive")
argument: the parade of anti-federalism horribles. He saw no middle
ground.
75
Nor does Newsom. He contends that Miller "sought to maintain some
semblance of a federal-state balance of power"76 and that Miller believed
74 Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
75 Id.
76 Newsom, supra note 3, at 707. Newsom then overstates his case immediately
following the above-quoted passage: "Hence, [Miller's] opinion in Slaughter-
House acknowledged the incorporation of the most uniquely federal of individual
rights, including many of those enumerated in the first eight amendments, but
refused the federalization of common-law rights." Id. Newsom wrongly states that
Miller's opinion acknowledges incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights. The
best one can say from the text is that the Court mentions the "right to peaceably
assemble and petition for redress of grievances." Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) at 79. Just a few pages earlier, Newsom characterizes the opinion as follows:
"there is nothing in Slaughter-House that precludes a reading of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as incorporating the Bill of Rights. In fact, viewed in proper
context, Miller's majority opinion in Slaughter-House seems quite possibly to
contemplate incorporation." Newsom, supra note 3, at 683. This latter avoidance
of overstatement accurately captures Newsom's valuable point that the opinion
does not "preclude" incorporation, as well as his thesis that one can read a context
(mostly based on Newsom's careful reading of Miller's jurisprudence) in which it
does more. It is not clear why Newsom converts his cautious speculation (note the
words: "context," "seems," "possibly," and "contemplate") into a bold assertion of
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that "the transfer of authority over the definition and protection of
individual rights was not wholesale."' Otherwise, "the boundary lines
between the States and the National Government would be practically
abolished.""8 In these statements, Newsom, like Miller, sees the restrictive
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a final dike against
the nationalism flood. Near the end of his article, Newsom cites Justice
Thomas for the proposition that courts might employ the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to engage in the dangerous activity of inventing new
rights, which Newsom identifies as "very legitimate fears" and "grave
concerns."79 Wildenthal also expresses this concern for upsetting the
"fundamental federal-state balance of power."
80
express incorporation ("acknowledged" incorporation of "many" of the Bill of
Rights) a few pages later.
77 Newsom, supra note 3, at 692.
781 Id. (quoting 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 547 (rev. ed. 1926)).
79Id. at 735 (citing'Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (Thomas, J. dissenting)).
Newsom also cites Lawrence Tribe to support this point, but he quotes Tribe
partially and out of context. Here is the statement Tribe makes, with the portions
quoted by Newsom in italics: "invoked in its (until recently) virgin state, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, some might fear, could invite judicial
decisionmaking untethered by precedent and untamed by tested principle and
might thereby undermine the legitimacy both of the decision relying upon it and of
the courts invoking it." TRIBE, supra note 24, §§ 7-6, at 1328-29; Newsom, supra
note 3, at 735. The omitted language ("some might fear") makes plain that Tribe
castes this statement in the voice of others-judges and scholars, it turns out--and
does not necessarily agree with it. In his subsequent discussion, Tribe makes clear
his position that it is wrong to assume courts would view the Clause as "carte
blanche to enact their own policy preferences" or use it arbitrarily. TRIBE, supra
note 24, §§ 7-6, at 1329.
80 Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra note 4, at 1067. See also Palmer,
supra note 4, at 741 (Miller's was a "middle ground"); id. at 743 (dissents would
"change the entire relationship between federal and state governments."); id. at 757
(dissenters "are called Radical Republicans for a reason."). Wildenthal also
contends that "clearly [the Fourteenth Amendment] was not meant to obliterate
state power or radically alter the federal-state balance." Wildenthal, The Lost
Compromise, supra note 4, at 1114. See also McConnell, Institutions and
Interpretation, supra note 6, at 174 (Republicans "were not prepared for [a radical]
transformation in the balance of power between the central government and the
states."). This sounds much like Miller's opinion, which Wildenthal then quotes
favorably on this point. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra note 4. As
evident in my discussion below, I think it is far from "clear" that the Fourteenth
Amendment was not meant to alter significantly federal-state relations. In
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The fears expressed by Miller, and echoed by Newsom and others,
sound like the fears of a sea traveler confronting unfamiliar waters. The
choice quickly becomes one between steering a course already charted or
venturing onward into the sea of one's imagined monsters. The monster for
Miller was expanded federal powers, and the charted path was antebellum
federalism. The revisionist re-reading of Miller's opinion cannot avoid the
fact that Miller clearly and forcefully chose to steer "with a steady and even
hand" along the course of antebellum federalism, making a firm statement
of his position in the final paragraph of the opinion:
But whatever fluctuations may be seen in the history of public opinion on
this subject during the period of our national existence, we think it will be
found that this court, so far as its functions required, has always held with
a steady and an even hand the balance between State and Federal power,
and we trust that such may continue to be the history of its relation to that
subject so long as it shall have duties to perform which demand of it a
construction of the Constitution, or of any of its parts.8'
In the face of a Civil War that deeply tested the antebellum understand-
ing of federalism and a series of constitutional amendments that had
restructured this federalism, such an effort to turn back the clock would
seem fanciful had it not been so successful. It denies any revolutionary
effect to the war and the spate of congressionally empowering constitu-
tional Amendments and national legislation of the 1860s and 1870s.
Instead, it substitutes a mild bromide to remedy the constitutional ills that
helped cause a great and horrific war. 2 Thus Justice Swayne's response to
particular, congressional enactments of the period, which relied in large part upon
Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment, were a significant, and one
could argue "radical," change in federalism. The current Court invokes concerns
with congressional power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment similar
to the revisionists. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000). The
Court oddly expresses more concern for the framers of the original Constitution
than for the views of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment which, after all, is
the portion of the Constitution being interpreted.
s Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 82.
82 James McPherson, among others, describes this war and post-war period as
a "second American revolution" in part because of the nationalization of powers
over individuals. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE
SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION, at 12-13, 140-52 (1991). See also Robert J.
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 871-99 (1986) [hereinafter Kaczorowski,
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Justice Miller: "These amendments [the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth] are a new departure, and mark an important epoch in the
constitutional history of the country. They trench directly upon the power
of the States, and deeply affect those bodies. They are, in this respect, at the
opposite pole from the first eleven." 3 And further: "[t]hese amendments
are all consequences of the late civil war. The prejudices and apprehension
as to central government which prevailed when the Constitution was
adopted were dispelled by the light of experience.... It is objected that the
power conferred is novel and large. The answer is that the novelty was
known and the measure deliberately adopted."'" Ultimately, the Slaughter-
House revisionists perform the contemporary equivalent of Justice Miller's
feat: they drain the Privileges or Immunities Clause of its force by limiting
Revolutionary Constitutionalism]; Donald G. Neiman, From Slaves to Citizens:
African-Americans, Rights Consciousness, and Reconstruction, 17 CARD. L. REV.
2115, 2115-17 (1996). But cf Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism:
Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 39, 57-62 (arguing that
Miller's opinion was a reasonable balancing of post-war nationalism and
commonly held ideals of federalism); Earl Maltz, Reconstruction Without
Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 24 Hous. L. REv. 221,230-36 (1987) and id. at 233 ("The Civil War
wrought no great change in the attitudes of Americans toward the possibility of
being governed primarily by the federal government.").
83 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 126 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 128-29 (Swayne, J., dissenting). Some might find Swayne romantically,
even absurdly, sanguine about national power. Certainly Swayne did claim that the
provisions of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment "are a bulwark of
defense, and can never be made an engine of oppression" and that the power
granted "is beneficent in its nature, and cannot be abused." Id. And certainly this
is optimistic. But given the choice, in 1873, between Swayne's optimism about
federal powers as yet little tested or Miller's desire to return as nearly as possible
to a state-based, antebellum federalism with a long and recent history of horrible
abuses-against slaves, free blacks, and abolitionist whites---one wonders why
Miller's choice seems so sensible to revisionists. Republicans in fact had
articulated an unromanticized and very plausible version of Swayne's argument.
See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 334-35 (1871) (Representative Hoar,
debating the Enforcement Act, argued that the actual deprivation of rights by states
was far more problematic than potential federal abuses, and concluded: "The
principle danger that menaces us to-day is from the effort within the States to
deprive considerable numbers of person the civil and equal rights which the
General Government is endeavoring to secure to them."). Revisionists give
insufficient attention to this argument.
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it to the rights expressed in Slaughter-House plus the already incorporated
portions of the Bill of Rights. 5
Slaughter-House revisionists do not necessarily think that this is what
they are doing. Newsom, for instance, purports to allow room for additional
privileges through Justice Miller's rubric of whether the rights "owe their
existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitu-
tion, or its laws,"8 '' with a focus primarily on the "National character"
prong. But as far as we can tell from Newsom, this gets us only the right to
travel, which itself has a substantial basis in constitutional language other
than the Privileges or Immunities Clause and is certainly no neophyte in the
pantheon of national privileges and immunities (it arguably existed prior
to the Fourteenth Amendment). 7
" To the extent that the revisionists so limit the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, they are doing little more than what Justice Black urged over fifty years
ago: incorporating the Bill of Rights but limiting the privileges and immunities of
national citizenship to those rights clearly enumerated in the text of the Constitu-
tion. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting). See RICH 4RDS, supra note 67, at 202 (discussing Black's interpretive
positivism in limiting privileges and immunities to textually enumerated rights).
86 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79; Newsom, supra note 3, at 736.
7 In Saenz v. Roe, the Court tried to pin the previously floating right to travel
to specific language in Constitution. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500-04 (1999).
See also Douglas G. Smith, A Return to First Principles? Saenz v. Roe and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 2000 UTAH L. REv. 305, 308 nn.14 & 15
[hereinafter Smith, A Return to First Principles?] (discussing shifting basis for the
right to travel prior to Saenz). The Saenz Court, however, itself shifts between the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Citizenship Clause in defining the right to
travel and reside in a particular state, see Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502 n. 15, 503, 506-07,
510-11, n.27. Newsom locates the Saenz Court's right to travel in Miller's
"National character" of the Federal government, Newsom, supra note 3, at 735,
and omits any discussion of the concept of national citizenship so important to the
Saenz Court's opinion. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506-07 and 510-11. In any event, the
right to travel has ample basis in other provisions, as discussed by the Court in
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 (1969), and arguably pre-dates the
Fourteenth Amendment in an opinion written by Justice Miller in Crandall v.
Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868). Indeed, one suspects that Justice Miller's
inclusion of the "National character" of the federal government as a source of
national privileges, followed immediately by citation to Crandall, was itself an
attempt to further justify his creation of rights not based on specific text in
Crandall, and moor that approach to the subsequently enacted Fourteenth
Amendment. In Slaughter-House, Miller also posits a version of the right to travel
in the right of a United States citizen to "become a citizen of any State of the
Union by a bonafide residence therein." Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at
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Wildenthal advocates this moderation as a selling point of his
approach."8 He admits that his view errs "on the side of conservative
textualist principles in a way that would not upset, as the Amendment's
opponents feared, the fundamental federal-state balance of power."89 He
further acknowledges the possibility that the framers of the Amendment, or
at least some of them, intended the clause to create a wide range of
unenumerated rights, much as Justice Bradley argued in dissent.9"
Wildenthal contends, however, that his incorporationist-only reading of the
Clause is more closely tied to the constitutional text, and that the Court's
effort to avoid "an untrammeled nationalist interpretation" of the Amend-
ment was consistent with many contemporaries, including those in
Congress, who did not want to significantly alter the federal-state bal-
ance.
9 1
B. Misreading the Fourteenth Amendment and its History
The problem with the reinterpreted, incorporationist view of Slaughter-
House is that it overlooks historically significant variations for determining
the content of the Privileges or Immunities Clause beyond the Bill of
Rights: the natural rights theory of many Framers of the Amendment and
the role for Congress under Section Five. Revisionists largely dismiss the
former and ignore the latter.
As to the first point, there is significant evidence that many of the
framers of the Amendment who drafted and debated the Privileges or
Immunities Clause intended to have it include natural rights concepts. This
80. As Douglas Smith has pointed out, the Court in Saenz was really doing nothing
new in identifying the right to travel as a privilege of citizenship. See Smith, A
Return to First Principles?, supra, at 317-19. On Saenz generally, see Lawrence
H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges orImmunities Revival Portend
the Future-Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARv. L. REv. 110
(1999).
88 Wildenthal argues that the Supreme Court will eventually need to address
some of the as yet unincorporated rights of the Bill of Rights (and may even re-
think some currently incorporated rights), and that the Court's determination of the
basis for incorporation will make a difference in the outcome of these decisions.
Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra note 4, at 1056. See also Wildenthal, The
Road to Twining, supra note 62, at 1525-30 (discussing the Court's long
acceptance of the basic incorporation of most of the Bill of Rights).
8' Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra note 4, at 1066-67.
90Id. at 1112.
91 Id. at 1112-13, 1170-72.
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position has been well documented elsewhere,92 and I will only summarize
the argument here. First, the drafters and supporters of the Amendment
often spoke of broad, natural rights concepts. Representative Bingham, the
primary drafter of Section One of the Amendment, stated that the Amend-
ment would enable the people of the nation "to protect by national law the
privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn
rights of every person within its jurisdiction" and that the privileges and
immunities "include, among other privileges, the right ... to be protected
in life, liberty, and property."
93
Senator Howard, who presented the Amendment to the full Senate on
behalf of the Joint Committee that drafted the Amendment, set forth the
clearest, most elaborate definition of the Clause. In doing so he included
the rights listed in the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights, a point
often made by advocates of incorporation, but he also stated that such rights
were non-exhaustive because privileges and immunities "are not and cannot
be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature."94 This at the very
least indicates that Howard did not view the Clause as limited to the Bill of
Rights. More significantly, Howard began his explication of the definition
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause by reading a long passage from
92 JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUITY UNDER LAW 209-39 (1965) (revised edition of
THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951)); Daniel A.
Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment,
1 CONST. COMMENT. 235 (1984); Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism,
supra note 82, at 890-95; Douglas G. Smith, Natural Law, Article IV, and Section
One of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 351 (1997) [hereinafter
Smith, Natural Law]; Douglas G. Smith, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2: Precursor ofSection 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 809, 881 (1997) [hereinafter Smith, The Privileges and Immunities
Clause]. For one of the more extensive statements of the natural rights foundation
of congressional power during reconstruction, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1119 (1865) (statement of Rep. Wilson). See also sources cited and discussed
in Robert J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and
Civil Rights After the Civil War, 92 AM. HISTORICAL REV. 45, 48 n.10 (1987)
[hereinafter Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew] and Kaczorowski,
Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 82, at 878 n.58.
93 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep.
Bingham). For an excellent presentation of Bingham's views, see Richard L.
Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE
L.J. 57 (1993) [hereinafter Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham]. See also
Richard L. Aynes, The Antislavery and Abolitionist Background of John A
Bingham, 37 CATH. U.L. REV. 881 (1988).
94 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Howard).
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Corfield v. Coryell.95 In that case, as quoted by Howard, Justice Washing-
ton, riding circuit, interpreted the definition of privileges and immunities
under Article IV, Section Two of the Constitution.96 Significantly, the
framers of the analogous clause in the Fourteenth Amendment frequently
referred back to Article IV and particularly to Justice Washington's
discussion of privileges and immunities. The importance of the quote for
the purposes of interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, however, lies
primarily in Senator Howard's use of it to explain the similar language of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In Corfield, Justice Washington set
forth "fundamental" privileges belonging "of right to the citizens of all free
governments," and gave an illustrative list that goes well beyond (and does
not itself include) the Bill of Rights. There is certainly good reason to view
Washington's definition as based in natural rights,97 and even better reason
9 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
96 According to Justice Washington, the Privileges and Immunities Clause
encompassed:
"[T]hose privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental;
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which
have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which
compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and
sovereign. What these fundamental rights are, it would perhaps be more
tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all compre-
hended under the following general heads: Protection by the government;
the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety;
subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly
prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one
state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for purposes of trade,
agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the
writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the
courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or
personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid
by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the
particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced
by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which
may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the
laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised. These, and
many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges
and immunities."
Id. at 551-52.
97 Compare HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE
UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 1835-1875, at 407 (1982)
(referring to the "natural law catalog" of Corfield) and TRIBE, supra note 24, §§
2002-2003]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
to think that the use of the Corfield quote to define the Fourteenth
Amendment version of privileges and immunities was meant to illustrate
the far-ranging, natural rights meaning of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause itself. While the precise application of these Corfieldian rights to
particular cases remains difficult (e.g., does Justice Washington's
invocation of the rights of life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of
happiness encompass the anti-monopoly, free labor position of the
dissenters in Slaughter-House?), it becomes hard to argue that Senator
Howard would have supported a Bill-of-Rights-only limitation to the
Privileges or Immunities Clause. Moreover, Howard's characterization was
not challenged in the Senate or the House, indicating that his definition
should carry some interpretive weight. 8
These two statements are supported by repeated references in the
debates to both Corfield and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV. As David Farber and John Muench have argued, fundamental
rights were the cornerstone of what the framers were protecting with the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and Reconstruction legislation.9
Natural law provided a wellspring for many anti-slavery Republicans both
before the Civil War and during the framing of the Thirteenth
Amendment.' 0 Farber and Muench also perceptively note that the
Republican rhetoric shifted after the War to an emphasis on the rights of
national citizenship, but that this rhetoric was itself based on the same
14-13 ("Corfield can best be understood as an attempt to import the Natural Rights
doctrine into the Constitution by way of the Privileges and Immunities Clause...")
with Fox, supra note 24, at 480-84 (suggesting that Justice Washington's
limitations on the rights listed in Corfield rendered the fundamentalness of those
rights rather thin). Ultimately, the most significant aspect of Corfield is not how
one should properly read Justice Washington, but how the framers of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments read the case and implemented their own
interpretation through the Amendments and enforcing legislation. See, e.g., CURTIS,
No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 24, at 114-15; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra,
at 407, 435. Cf EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 106-09 (1990) [hereinafter MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS]. My
own view is that some framers believed Corfield supported federalized natural
rights. But cf Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 24, at 651
(arguing that "fundamental" as used in Corfield and by the framers referred to
constitutional, not natural, rights).
98 See AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 24, at 167-87; CURTIS, NO STATE
SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 24, at 91.
99 See Farber & Muench, supra note 92.
'00 Id. at 246-59.
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natural law principles that had inspired the Thirteenth Amendment;
American citizenship inherently encompassed natural rights principles.''
Newsom tries to deflect this position by asserting that the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to include natural rights as
privileges and immunities ofnational citizenship. Newsom relies primarily
on Professor Maltz's study of this issue, 2 yet Newsom misconstrues both
the framers and Professor Maltz. Newsom, citing Maltz, posits that the
refusal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen (drafted the Amendment) to
endorse the proposal of reformer Robert Dale Owen, which referred to
"civil rights," combined with the eventual congressional agreement on
Representative Bingham's "Privileges or Immunities" phrasing, indicates
that Corfieldian state-based civil rights Were not part of the federal
Privileges or Immunities. Newsom argues that "civil rights" must have been
understood to include natural rights in a way that "Privileges or Immuni-
ties" did not. But Maltz does not attribute the change to such a singular
cause. Maltz does say that "the Bingham substitute must have been aimed
at a narrower class of rights than the Owen proposal."'0 3 This conclusion
is based on Maltz's careful dissection of the voting patterns of the Joint
Committee and his evaluation of their political leanings. While his analysis
carries weight, it remains speculative since, as he admits, there is no record
of the discussion of the Joint Committee to confirm or reject a
hypothesis."° Moreover, Maltz himself does not argue that the Privileges
or Immunities formulation clearly rejected Corfieldian rights. By "narrower
class of rights," Maltz refers primarily to the fact that civil rights might
have included voting rights, whereas Privileges or Immunities did not.'
Maltz also mentions that Privileges or Immunities would likely have been
taken to encompass "fundamental" rights, although "fundamental" was
" ld. at 262. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1865) (state-
ment of Sen. Trumbull) (responding to President Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights
Bill, Sen. Trumbull argued that the Bill protected "inherent, fundamental rights
which belong to free citizens or free men in all countries .... The right of
American citizenship means something.").
102 Newsom, supra note 3, at 699-700.
103 Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise-
Section One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933,964
(1984) [hereinafter Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment] (emphasis added). For the
Journal of the Joint Committee, see BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 37-129 (1914) (1969, Negro
University Press).
104 Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 103, at 949-50.
"o5 Id. at 967.
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probably more narrow than "civil" (again, because of the non-inclusion of
voting rights). Ultimately, Maltz confirms the point that there was
uncertainty within Congress about what the phrase "privileges and
immunities" did encompass; he does not go so far as to contend that
Corfieldian rights were off the table. 6 When put alongside the evidence
that some members of Congress did see the Clause as encompassing
Corfieldian rights, Newsom's analysis on this point seems rather weak. 7
A natural rights reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause also
receives potential support from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, passed over
President Johnson's veto, and simultaneous with the drafting of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As mentioned above, Congress drafted the
Fourteenth Amendment in part to give constitutional legitimacy to the Civil
Rights Act. That Act declared that all citizens of the United States (defined
by birth):
'06 Cf MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 97, at 107 (Corfield was one of the
sources used by framers of the Privileges or Immunities Clause); id. at 114-15
(noting that Senator Howard defined privileges or immunities as both the Bill of
Rights and "fundamental" rights, and that Representatilve Bingham sometimes
linked privileges and immunities to natural rights and sometimes to the Bill of
Rights); id. at 118-20 (framers had particular desire to remove the right to vote
from privileges and immunities concepts).
107 Newsom also presents a misleading interpretation of Representative
Bingham's vote against the Civil Rights Bill. Newsom argues that Bingham's vote
against the Bill was based in part on his fear that the Bill would grant too much
power in the federal government. Newsom, supra note 3, at 700 n.276. Newsom
even goes so far as to equate Bingham's simultaneous endorsement of the
Fourteenth Amendment and rejection of the Civil Rights Bill as support for Justice
Miller's views in Slaughter-House. Id. This is curious, considering that Bingham
voted in favor of the re-enactment of the Civil Rights Act in 1870, a re-enactment
which occurred in part to meet Bingham's main concern in 1866 that the
Fourteenth Amendment itself was necessary to grant Congress the power to enact
the Civil Rights Bill. 41st Cong., 2d Sess. (May 27, 1870) (House vote over final
version of Enforcement Act containing Civil Rights Act). Bingham also enabled
the enactment of the 1866 Bill over Johnson's veto by pairing his vote to enable a
two-thirds majority override, despite his misgivings about its constitutionality.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1861 (1866). While it is not clear how far
Bingham would have wanted Congress or the Courts to go in enforcing a broad
natural rights theory under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, one cannot use
Bingham's opposition to the Civil Rights Bill as evidence of a no-natural rights
interpretation of that Clause. For a more plausible reading of Bingham's opposition
to the 1866 Act, as based on Bingham's belief that the Fourteenth Amendment was
necessary to give Congress the power to pass the act, see Aynes, On Misreading
John Bingham, supra note 93, at 72-73.
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shall have the same right in every-state and territory in the United States,
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,
and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstand-
ing. 108
Congress here enacted a national citizenship consisting of defined rights
and privileges. 109 The language of the Act leaves little doubt that Congress
was doing something other than enforcing the Bill ofRights under the guise
of citizenship rights: the subject rights included contract, property, and
court access, not the rights to bear arms, assemble, or speak. Since
Congress viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as enabling it to do the type
of things it had done in the Civil Rights Act, it is logical to see the Act as
being one particular instantiation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
There is admittedly room for debate over whether Congress understood this
Act to assert only a national privilege to equal treatment in relation to the
listed fundamental rights, or instead saw the particular fundamental rights
mentioned as themselves national privileges. The problem with Slaughter-
House revisionism, however, is that it tends to assume the equality-only
reading and ignores the evidence of a fundamental rights reading.
The Slaughter-House revisionists might reply that the Civil Rights Act
is self-evidently about equal treatment. Kevin Newsom, for instance, quotes
the act and asserts, with little discussion, that the fundamental rights
reading of Justice Field is plainly wrong."0 This being the case, there is no
need to consider equality as an additional citizenship privilege since it is
itself enumerated in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause."' This is a plausible reading of the Act, but it is not the only one.
The equality-only reading of the Act ignores important evidence that the
Act was intended to grant equality of something. That "something" was a
baseline of "white" rights, a guaranty of absolute rights as already
108 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
'09 See Fox, supra note 24, at 493-94; Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitu-
fionalism, supra note 82, at 884-90.
"0 Newsom, supra note 3, at 663. See also id. at 684-85.
"' For another example of the equality or antidiscrimination reading of the Act,
see MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 97, at 66-67. For a rejection of the equality-
only reading, see CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 24, at 72-73.
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evidenced by the rights whites possessed. Under this alternative reading,
mere equality was insufficient (and even meaningless and incomprehensi-
ble in a free society) without reference to some baseline of natural rights.
The Act did not state merely that blacks would have "whatever rights the
State chooses to grant to other persons," but instead that blacks (and all
other citizens) would have "the same right . . [to contract, property,
security, etc.] as is enjoyed by white citizens... ."12 The rights were
already enjoyed by whites because they were natural rights; whites were the
universalizing race. The white citizen had always been the standard for the
highest level of protection of these rights, and so long as popular govern-
ment existed, whites' political protections should ensure that whites would
not deny themselves these basic rights. Thus, stating the guaranty as one of
equality to whites was sufficient to secure those fundamental rights for
everyone." 3
112 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (emphasis added). The language "as is
enjoyed by white citizens" was added to the Bill in the House with little debate to
assist our interpretation. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115 (1865). A
similar point can be made by observing that the Act guaranteed the "full and equal
benefit of all laws or proceedings for security of person and property." See
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE" 371
(2000) [hereinafter CURTIS, FREE SPEECH]; Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges,
supra note 68, at 54; Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul
Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651, 683-84 (1979).
"13 Thus, Professor McConnell is not necessarily right to paraphrase the Act as
stating: "Ifa state provided these rights to its 'white citizens,' it had to provide the
'same right' to all citizens." See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947,958 (1995) [hereinafter McConnell,
Originalism]. There is no conditional "if' in the Act. It simply states that blacks
"shall have the same right [to contract, property, etc.]... as is enjoyed by white
citizens." I read this as mandatory, not conditional, language that assumes an
established right and commands equal access to that right. Professor McConnell's
paraphrase obviously indicates that he reads the language as conditional. For other
readings contrary to mine, see MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 97, at 66-67
(reading the language as McConnell later does, and also suggesting a political
benefit to the language as avoiding the necessity of federal definitions of rights);
Earl M. Maltz, The Constitution and NonracialDiscrimination: Alienage, Sex, and
the Framers'Ideal of Equality, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 251,265 (1990) [hereinafter
Maltz, The Constitution and Nonracial Discrimination] (use of "whites" was a
matter of convenience). Ultimately, I think it is unlikely that Republicans
attempting to combat the Black Codes would have considered the elimination of
fundamental rights such as contract to be consistent with the Act or basic
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This reading is also consistent with some evidence of what African-
Americans took to be the meaning of freedom and citizenship. As one
Union League convention in Alabama wrote:
[W]e claim exactly the same rights, privileges, and immunities as are
enjoyed by white men--we ask nothing more and will be content with
nothing less.... The law no longer knows white nor black, but simply
men, and consequently we are entitled to ride in public conveyances, hold
office, sit on juries and everything else which we have in the past been
prevented from doing solely on the ground of color.... 4
To these authors, privileges and immunities include all the things that make
people (or, in the gendered language and law of the period, men) participat-
ing and free citizens. At least some contemporaneous public understandings
of the Act included a baseline of affirmative natural (white) rights.
Several statements in the congressional debates support such a reading.
Senator Trumbull, when first discussing the possibility of civil rights
legislation in December 1865, stated upon the imminent adoption of the
Thirteenth Amendment:
If the information from the South be that the men whose liberties are
secured by it are deprived of the privilege to go and come when they
please, to make contracts and enforce contracts,. . . I shall introduce a bill
and urge its passage through Congress that will secure to those men every
one of these rights: they would not be freemen without them. It is idle to
say that a man is free who cannot go and come at his pleasure, who cannot
buy and sell, who cannot enforce his rights.' 15
Reconstruction principles simply because the elimination was universally applied.
(It should be noted that Professor McConnell, in the article discussed above, also
seems to take the view that the 1866 Act did protect the rights of contract, property,
etc. See McConnell, supra, at 999.) It should be clear that by emphasizing "white"
rights as a baseline, I see this Act as expanding rights for non-whites and
implementing natural rights, not limiting non-whites to a "lowest common
denominator" of rights. On this latter point, see Patricia Allan Lucie, White Rights
as a Modelfor Blacks: Or-Who 's Afraid of the Privileges or Immunities Clause?,
38 SYR. L. REv. 859 (1987).
..4 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 288 (1988) (citing Alabama Union League
Convention, Statement, ALABAMA STATE SENTINEL, May 21, 1867) (emphasis in
original).
115 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong, 1st Sess. 43 (1865). Trumbull echoed this
position in his response to Johnson's veto of the Bill several months later.
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Tellingly, Trumbull referred to the listed freedoms as "privileges" and
"rights." Senator Wilson took a similar view at that time, declaring that
Congress needed to ensure that the freed slave would be assured
that he can go where he pleases; work when and for whom he pleases; that
he can sue and be sued; that he can lease and buy and sell and own
property, real and personal; that he can go into the schools and educate
himself and his children; that the rights and guarantees of the good old
common law are his, and that he walks the earth, proud and erect in the
conscious dignity of a free man...."116
Such statements seem more consistent with viewing the Civil Rights
Act as securing already established natural rights than as establishing a
mere equality that would permit the equal denial of the rights described as
essential to freedom. It is also consistent with the Republican view that
these rights were fundamental to freedom and that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, by securing freedom for former slaves, enabled Congress to pass the
Civil Rights Act. To read the Act as a guaranty of equality without any
such baseline would be to ignore the basic ideals of freedom embodied by
the Thirteenth Amendment." 7
The natural rights reading of the Civil Rights Act, like that same
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, must confront the problem of the
variety of laws and rights as applied to whites (let alone to other races)
existing from state to state in 1866. If the right to buy and sell property is
a natural right, what basis is there for differences in the rules and proce-
dures governing the rights? The response to this problem is that natural
11 6d. at 111. See also id. at 91 (Sen. Sumner discussing and comparing Russian
emancipation of serfs); Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 437,476 (1989).
"7 See, e.g., Hyman & Wiecek, supra note 97, at 301 ("The right Ameri-
cans-white Americans, at least-enjoyed the opportunity to enter into almost
limitless civil relationships, and to gain or lose from these involvements was
considered a precious right. This right underlay what Republicans meant by free
labor."). On ideals of freedom and the drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment, see
generally VanderVelde, supra note 116. For interesting recent explorations of the
Thirteenth Amendment as a source for constitutional law before the revitalization
of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 1950s, see Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth
Amendment and the Lost Origins of CivilRights, 50 DUKE L.J. 1609 (2001); James
Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and
the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-195 7, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(2002).
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rights never exist without particularization. Such particularization would
necessarily differ in various jurisdictions, but so long as the differences
were ones of procedure and mechanics, and not an outright denial of the
right, the differences were permissible. William Nelson argues that
Republicans who advocated a fundamental rights theory of the Fourteenth
Amendment took a similar position. For example, Nelson cites Senator
Edmunds who, when discussing the Fourteenth Amendment during the
debates over the Fifteenth, stated that "[e]very lawyer knows... that it is
one thing to have a right which is absolute and inalienable, and it is another
thing for the body of the community to regulate ... the exercise of that
right."'s" Ultimately, the argument that the effectuation of rights may differ
across jurisdictions is not itself sufficient to counter the evidence that many
framers believed that fundamental rights exist and were encompassed by
the Civil Rights Act or the Fourteenth Amendment.
My point here is not so much to establish that a natural rights reading
is superior, but to demonstrate that such a reading-which Justices Bradley
and Field pressed in Slaughter-House--had significant support and was
within the range of understandings of the drafters and their contemporaries.
By adopting Miller's reading of the Amendment, the revisionists adopt a
misreading of the framers' intent that improperly converts a complex and
ambiguous record into a simple declaration of equality and an almost
mechanical incorporation of the Bill of Rights. As Professor Nelson has so
aptly written, "[o]nly one historical conclusion can therefore be drawn:
namely, that Congress and the state legislatures never specified whether
section one [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was intended to be simply an
equality provision or a provision protecting absolute rights as well."'"19
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 also exposes the second omission of
Slaughter-House revisionism: the scope of congressional powers under
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Act not only addressed
equality of fundamental rights, it also asserted congressional power to
118 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 120 (1988) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong.,
3d Sess. 1003 (1869)). Nelson seems agnostic on the question of whether such an
argumentjustifies anything beyond a legal requirement of equality; he does observe
that it could have greater force in supporting the use of congressional powers under
Section Five. Id. at 121-24. It is important to note that this argument in favor of
local variation of rules was also used to justify the exclusion of women from the
fundamental rights protections of the Amendment. See id. at 119-20 (discussing
speech of John Bingham, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1865)).
" 9 Id. at 123.
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legislate on issues of national citizenship. In debates over the Act,
Representative Wilson argued in favor of congressional protection of
fundamental rights (security, liberty, and property): "Whatever these great
fundamental rights are, [Congress] must be invested with the power to
legislate for their protection or our Constitution fails in the first and most
important office of government." 20 Senator Sherman had earlier asserted
that the rights eventually embodied in the Civil Rights Bill were essential
to liberty under the Thirteenth Amendment, and that the Amendment was
both "a guarantee of liberty to every inhabitant of the United States," and
"an express grant of power to Congress to secure this liberty."'' President
Johnson, in vetoing the Bill, argued that:
In all our history, in all our experience as a people living under Federal
and State law, no such system as that contemplated by the details of this
bill has ever before been proposed or adopted. They establish for the
security of the colored race, safeguards which go infinitely beyond any
that the General Government has ever provided for the white race. In fact,
the distinction of race and color is, by the bill, made to operate in favor of
the colored and against the white race. They interfere with the municipal
legislation of the States, with the relations existing exclusively between
a state and its citizens, or between inhabitants of the same State-an
absorption and assumption of power by the General Government which,
if acquiesced in, must sap and destroy our federative system of limited
power, and break down the barriers which preserve the rights of the
States. It is another step, or rather stride, toward centralization and the
concentration of all legislative power in the national Government.1
22
The battle lines were set. Proponents of the Bill argued that Congress
had the power to legislate over fundamental rights, at least to the extent of
enforcing equality of those rights, while opponents argued that such
fundamental rights were the exclusive province of the States, even on the
question of equality. Indeed, the subsequent debate over the ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment, the question of congressional power-
120 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1865). Senator Trumbull also
asserted that the second clause of the Thirteenth Amendment was designed to
enable Congress to secure the rights of freedom (contract, property, etc.) for the
freed slaves. See id. at 43.
"IoId. at 41.
122 CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1681 (1866) (message of President
Johnson).
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especially congressional power over the topics contained in Section
One-raised some of the strongest concerns for southern whites who
rejected the Amendment. 23 When southern white governors proposed an
alternative Fourteenth Amendment they adopted much of the substantive
language of Section One of the amendment being considered for ratifica-
tion, but omitted any congressional enforcement power, indicating a
fundamental concern with the enforcement of Section One and not with its
general principles (which the governors presumably believed they and their
legislators could implement as they saw fit).1
24
123 Arkansas's legislature rejected the Fourteenth Amendment. It was Arkan-
sas's position that "the great and enormous power sought to be conferred on
Congress by the amendment, by giving to that body authority to enforce by
appropriate legislation the provisions of the first article of said amendment, would,
in effect, take from the States all control over their local and domestic concerns,
and virtually abolish to States." See Arkansas Legislature Resolution of Dec. 10,
1866, reprinted in 1 WALTER L. FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECON-
STRUCTION: POLITICAL, MILITARY, SOCIAL, RELIGIOUS, EDUCATIONAL AND
INDUSTRIAL, 1865-1906, at 236-37 (1966). See also JAMES E. BOND, NO EASY
WALK TO FREEDOM: RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 236-37 (1997) (opposition of white Georgians to congressio-
nal powers).
124 Southern Governors' Proposal for Fourteenth Amendment, reprinted in
FLEMING, supra note 123, at 238. The southern governors' proposed substitute for
Section One was:
Section 3. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the States
in which they reside, and the Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States. No State
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
Id. at 240. This proposal parroted much of the actual Fourteenth Amendment,
including the Citizenship Clause. Interestingly, it substituted a version of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV (itself rewritten to substitute
"citizens of the several States" for "citizens in the several States") for the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, indicating, perhaps,
some fear that the Fourteenth Amendment version went farther in asserting
national, as opposed to state-based, privileges and immunities. The change in the
Article IV language was the same rewriting employed by Justice Miller in
Slaughter-House and, in Miller's case, arguably was intended to avoid any
implication of general, or national, citizenship privileges. See TRIBE, supra note 24,
§ 15-2; Aynes, Constricting the Law ofFreedom, supra note 24, at 636. Indeed, as
Dean Aynes has shown, Miller apparently supported the Southern, Johnsonian
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The congressional responses to Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Bill
are also instructive, since they reflect the Congress' understanding of the
basis of their power when they took the (at that time) extraordinary step of
overriding the veto. Senator Trumbull responded to Johnson's veto message
with an argument common among Reconstruction Republicans: no state
ever has the right to deny civil rights to people on the basis of color, and
federal legislation that protects such rights does not interfere with the
legitimate exercise of state sovereignty.'25 He also argued that the
Thirteenth Amendment's enforcement provision granted Congress the
power "to do whatever is necessary to protect the freedman in his
liberty[.]"' 26 Senator Stewart repeated this argument based on the Thir-
teenth Amendment, and observed that while he hoped the States would take
care of such essential matters on their own, Congress unquestionably had
the power to act as well.'27 While these statements indicate a range of
understandings about the powers of Congress, from protecting equal
treatment in basic rights to protecting liberty, broadly construed, they also
demonstrate that the Congress, which drafted the Fourteenth Amendment,
understood itself to possess power over the stuff of citizenship, and the
power to explore what that stuff would be.'28
That this "stuff' of citizenship might well mean more than mere
equality and the Bill of Rights becomes evident through the even broader
context of congressional actions in the first half of 1866. The Civil Rights
Act was not the only use of congressional power to promote national
alternative that de-fanged the Amendment. See Aynes, Constricting the Law of
Freedom, supra note 24, at 660 n.228.
125 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1761 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Trumbull).
126 Id. at 1759. Trumbull's statement responding to President Johnson echoed
his position just prior to passage of the Thirteenth Amendment that the Amendment
gave Congress power to secure basic civil rights: "These [freedom of movement,
freedom to buy and sell, freedom of contract] are rights which the first clause of
the constitutional amendment meant to secure to all; and to prevent the very cavil
which the Senator from Delaware suggests today, that Congress would not
have power to secure them, the second section of the amendment was added." Id.
at 43.
...Id. at 1785 (1866) (statement of Sen. Stewart). See also id. at 1835 (1866)
(statement of Rep. Lawrence) ("The Constitution declares these civil rights to be
inherent in every citizen, and Congress has power to enforce the declaration.").
12' On the importance to the Reconstruction Era of the concept of citizenship
generally and the Citizenship Clause in particular, see generally Jack M. Balkin &
Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV.
1045,1094-1102 (2001); Fox, supra note 24, at 489-545; Zietlow, supra note 6.
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citizenship at the time Congress drafted the Fourteenth Amendment.
Congress also enacted legislation further defining and supporting the
Freedmen's Bureau. Indeed, the Civil Rights Bill was originally part and
parcel of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill.'29 The Bureau had been established
in 1865 to assist newly freed slaves and war refugees. The first version of
the Reauthorization Act, which passed in 1866, demonstrated Congress'
further support for what was essentially poor relief, health, and educa-
tion programs for a significant population in the South, primarily recently
freed African-Americans. 3 ° Johnson vetoed this legislation (shortly
before his veto of the Civil Rights Bill) on the grounds that it usurped
states' exclusive powers and favored a particular class (blacks).' John-
son's objection to the usurpation of state powers was probably on stronger
ground with regard to the Freedmen's Bureau than the Civil Rights
Bill, since the Bureau acted directly on citizens in areas traditionally
reserved to state and local governments (poor relief, health, education),
rather than simply requiring the states to enforce equality. Nonetheless,
Congress reconfigured the Act and overrode another veto in order to
continue the activities of the Bureau. It did so with an explicit connection
of this direct federal assistance program to the concept of national
citizenship.'32
The Slaughter-House revisionists do not address the significance of
Congress' support for the Bureau as a way of fully understanding the
Citizenship and Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, yet it is important evidence that Congress had already begun
enforcing its own concepts of citizenship at the time it was drafting and
129 CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 24, at 57. Akhil Amar has
aptly characterized them as siblings. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 24,
at 260.
130 See EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 72 (1871) (reprinting the
Freedmen's Bill of March 2, 1866, which was vetoed and not re-enacted).
'1' 8 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 3596
(John D. Richardson ed., 1897).
132 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 173, 174 (1868) (purpose of the act was to enable
recipients ofaid "to become self-supporting citizens of the United States," and help
them in the freedom guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment). On the Freedmen's
Bureau, see generally FONER, supra note 114, at 68-70, 142-70. For a collection
of the scholarship on the Bureau, see THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND BLACK
FREEDOM (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1994), including the reprint of John and La
Wanda Cox's 1953 article General 0. 0. Howard and the 'MisrepresentedBureau'
at page 105. See also Fox, supra note 24, at 523-36.
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proposing the Fourteenth Amendment. '33 The Bureau and its supporting Act
can, I believe, help us understand the Fourteenth Amendment in two ways.
First, it further shows that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
were willing to employ congressional enforcement powers to enter spheres
"traditionally" reserved to the states. As was true with the Civil Rights Act,
members of Congress understood the Thirteenth Amendment as granting
the power to create and support the Freedmen's Bureau and its activities.
3 4
The Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment was seen as
empowering Congress to maintain an administrative apparatus to provide
subsistence and enable freedom for African Americans.
While the Freedmen's Bureau Act does demonstrate a congressional
willingness to act in areas usually within the exclusive powers of the states,
in some respects it did not go so far as the Civil Rights Act. The Civil
Rights Act applied by its terms to all states and without any time limitation.
The Freedmen's Bureau Act contained significant limits on its jurisdiction,
in particular the Bureau was expressly restricted to acting in former
Confederate states and only for a limited period.' For this reason some
congressmen, including John Bingham, did not view the Bureau Act with
the same concerns for over-reaching congressional powers as they did the
Civil Rights Act.'36 On the other hand, President Johnson, in his veto of the
Act, was greatly concerned that it interfered with the exclusive powers of
the states over matters of poor relief, education, and other areas.'37 For
these reasons, the Bureau Act is more revealing for the types of provisions
seen as essential to national citizenship than for a clear statement about
congressional powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, the Bureau was seen as helping to bring people into freedom
and citizenship, and the objects of its activities were the essentials of
133 A few scholars have explored the meanings the Freedmen's Bureau lends to
the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 24,
at 260-62 (Freedmen's Bureau Act as evidence of incorporation of individual rights
version of Second Amendment); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the
Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985).
134 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43, 77, 322 (1865) (statement of
Sen. Trumbull); id. at 2773 (statement of Rep. Eliot). The Bureau had originally
been based in the War Powers, but ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment
provided additional footing for their congressional action.
13' Freedmen's Bureau Act § 1, 13 Stat. 507, § 1, 14 Stat. 173 (1866).
136 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong, 1st Sess. 1291-92 (1866) (Rep. Bingham). See
also Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham, supra note 93, at 72-73.
"' 8 A COMPILATION OFTHEMESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra
note 131, at 3596.
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citizenship. 3 ' Ideas of freedom were intricately entwined with ideas of
citizenship, since American citizens were seen as a free people. Poor relief
was important because severe destitution prevented people from being free
citizens capable of labor and self-support.'39 Medical services were also
central to the congressional vision of the relief of destitution. 4 ' Education
was central to enable people to be participating citizens, from the polls to
the labor market.' And access to the courts was central for citizens to be
able to enforce those citizenship rights deemed fundamental and identified
by both the Freedmen's Bureau Act and the Civil Rights Act.'42 None of
these areas contained in the Bill of Rights, yet the Reconstruction Congress
deemed them important enough to establish unprecedented federal
involvement through the Bureau in spheres traditionally reserved to the
state. At the very least, the congressional support for the Bureau indicates
a recognition within Congress that some basic level of health, education,
and welfare was necessary for the full exercise of the privileges and
immunities of citizenship.
When looked at in light of the Civil Rights Act and the Freedmen's
Bureau, it becomes much more difficult to limit the constitutionalization of
United States citizenship and its privileges and immunities or to restrict
congressional powers to enforce those privileges and immunities to the Bill
of Rights alone. The framers of the Amendment were exploring a variety
of means of creating citizenship and preserving privileges and
immunities.'43 To restrict our own view of the Privileges or Immunities
138 1 have explored this elsewhere. See Fox, supra note 24, at 523-36.
' 39 See id. at 529-30 (Senator Trumbull's views on poverty relief and the Freed-
men's Bureau); id. at 542-45 (Republican's views on destitution relief more
broadly).
" See, e.g., Freedmen's Bureau Act, § 5, 14 Stat. 173, 174 (1868) (the portion
of the Act reauthorizing the Bureau).
141 On education and the Freedmen's Bureau, see Paul A. Cimbala, Making
Good Yankees: The Freedmen's Bureau and Education in Reconstruction Georgia,
1865-1870, in THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND BLACK FREEDOM at 57 (Donald G.
Nieman ed., 1994), reprinting 29 ATLANTA HISTORICAL J. 5 (1985). See generally
JACQUELINE JONES, SOLDIERS OF LIGHT AND LOVE: NORTHERN TEACHERS AND
GEORGIA BLACKS 1865-1873 (1980). The 1866 reauthorization of the Bureau
expressly supported educational activities. See 14 Stat. 173, 176 (§§ 12-13).
142 See, e.g., 14 Stat. 173, 176 (§ 14).
'43 One could add to this the Republican Party's more limited actions to promote
education through the 1862 Morrill Act and its 1866 extension to the Southern
states, and to broaden property ownership through the land distribution policies of
the Homestead Acts of 1862 and 1867. On these matters, see ROGERS SMITH, CML
IDEALS 277-78, 320-21 (1997); FONER, supra note 114, at 246.
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Clause to the reinterpreted version of Slaughter-House would be to ignore
both historical evidence and future potential.
C. Reading the Fourteenth Amendment
If the Slaughter-House revisionists are indeed taking us down an
unnecessary path that obscures other possibilities, what are those possibili-
ties? If their Bill-of-Rights-only approach to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is not the best way to read the Clause, then what is? Do we
necessarily adopt the no-holds-barred, freedom-of-contract/free labor
perspective of the dissents in Slaughter-House, or is there some middle
ground reasonably consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment and the
background of its adoption?
Michael Kent Curtis has recently explored this question. Professor
Curtis has performed much of the scholarly hard labor over the past two
decades to show that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was meant to
incorporate the Bill of Rights; he has continued to demonstrate this in two
recent articles on the Clause.'" Although Curtis does not himself adopt the
revisionist view of Slaughter-House, his efforts to demonstrate an intent to
incorporate the Bill of Rights through the Privileges or Immunities Clause
have an outcome similar to that of the Slaughter-House revisionists. 45 His
recent work, however, also addresses the question left open by the
revisionists: whether the Clause contains, or can contain, somethingbeyond
incorporation.
In his 1996 work, Curtis explores the debates over the Civil Rights Act
to determine what the intent might have been, both for that act and for the
related Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. 46 He concludes that
while the evidence supporting incorporation is fairly strong, the evidence
of whether protections beyond the Bill of Rights were included, or how
such federal rights and privileges would affect federalism, is far less
clear."'47 Indeed, Curtis' analysis indicates that some of the framers seem to
'"4See CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 24; Curtis, Resurrecting
the Privileges, supra note 68; Michael Kent Curtis, HistoricalLinguistics, Inkblots,
and Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States,
78 N.C. L. REv. 1071 (2000) [hereinafter Curtis, HistoricalLinguistics]. Curtis also
addresses some of these issues in his recent book on the history of free speech
protection. See generally CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 112, at 357-83.
"' Curtis seems to have been partially persuaded by Wildenthal's piece. See
Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note 144, at 1074 n. 15.
" Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges, supra note 68, at 36.
14 7 Id. at 37.
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have wanted contradictory goals: both the federal power to protect life,
liberty and property, and a continuation of state sovereignty over basic
legal rights such as property and contracts-a contradiction that Curtis
perceptively notes was understandable given the momentous and difficult
period of war and reconstruction. 41 Ultimately, Curtis concludes that, other
than-incorporation of the Bill of Rights, the main thrust of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was to secure equality of treatment with respect to
fundamental rights and privileges. Like the Slaughter-House revisionists,
Curtis sees his interpretation as respecting the framers' desire to balance
federal protection of rights with their simultaneous desire to preserve state
sovereignty.
149
Curtis is particularly weary of efforts to convert the Clause into a
broadsword for protection of economic rights a la the Lochner-Era.5 '
Curtis seems most concerned that the Court not assert the power to employ
a rationality review to overturn state laws. 5' This is arguably exactly what
the dissenters in Slaughter-House wanted to do, and some scholars view
those dissents as a foreshadowing of the Lochner demons.
5 2
While Curtis senses an appropriate caution with the project of
reinvigorating the judicial theories of the Slaughter-House dissents, his
concerns do not properly account for the legislative opposition to the
Court's interpretation. This focus on judicial interpretation and powers
tends to unnecessarily circumscribe the Privileges or Immunities Clause
and the Fourteenth Amendment. According to this view, limiting the
meaning of the clause to textually defined rights prevents a judicial
usurpation of constitutional authority that will bring back the ghosts of
41 Id. at 41-43.
'49 See, e.g., id. at 57, 68, 88-89. This analysis of Curtis admittedly takes him
a bit out of context. Curtis has been responding primarily to an argument that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause only establishes equality. The main proponents of
this view include John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1358 (1992), and to a lesser degree, NELSON, supra note
118. Curtis argues that the Clause does more, and that this something more clearly
includes incorporation of the Bill of Rights. He does not grapple directly with the
contention that the something more may also include fundamental rights beyond
establishing equality in treatment with respect to those rights.
150 See Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges, supra note 68, at 95-106.
'.' See Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note 144, at 1150.
132 See, e.g., KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND
MATERIALS at 370 (2d ed. 1996); Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges, supra note
68, at 85; Newsom, supra note 3, at 665; Wildenthal, How I Learned to Stop
Worrying, supra note 4, at 246.
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Lochner and perhaps threaten representative democracy itself. If the Court
can indiscriminately fashion reasons for overturning state laws, the greatest
political power will reside with the unelected judiciary.'53 This is true,
however, only if we allow that the Court is the sole actor. If only the Court
is allowed to declare what the Privileges or Immunities vessel contains,
then these criticisms are forceful. If, on the other hand, Congress has some
leeway in declaring and particularizing privileges and immunities, the
concern that the Clause will result in undemocratic political action
evaporates (although the concern for unbridled federal powers comes to the
fore).'54 The focus on judicial interpretive power distracts attention from
and implicitly devalues Congressional interpretive powers, which seems
odd in light of the affirmative grant of congressional power in Section Five
of the Amendment. 5 5 Ultimately, such a failure to credit the potential of
Section Five deprives the Fourteenth Amendment of its fundamental
'5 See, e.g., Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges, supra note 68, at 101.
154 Justice Breyer recently made a similar point in critiquing the Court's close
scrutiny of congressional action under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 383 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(" 'Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process ... have no
application to Congress.' Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,248 (1970) (Brennan,
White, and Marshall JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)").
"' At one point Curtis asserts that Republicans recognized the potential breadth
of Section Five's enforcement power and "feared that an excessively broad
definition of the interests protected by Section 1 would grant Congress equally
broad powers to preempt state legislation." Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges,
supra note 68, at 101-02. The implication here is that the framers preferred a
narrow definition of the Privileges or Inmmunities Clause to avoid excessive federal
powers. The problem with this view is that the framers also wanted to empower
themselves to act, as they had with the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Curtis, however,
also cites favorably the Enforcement Act of 1871 as a reasonable interpretation of
the state action aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment, and as an alternative to the
Court's interpretation in United States v. Cruikshank. Id. at 89-90. See also CURTIS,
FREE SPEECH, supra note 112, at 381-83. This argument seems to support the idea
that Congress was interpreting (interpretation being necessary to particularization
of broad rights) the Clause and since the interpretation was reasonable it should be
granted some respect (I purposely avoid the legally loaded term "deference,"
although in common usage that's what it is). See McConnell, Institutions and
Interpretation, supra note 6, at 184-94. For an argument that the framers did not
intend the state action language of Section One to limit congressional enforcement
of the Amendment against private actors under Section Five, see generally Laurent
B. Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against
Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964).
[VOL. 91
RE-READINGS AND MISREADINGS
revolutionary character. As one scholar of the ratification of the Amend-
ment recently stated, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment was revolutionary, not
because it redefined privileges and immunities to include the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights, but because it gave Congress the power to define and
therefore expand the Privileges and Immunities of citizenship...." , 56
Professor Curtis has also provided excellent historical analysis of the
original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Not only does
Curtis investigate a broad range of sources to try to determine the meaning
of the Clause, he also recognizes that original meaning is but one of several
sources of constitutional interpretation, albeit one he gives much weight.
For Curtis, it is possible to determine with reasonable confidence that the
terms "privileges" and "immunities," used in conjunction with "national
citizenship," were understood to encompass the Bill of Rights. He provides
extensive support for this position. Curtis appears reluctant to posit any
meanings for the phrases beyond the Bill of Rights, however, likely due to
lack of support or conflicts in the evidence. 57
Despite the strengths of Curtis' analysis, there are important criticisms
of this approach. First, assuming one is willing to explore the originalist
methodology used by Curtis, 58 it is possible that the vague words "privi-
156 BOND, supra note 123, at 255.
15'See generally Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note 144. See also Curtis,
Resurrecting the Privileges, supra note 68, at 24-25 ("The Fourteenth Amendment
did not create new privileges. It created a.new method of protecting old and
inadequately secured privileges [such as those in the First Amendment]."). Cf
Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 24, at 628 n.4 (framers did
not intend to create new substantive rights).
"' A note on originalism may be appropriate. The critique in the text operates
mostly within the context of an originalist or historical perspective. One might well
criticize the very project of applying originalism or any historical analysis to the
Fourteenth Amendment. It may be that we should not be bound by the understand-
ing of the framers and of Americans generally regarding what were national
privileges and immunities or congressional powers in 1866-68. This raises
theoretical issues that go beyond the scope of this paper. My own developing view
is that historical interpretations and investigations are relevant for us to understand
constitutional text and issues and to enrich our own interpretations and understand-
ings of the text, but that these historical studies are only one of many (and not
especially privileged) tools for us as modem interpreters. The problem of
conforming original understandings to modem interpretations is particularly
evident with the Fourteenth Amendment because it is fairly clear from the historical
record (at least as clear as the incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the
Privileges or Immunities Clause) that women were not to be included in the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, and especially not the Privileges or
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leges" and "immunities" were understood to be developed over time, and,
given Section Five's enforcement powers, that the development would be
at least in part by the Congress. That is, the original meaning of Section
Five was to allow Congress to supply future meaning to "Privileges or
Immunities." This is perhaps more likely in an era where Congress
repeatedly acted to protect the rights of American citizens within the states.
One of the purposes behind using broad language such as "Privileges or
Immunities," and including a power of congressional enforcement would,
under this analysis, be to permit Congress to develop privileges and
immunities through applications to particular events and circumstances,
perhaps unforeseeable to the drafters.'59 The framers were living through
Immunities Clause. See Ward Farnsworth, Women Under Reconstruction: The
Congressional Understanding, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1229 (2000); Maltz, The
Constitution and Nonracial Discrimination, supra note 113, at 266-82. Yet, few
people today would contend that such original meanings or intent should control
our modem interpretation of the Amendment. It seems to me that the best
explanation of this "exception" to originalism is to admit that historical explora-
tions are always being checked against modem sensibilities, cultural changes, and
moral advances. Cf RICHARDS, supra note 67, at 230-32 (discussing how we can
and should weave together text, history, and political theory in interpreting the
Privileges or Immunities Clause (and the Constitution generally)). As I mentioned
above, I think it is plausible that the framers of the Amendment "intended" to
permit these changes (and so might have accepted the fact that women would be
included within protections of the Clause in the late Twentieth Century even when
they rejected it in their own time); even if the framers did not so intend, however,
such changes are essential to any understanding of textual interpretation over time
in a constitutional context. Thus, I view our exploration of the historical back-
ground of the Amendment as important both in understanding the historical
perspective and context of the Amendment and Slaughter-House Cases, and in
reconceiving our current interpretation of the two; I do not believe, however, that
we are bound to understandings of the framing period. For a similar statement of
an historical approach, see Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges, supra note 68, at 4-
5.
19 The comments of Representative Dawes in 1871 during debates over the
Enforcement Act suggest such a theory:
"I talk of nothing but constitutional guarantees; I do not claim myself to be
able to comprehend their full measure and scope. As long as the American
citizen shall live under this flag and expanding his pursuits in his honest
endeavors, so long his constitutional guarantees will expand and grow with
him, and be equal to and cover every lawful enterprise and undertaking of
his within the limits of this Republic; and no man can define them upon
paper until they come up."
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 476 (1871).
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a period of rapid evolution in political and social views. The radical ideas
of small groups of abolitionists in the 1830s and 1840s had become the
dominant discourse in the halls of Congress by 1866.160 The right of
suffrage for black males, which would have been inconceivable in 1860,
and was deemed impossible in 1866, became reality in 1870. As Senator
Stewart said in explaining why he had moved during the five months of
congressional debate from opposing suffrage to supporting it: "The world
moves, and those who do not perceive it are dead to the living issues of the
day. I have always advocated the necessity of taking the world as we find
it, and following the logic of events. The development of new facts is
constantly exploding old theories., 16' To fix ideas as essential as the rights
and privileges of citizenship with particularity would have been to deny the
recent history of the country and the possibilities of future generations of
Americans and their congressional representatives. By employing broad
language (and notably not employing the particularized language of the
Civil Rights Act) the framers may well have wanted to allow for congres-
sional and social flexibility, even if that flexibility was not foreseeable to
them. 162
Second, even if one does not grant that the Enforcement Clause gives
Congress power to define the particulars of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, there is another consideration in favor of congressional powers to
define national privileges: the term itself had been understood to include
legislatively created rights and privileges. Curtis' analysis essentially
'60 See generally TENBROEK, supra note 92; CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note
112. See also Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew, supra note 92, at 49
(the movement of abolitionist theories on civil rights to the mainstream of
Republican thought "reveals the extent to which the Civil War radicalized
Americin politics").
161 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2799 (1866). For Stewart's state-
ments from January 1866 against black suffrage and in favor of "Anglo-Saxon"
rule, see id. at 298. Representative Patterson also observed the changing of
attitudes common at the time during the debates over the Thirteenth Amendment:
"The English definition of justice and liberty in the twelfth century is not the
definition of the nineteenth. Our interpretation of these terms in the future of our
history will vary with education and local prejudices." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong.,
2d Sess. 484 (1865).
162 See Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 82, at 925-
28. See also Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segrega-
tion Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 59-65 (1955); cf William W. Van Alstyne, The
Fourteenth Amendment, the "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-
ninth Congress, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 33, 77-78 (1965).
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restricts "privileges" to "natural" rights. 63 This is particularly puzzling
with respect to Curtis because he provides such a detailed examination of
the historical understanding of the terms."6
Many privileges were granted or created by antebellum state legisla-
tures. Statutorily granted privileges and immunities (and rights) were
attached to particular statuses. Corporations had privileges granted them by
legislative incorporation laws,'65 colleges obtained educational privileges
by statutory grants," inn and tavern keepers had privileges granted by
licenses, 167 and local governmental entities had township privileges
(historically related to corporate privileges). 68 Citizenship and residence
were also statuses to which certain privileges attached. As Justice Shaw
stated in the important fugitive slave case of Commonwealth v. Aves, "as
a general rule, all persons coming within the limits of a state, become
subject to all its municipal laws, civil and criminal, and entitled to the
privileges which those laws confer.... ,"69 Here, Shaw appears to base this
principle both on Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause and
163 Curtis, HistoricalLinguistics, supra note 144, at 1132-38; Curtis, Resurrect-
ing the Privileges, supra note 68, at 67-71.
164 See generally Curtis, HistoricalLinguistics, supra note 1 44. It is understand-
able, however, when one recalls that Curtis' focus is on demonstrating that the Bill
of Rights' guarantees were, at the very least, part of the understanding of
"privileges" and "immunities," regardless of whatever else one might decide the
terms included. Curtis recognizes that the term "privileges" and "immunities" had
other meanings but does not explore them in detail. See, e.g., id. at 1101 ("When
people [circa 1787] spoke of their invaluable privileges, it is not always clear
whether they referred to a common heritage of the American people, merely to
specific rights under state law, or to both"); id. at 1137 (some congressmen, such
as Senator John Sherman, believed that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
encompassed rights in addition to the Bill of Rights, including some common law
rights).
16' E.g., Anderson v. Brock, 3 Me. 243 (1825) (grants of privileges and
immunities of a corporate nature to religious groups); Old C. & F.R.R. Co. v.
County of Plymouth, 80 Mass. 155 (1859) (statutory privileges and immunities for
corporations).
' "E.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); Sage
v. Dillard, 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) 340 (1854).
167 E.g., Wason v. Severance, 2 N.H. 501, 502 (1822) (privilege of innkeeper
to sell liquor).
168 E.g., Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N.H. 284,292-93 (1858) (discussing grant of
privileges to towns and comparing them to corporate grants); Sewall v. Cargill, 15
Me. 414, 416 (1839).
169 Commonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. 193 (1836).
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general principles of law. Whatever the source, the point remains that a
state's laws grant privileges that attach to people present in the state by the
fact of their presence: the granting of privileges is one of the things that
statutes do. Indeed, the concept of granting privileges to citizens by state
legislatures is essential to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV.' If state legislatures were understood prior to the 1860s to be capable
of granting privileges, and if residence and citizenship were included in
those statuses to which certain statutory privileges obtained, then the
framers could have understood that the establishment of federal privileges
and immunities had, as one of its purposes, the empowerment of the
national legislature to grant privileges of national citizenship. 7'
The historic importance of legislative conferral of privileges and
immunities also counsels in favor of seeing Congress as a significant
interpreter of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The legislature has a
particular relationship with privileges and immunities, one arguably
different from its relationship to due process and equal protection. The text
170 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The issue in antebellum law under Article IV
was whether the particular privilege granted by a state statute or law was of a
category that also required non-discrimination against the exercise of the privileges
by out-of-staters. Justice Washington, in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (3230), held that only "fundamental" privileges were included
in this category.
17' The Supreme Court, in 1855, recognized that Congress possessed the power
to create "privileges and immunities" for ships entering ports. See Pennsylvania v.
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 435 (1855). See also Rich,
Privileges or Immunities: The Missing Link, supra note 6, at 244. Professor Rich
goes too far, I think, in concluding that this case involved privileges and immuni-
ties as related to national citizenship; the case does, however, reveal a general
understanding of the national legislative power to create privileges. See also Act
of 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 241 (congressional grants of privileges and immunities
to revenue officers). On antebellum federal cases implicitly supporting a broader
understanding of what constitutes privileges and immunities under Article IV, see
Rich, Privileges or Immunities: The Missing Link, supra note 6, at 240-49. To the
contrary of the position set forth above, Douglas Smith has argued that the
Privileges or Immunities Clause was not intended to encompass "special"
privileges such as those established by state incorporation laws, see Smith, The
Privileges and Immunities Clause, supra note 92, at 902-04. The Clause was
intended to cover a "closed set of privileges and immunities," see Smith, Natural
Law, supra note 92, at 395. Despite Smith's excellent work in uncovering the
origins of the Clause, I believe he takes insufficient account of Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment as a source for development of the privileges of citizen-
ship.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, notably, does not distinguish the enforce-
ment powers of Congress based on which specific language within the
amendment Congress would be enforcing. Nonetheless, of all the terms in
Section One, the Privileges or Immunities Clause seems the most apt for
congressional development. It calls for affirmative grants of privileges
based on determinations of what the community (national citizenship)
believes to be essential to its own existence. Far from being an illegitimate
assertion of congressional powers, expanded congressional powers to
implement the Privileges or Immunities Clause would seem democratically
more legitimate than judicial restraints on congressional powers that
require a tight fit between congressional action and the unelected judi-
ciary's determination of the privileges of citizenship.'72
Critics might likely respond that even if these two types of privi-
leges--fundamental and positive (or statutory)--existed in the 1860s, the
Privileges or Immunities Clause only addresses the fundamental privileges.
This could be consistent with the framers' citations to Justice Washington's
dicta in Corfield, where he emphasized that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV encompassed fundamental privileges, such as contract,
liberty of movement, property, etc., and not mundane privileges, such as
oystering..'7  Thus, the framers arguably intended the Privileges or
Immunities Clause to incorporate only the fundamental privileges, more
akin to natural rights, and not to empower Congress to create new
privileges.
Again, this is a reasonable reading of the text and context, but it is not
the only reasonable reading. Pushed to its conclusion, the argument proves
too much, because it would deny that Congress has any power to create
national privileges, which it plainly does have through its enumerated
powers in Article I. As Professor Rich has recently pointed out, Congress
may well use its Article I powers to create privileges of national citizen-
ship. 74 Interestingly, Justice Miller seems to have alluded to this. His
relatively restricted definition of the Clause in Slaughter-House included
privileges that "owe their existence to the Federal government, its National
character, its Constitution, or its laws."' None of the Slaughter-House
revisionists explore the possible import of Miller's inclusion of Congress'
172 Cf McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation, supra note 6, at 156.
7 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (1823).
1 Rich, Privileges or Immunities: The Missing Link, supra note 6, at 301.
7 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) (emphasis sup-
plied).
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"laws" in this definition of privileges and immunities; at the very least it
should mean those laws which are passed under the powers of Article I.
Professor Rich has also recently offered an alternative reading of the
Clause that captures both the fundamental rights concept and the positive
rights potential of congressionally granted rights and privileges. He argues
that the antebellum understanding of "privileges" included both natural or
fundamental rights and rights created by legislatures. 76 He contends that
this "two-tiered" structure of the term can be adapted to the national
political structure so that congressional statutes can, in some instances, be
deemed to grant national privileges. 77 While I have some reservations
about Rich's application of this insight, in particular with his unwillingness
to see the Fourteenth Amendment as an independent source for Congress
to create national privileges, 171 it seems to me essential to consider the point
that "Privileges or Immunities" was understood to include congressionally
created rights and privileges.
By concentrating on Slaughter-House and a revival of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as another route to incorporate the Bill of Rights, the
revisionists overlook this important background to the drafting of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Citizenship and Privileges or Immunities
Clauses. To a certain extent they are repeating Justice Miller's error in
refusing to address the Civil Rights Act as background for the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Like Miller, they take the Clause partially out of
context and drain it of the potential it had when drafted in 1866.179 The
176 Rich, Privileges or Immunities: The Missing Link, supra note 6, at 256.
177 Id. at 301.
'8Id. at 257.
' Wildenthal addresses this point by asserting allegiance to textualist inter-
pretive methodology. He views the Bill-of-Rights-only interpretation as more
consistent with the text and would not look farther for definitions of privileges and
immunities. Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra note 4, at 1170-72.
Newsom's position is more troubling. He argues that Justice Miller was a staunch
advocate of original intentjurisprudence, Newsom, supra note 3, at 696, yet cannot
adequately explain Miller's refusal to discuss the statements or activities of the
Congress that drafted the Amendments at issue. The closest he comes is to argue
as follows: first, that Miller had a general policy (not discussed in Slaughter-House
but supported by Newsom's research) of following original intent; second, that the
framers had an intent to incorporate the Bill of Rights but no intent to incorporate
other rights such as those mentioned in Corfield; and, third, that Miller could
therefore not have meant to exclude the Bill of Rights from the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. Id. at 696-703. This is another example ofNewsom's generous
reading of Miller's opinion. As discussed above, I think Newsom is wrong about
the second point. Moreover, it shows poor judicial and intellectual form consider-
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revisionists should be applauded for correcting many common mis-readings
of Slaughter-House. But by re-reading Slaughter-House's reading of the
1860s Amendments, the revisionists unfairly de-radicalize Reconstruction
and under-read the Fourteenth Amendment. The better source for divining
some potential meanings of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is not case
law from the 1870s, but the congressional and historical context of
Reconstruction itself.
ImI. RECONSTRUCTION AND THE
CONGRESSIONAL POWER OF INTERPRETIVE ENFORCEMENT
I remain agnostic on the question of whether the Privileges or
Immunities Clause was meant to (or should today be interpreted to) include
natural rights beyond those listed in the Bill of Rights and Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses. There is significant evidence that several framers
contemplated this, and, as mentioned above, this terrain has been well-
mapped by others. The more significant problem for me, and the one
frequently ignored by Slaughter-House revisionists and others who focus
on the Privileges or Immunities Clause, is the possibility of congressional
definition of specific privileges and immunities.80 Exploration of
ing that Justice Field explicitly took Miller to task for not discussing the Civil
Rights Act and not addressing Field's (and counsel's) argument that the original
intent ran against Miller's conclusions. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 91-
92 (Field, J., dissenting). Palmer similarly errs. He defends Miller's refusal to
address the Civil Rights Act by arguing that Miller, like some Republicans in
Congress, probably considered the Act unconstitutional and therefore irrelevant.
Palmer, supra note 4, at 756. The problem is that the Amendment was seen as
enabling enactment of the Civil Rights Act, and that the Civil Rights Act was re-
enacted in 1870, well before the Slaughter-House opinion. Miller could legiti-
mately have read the Act differently, but his failure to address it shows a refusal to
engage in constructive discourse about the intent of the framers of the Amendment.
If Newsom is correct that Miller valued original intent, such a refusal to engage in
the originalist discourse more likely means that Miller felt he would lose the
argument.
"I William Rich provides an important recent exception to this trend of
omission. Rich, Privileges or Immunities: The Missing Link, supra note 6. He
argues that Congress retains the power to create privileges through its Article I
powers. His focus then shifts to showing how the Fourteenth Amendment gives
backbone to certain types of Article I legislation and should overcome objections
to the legislation based on the Eleventh Amendment. See generally id. at 283-304;
Rich, Taking "Privileges or Immunities" Seriously, supra note 6. Michael Kent
Curtis has also explored post-1866 congressional actions, but with a predominant
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congressional actions during and after ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment are important for understanding how the Reconstruction
generation and Congress understood the role of the national legislature
under the Amendment. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 becomes especially
important here because it was debated simultaneously with the Court's
consideration of and decision in Slaughter-House; these debates reflect
congressional understandings of the Amendment, its Privileges or
Immunities Clause, and the Court's reading (or misreading) of the
Amendment.''
A. Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Principle of Interpretive
Enforcement"2
The most obvious evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment's
Enforcement Clause was intended to enable broad congressional actions
and interpretations of Section Five comes from the Civil Rights Act of
1866. As discussed above, the Act serves as evidence of the possible
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. This is because when
drafting Section One the framers were thinking, inter alia, of the things they
were protecting in the Civil Rights Act. They wanted the principles of the
Act raised to constitutional, supermajoritarian status.8 3 The Civil Rights
Act is a rich source for understanding the Fourteenth Amendment because
focus on the Bill of Rights and, to a lesser extent, state action. See CURTIS, No
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 24, at 154-70.
i81 My approach to using the post-1866 congressional actions to explore the
meaning of and possibilities for the Fourteenth Amendment is somewhat similar
to Professor McConnell's method in exploring originalism and segregated schools.
See McConnell, Originalism, supra note 113. His analysis focuses on segregated
schools, touching as necessary on broader questions. I concentrate on the broader
issues of the possible meanings of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the
range of congressional powers. My choice to explore congressional actions has
been influenced by McConnell's work as well as by the fine efforts of other
scholars. See, e.g., Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra note 4; Aynes,
Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 24, at 679-81; Kaczorowski, To
Begin the Nation Anew, supra note 92.
'2 On the concept of interpretive enforcement under Section Five, see generally
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation, supra note 6. Cf Jack Wade Nowlin,
The ConstitutionalIllegitimacy ofExpansive JudicialPower: A Populist Structural
Interpretive Analysis, 89 KY. L.J. 387, 447-48 (2000-2001).
183 In fact, the Civil Rights Act had achieved supermajoritarian status in
Congress because it was enacted with the two-thirds majority necessary to override
the Johnson veto.
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it also tells us the possible meaning of Section Five, as several commenta-
tors have argued." 4 The textual source for Section Five was Section Two
of the Thirteenth Amendment. The interpretive position that the drafters
took towards the Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment
strongly reveals their own ideas of what their powers were under Section
Five. It also served as notice to the states asked to ratify the Amendment of
just what powers they were establishing in Congress.'85
By its language, the Thirteenth Amendment eliminates "slavery and
involuntary servitude." It says nothing about the right to contract, rights to
hold property, rights of access to courts, or citizenship. Yet Congress found
the power to enact legislation guarantying these rights through its power to
enforce the Amendment. To do this Congress had to assume the power to
interpret the language of Section One to cover the topics encompassed by
the Civil Rights Act. Thus Senator Trumbull argued that the Amendment
gave Congress the power "to protect every person in the United States in
all the rights of person and property belonging to a free citizen."'8 6 The
interpretive argument was that the abolition of slaverymeant the establish-
ment of freedom, and the establishment of freedom meant the guaranty of
the rights to sue, contract, hold property, etc.'87 Congress was enforcing
Section One because it understood the anti-slavery language of Section One
broadly. One can argue about whether Congress' interpretation was right,
but it is beyond doubt that Congress was interpreting the language of
Section One. It would be odd indeed to think that, in structuring the
Fourteenth Amendment parallel to the Thirteenth, Congress did not think
Section Five of the Fourteenth granted it this power of interpretation.
It is also revealing to follow Congress' interpretive steps. We start with
the specific language of the Amendment: the end of slavery and involuntary
' See, e.g., Amar, Intratextualism ,supra note 6, at 823; Caminker, supra note
6, at 1158-65; Engel, supra note 70, at 141-45; Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs
in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 743, 754-55 (1998);
McConnell, Originalism, supra note 113, at 957-62.
85 Considering the clear importance of the Civil Rights Act for understanding
Section Five, the failure of any Justice--in the majority or the dissent--to address
the issue in Boerne reveals a parallel to Miller's opinion for the Court in Slaughter-
House, he conspicuously ignored the Act.
186 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1865). See also id. at 475 (1866)
(Trumbull argued that the Amendment granted Congress the power to "pass any
law which, in our judgment, is deemed appropriate, and which will accomplish the
end in view, secure freedom to all people in the United States.").
... See, e.g., id. at 41 (statement of Sen. Sherman); id. at 1118 (statement of
Rep. Wilson). See Engel, supra note 70, at 133. Cf Maltz, The Constitution and
Nonracial Discrimination, supra note 113, at 259.
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servitude. We then move, by interpretation of this specific language, to the
point that the end of slavery meant the establishment of freedom. Freedom,
however, is too broad a concept to have meaning in particular situations
without more legal development. Someone had to do the developing.
Congress, as the enforcing authority under the Amendment, was properly
authorized to fill the broad concept of freedom with the particularity
necessary for legal implementation and, ultimately, for the social reification
of freedom.
Rather than asking us to make the first interpretive step from the
specific to the general, as the Thirteenth Amendment does, the Fourteenth
Amendment starts with the general (Privileges or Immunities). Like the
concept of freedom, however, the phrase "privileges or immunities" is too
general for specific application without more legal analysis. Congress,
having the same enforcing power under the Fourteenth Amendment as it
does under the Thirteenth, would be the proper body to give the general
term its concrete meanings through legislation. By beginning with the
general concept, Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment is more
obviously drafted with an intent to require interpretive enforcement than
even the Thirteenth Amendment, upon which the Civil Rights Act was
based. Or said another way, it requires less interpretive work to derive
congressional power to interpret Privileges or Immunities from the
Fourteenth Amendment than it does to derive congressional power to pass
the Civil Rights Act from the anti-slavery language of the Thirteenth. Since
the Drafting Congress believed it had this power under the Thirteenth, it
must have believed it had the power under the Fourteenth.
Discussion of the congressional understanding of its powers to pass the
Civil Rights Act under the Thirteenth Amendment would be incomplete
without some mention of Representative Bingham's constitutional
objections to the Act. Bingham doubted that Congress had the power to
pass the Act under the Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Essentially he doubted the interpretive position discussed above. Thus, he
contended that the Fourteenth Amendment, which he was drafting, would
give Congress the power to pass the Act.88 Presumably this was so because
Section One's Privileges or Immunities Clause encompassed the rights
established in the Act. One could argue that such doubts about the
constitutionality of the Act in fact led to passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment,'89 and further that these doubts about the Thirteenth show that
188 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866); see also Aynes, On
Misreading John Bingham, supra note 93, at 72-73.
189 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYTHE JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFOR-
MATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 113-14 (1977).
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the interpretive powers assumed by Congress in passing the Act were not
to become part of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This argument founders in several respects. First, the vast majority of
the supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment also voted for the Act;
Bingham had doubts, others did not. Second, Bingham in fact did not vote
against the Act when Congress overrode the veto. Instead, he paired with
another representative and effectively avoided a vote. Third, it is entirely
possible for Bingham to have rejected the interpretive leaps involved in
deriving the Civil Rights Act from the Thirteenth Amendment and yet to
have approved (as he later would) of the congressional' interpretive power
over privileges or immunities. As discussed above, the interpretive leap is
greater when beginning with the more specific language of the Thirteenth
Amendment than it is when the starting point is the general language of the
Fourteenth. It seems entirely plausible that Bingham employed the general
language of privileges or immunities in Section One in part to avoid the
impediments to congressional interpretive powers that he identified in the
specific language of the Thirteenth Amendment.
B. Anti-Peonage Act and the Principle of Interpretive Enforcement
Even if we give significant interpretive weight to Bingham's concerns
about whether the Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment
permitted enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Thirty-ninth
Congress asserted its'interpretive authority under Section Two again in
legislation passed simultaneously with the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment.90 Like the Civil Rights Act, the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867''
is particularly relevant because it involved congressional use of its
enforcement powers under the Thirteenth Amendment and demonstrated a
congressional willingness to interpret the constitutional amendment for
itself in order to address particular instances of perceived violations of the
principles of the amendment. Unlike the Civil Rights Act, however,
supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment did not object to the congressio-
nal interpretive powers to pass the Anti-Peonage Act.'92 Moreover, because
'90 The Anti-Peonage Act was passed by the Senate on February 19, 1867, and
by the House on March 2, 1867. Seventeen states had ratified the Amendment by
January 1867, five more by June 1867, and six more by July 1868. NELSON, supra
note 118, at 59.
191 Anti-Peonage Act, 14 Stat. 546 (1867).
'92 Interestingly, Representative Bingham spoke in favor of the Anti-Peonage
Act despite its arguably broad interpretation of the language of the Thirteenth
Amendment. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1770 (1867). (I thank
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this Act was debated and passed at the same time that the American people
were actively debating the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment with
its identical enforcement clause, we may be able to garner some informa-
tion about how the congressional powers can be understood under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Peonage was a system of forced labor employed in the United States
territories influenced by Spanish law and practices. Under the system,
workers were compelled to labor, often at threat of state coercion, in order
to satisfy a debt or to fulfill an employment contract.'93 The Act itself
named New Mexico as the primary locus of the outlawed system, but the
Act applied throughout the entire United States.'94 The Act is often seen
simply as a logical enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment; the Supreme
Court read it this way thirty-eight years later when it upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Act.'95 This reading makes sense, but it also tends to paper
over one aspect of the law that makes it more intriguing than it initially
appears. The Act does not precisely parallel the language of the Thirteenth
Richard Aynes for bringing Bingham's support to my attention.)
193 On peonage in the Southwest in the 1860s, see Lawrence R. Murphy,
Reconstruction in New Mexico, 43 N.M. HIST. REV. 99 (1968). On peonage in the
American South after Reconstruction and applications of the Peonage Act, see
WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM'S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY AND THE SOUTHERN
WHITE QUEST FOR RACIAL CONTROL 1861-1915, 274-98 (1991); PETE DANIEL,
THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: PEONAGE IN THE SOUTH, 1901-1969 (1972); Pete
Daniel, The Metamorphosis of Slavery, 1865-1900, 66 J. AM. HIST. 88 (1979). On
Peonage in the South after Clyatt v. United States, see Risa L. Goluboff, "Won't
You Please Help Me Get My Son Home ": Peonage, Patronage, and Protection in
the World War 11 Urban South, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 777 (1999). See generally
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in
the Progressive Era. Part 2: The Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 646 (1982).
194 The Act states:
[T]he holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as
peonage... is hereby abolished and forever prohibited in the Territory of
New Mexico, or in any other Territory or State of the United States; and all
acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of the Territory of
New Mexico, or of any other Territory or State "of the United States,"
which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of
which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce,
directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any
persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise....
[are] declared null and void.
Anti-Peonage Act, 14 Stat. 546 (1867).
"9 Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 218 (1905).
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Amendment, which outlaws slavery and involuntary servitude.'96 Instead,
it proscribes "voluntary and involuntary service or labor" in peonage. This
was not a simple oversight. Senator Davis objected that Congress did not
have authority to address voluntary servitude. Despite his objection, the
language remained. 97
By encompassing voluntary arrangements, the Act arguably takes the
Amendment one step beyond its literal reading in an effort to prevent
arrangements that have the appearance of volition, such as those entered
into under contract, from being used as ruses to compel labor. One could
interpret the fact that payment of the debt would extinguish the service as
evidence that peonage was unlike either slavery or involuntary servitude.
But that was not Congress' interpretation in passing the Act. As the
Supreme Court later recognized, elements ofpeonage that could be deemed
voluntary might nonetheless amount to compulsion. The Court therefore
approved what seems a liberal constitutional interpretation by Congress,
showing particular deference to congressional interpretation.'
98
The Anti-Peonage Act provides additional evidence of a general
acceptance of broad congressional interpretation of the language of the
Reconstruction Amendments and its own powers thereunder. Congress' use
of its enforcement power to interpret "involuntary servitude" to include
certain "voluntary" agreements occurred simultaneously with the debates
over ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, a time when there was
heightened attention to and a revolution of the bounds of congressional
'96 U.S. CONST. amend. ill.
'9' CONG GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1571 (1867).
9I Clyatt, 197 U.S. at 215-16. See also United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133
(1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219,240-44 (1911). It is especially significant
that the Court accepted congressional interpretation of an issue-illusory volition
in employment contracts--that the same Court (the Court of the "Lochner Era") is
perceived to have interpreted quite differently in other contexts. See, e.g., Dennis
D. Hirsch, The Right to Economic Opportunity: Making Sense of the Supreme
Court's Welfare Rights Decisions, 58 U. Prrr. L. REV. 109, 114-23 (1996)
(contrasting the Lochner Era Court's assumptions that workers and employers were
equal bargainers with the New Deal Court's willingness to allow legislatures to
presume that workers were not contracting in a state of real freedom). This
interaction between the Court and Congress on the interpretation of the Thirteenth
Amendment nicely illustrates the type of relationship the modem Court seems to
reject. See, e.g., United State v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boeme v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). On how this relationship might work, see McConnell,
Institutions and Interpretation, supra note 6, at 184-94.
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power. 99 Moreover, this action by Congress was likely to affect areas
traditionally reserved to states: contract enforcement, debt, and labor.
Congress apparently believed that such "encroachment" into these areas
was permitted when the offensive labor arrangement at issue came within
what Congress perceived to emanate from the basic principles (rather than
a strict construction of the language) of the Thirteenth Amendment.
What can we conclude from this episode? One might contend that the
differences between the substantive provisions of the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments caution against too great a comparison. The
former Amendment contains no "state action" limitation, and so allows
Congress broader power to regulate the substantive area and not just to
respond to what the states did. But if Congress has the sort of interpretive
power that it showed with the Anti-Peonage Act, it should have some
flexibility both to determine the precise content of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and to determine what actions (or inaction) by states
trigger its powers. Indeed, congressional interpretation of "involuntary
servitude" to include voluntary arrangements seems more, not less,
aggressive than would congressional efforts to establish a particular
privilege or immunity under the very broad phrase "Privileges or Immuni-
ties" or to assert that public inns operate under state authority sufficient to
trigger the state action requirement.2"' For the language of the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments to be viable someone has to do some interpretive work;
the Anti-Peonage Act shows that Congress was willing to do so.
The fact that Congress took such an interpretive step under its
enforcement powers during the time of ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment also indicates at least an implicit acceptance of this type of
interpretive role for Congress by those who ratified the Amendment. This
point can only be made guardedly; it relies on negative inference since the
Anti-Peonage Act does not seem to have attracted much attention.2"' At the
time the Act was presented and passed, Congress was deeply enmeshed in
the Reconstruction Act of 1867, which set the terms by which the former
99See supra note 124 (discussing white Southern concerns for congressional
powers under Section Five as central to Southern States' opposition to ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment).2"o See infra Part III, discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
201 Apparently neither the New York Times nor Harper's Weekly noted the act
during the period of its adoption (Feb. and Mar. 1867); both publications dis-
cussed other congressional activities in some detail and cited specific legislative
actions. See generally N.Y. TIMES, Feb.-Mar., 1867; HARPER'S WEEKLY, Feb.-
Mar., 1867.
2002-2003]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Rebel states would re-gain representation; °2 the Anti-Peonage Act seems
to have been a sideshow. Nonetheless, it is more reasonable to conclude
that this type of congressional interpretation through legislation was viewed
as consistent with the enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction Amend-
ments than to assume the opposite.
20 3
C. Enforcement Act of 1871
After the Fourteenth Amendment became ratified in 1868, Congress
began implementing its interpretation of the Amendment and the powers
granted to Congress under Section Five. The first two instances of this
interpretive, implementing legislation occurred in 1870 and 1871. From
1868 through 1871 Ku Klux Klan violence ravaged the South and partly
succeeded in destroying the nascent political and economic power of
African-Americans and Republicans.2" State and local governments were
either unwilling or unable to counter this violent intimidation. If violence
and lawlessness were to be overcome, it would be through federal laws and
enforcement. Congress and some northern Republicans had grown weary
of Reconstruction and federal efforts in the South, but this new wave of
violence stirred them into action. Congress passed a series of acts to protect
blacks, primarily in the area of voting. The 1871 Act, for instance, created
a limited federal criminal law and punished conspiracies to deprive citizens
of their rights to vote, serve on juries, and obtain equal protection of the
law. As Eric Foner has stated, this shift of criminal law over private
conduct from the exclusive jurisdiction of the states to the shared power of
the federal government "pushed Republicans to the outer limits of
constitutional change.9 20 5 Opponents repeated their well-worn refrain that
such centralization would be the end of state and local government.2 6
Speeches by supporters of the Enforcement Act, who also participated
in the 1866 debates over the Amendment, serve as good examples of the
arguments in favor of their broad understanding of the Reconstruction
Amendments, both in substance and in the enabling of congressional
power. Representative Shellabarger, in his extensive speech supporting the
initial version of the Enforcement Act, asserted that the Fourteenth
22 The Reconstruction Act itself asserted an expansive view of federal powers.
See FONER, supra note 114, at 271-80.
203 Congressional enforcement powers were an important issue for southern
officials opposed to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 124.24 This summary relies largely on FONER, supra note 114, at 425-59.
2 5 Id. at 455.
206 Id.
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Amendment empowered Congress "to directly protect and defend
throughout the United States those privileges and immunities which are in
their nature 'fundamental"' and to "legislate directly for enforcement of
such rights as are fundamental elements of citizenship."2 °7 Thus
Shellabarger adopted both a natural rights interpretation of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause (he quoted from Corfield in the same speech) and a
strong view of congressional powers under Section Five, and saw them as
mutually reinforcing. In particular, Shellabarger emphasized the establish-
ment of national citizenship in Section One (in its opening sentence), and
argued that this national citizenship and its concomitant privileges and
immunities, combined with congressional empowerment, gave Congress the
power to protect privileges and immunities for citizens of the nation."'
Since the Act itself punished conspirators who sought to abridge "rights,
privileges, or immunities," the Act seemed, to Shellabarger, quite
consistent with the powers under the Amendment.0 9. Others shared
Shellabarger's view of the scope of congressional powers to implement
national privileges of citizenship."' 0
Shellabarger then responded to calls that the Act entrenched on states'
powers by arguing that this assumed that the two governments, federal and
state, could not have concurrent jurisdiction. Here, Shellabarger set forth
one of the most significant Reconstructionist views of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Amendment, according to Shellabarger, contemplates
concurrent jurisdiction over privileges and immunities. In an effort to
assuage those concerned that this was an entirely new construction of
American governmental powers, and to explain how such a dual jurisdic-
tion might operate, he pointed out that the Supreme Court had long
permitted both state and federal governments to hold the power to punish
counterfeiting. To the extent that the fundamental rights of citizenship were
at issue, the Fourteenth Amendment established a similar dual jurisdic-
207 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 69 (1871).
208 id.
209 This portion of the initial version of the Bill was changed in the final ver-
sion. See Michael P. Zuckert, Congressional Power Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment-The Original Understanding of Section Five, 3 CONST. COMM. 123, 149-50
(1986).
210 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1 st Sess. 334 (1871) (statement ofRep. Hoar)
("Congress is empowered by the fourteenth amendment to pass all 'appropriate
legislation' to secure the privileges and immunities of the citizen," and those
privileges and immunities include those expressly in the Constitution and those
"fundamental and essential to citizenship." (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas.
546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230))). See also FONER, supra note 114, at 455.
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tion.211 Shellabarger was therefore trying to move Congress beyond a
separate sphere conception of governmental powers toward a more nuanced
view of shared powers. The Supreme Court would struggle with this
problem of concurrent jurisdiction in Slaughter-House and its progeny, but
in 1871 some Republicans believed this had been settled by the Amend-
ment in favor ofjointjurisdiction. Finally, Shellabarger set forth a common
Republican argument in favor of Congressional power: Congress preyi-
ously exercised such power to enforce the Constitution when it passed
antebellum fugitive slave acts.2 12 If the Constitution permitted Congress to
enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause (which contained no enforcement
provision of its own) with affirmative legislation directed against individu-
als, then surely Congress could legislate to protect the privileges and
immunities of national citizenship through Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3
Representative Bingham also addressed the relationship of the
Enforcement Act to the Fourteenth Amendment. He engaged in a fascinat-
ing exchange with Representatives Farnsworth and Garfield, who both
asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment did not empower Congress to act
directly, but only to respond to laws of the states.214 Farnsworth and
Garfield relied heavily on the fact that in 1866 Congress had not adopted
the draft version of Section One, prepared by Bingham, which stated:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the
several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.
211
211 CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1871). Interestingly, the case cited
for this point, Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 20 (1852), while indeed
asserting the principle regarding counterfeiting, was not a counterfeiting case, but
a fugitive slave case. In Moore the Court upheld Illinois' punishment of a state
citizen for harboring a person who was enslaved in another state. The plaintiff had
argued that his act was only properly within the jurisdiction of the federal
government under the Fugitive Slave Clause. The Court rejected this view and
permitted a dual jurisdiction to protect slave owners. Thus, Shellabarger was
indirectly also making the point, similar to the assertion regarding federal powers
under the Fugitive Slave Clause, that dual sovereignty presented no obstacle for
antebellum states' rightists when used to support slavery.
212 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1871).
213 Justice Harlan also relied on this argument in dissent in the Civil Rights
Cases. See infra note 328.
214 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 81-86, 115-17 (1871). See Zuckert,
supra note 209, at 123-25.
215 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866).
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The House voted to postpone consideration of this version, and the
version eventually passed by the House and Senate--the one now in the
Constitution--contains the familiar "No state shall" language in Section
One with Section Five asserting congressional power to "enforce" the
Amendment with appropriate legislation. In 1871, Farnsworth and Garfield
argued that the powers claimed for congressional legislation in the original
draft were rejected by the House and the final, ratified Amendment avoided
such a broad grant of power. Bingham replied that the final version, which
he also wrote, "embraces all and more than did the February proposition"
in that the draft did not expressly prohibit the states from violating
privileges and immunities and the final version both empowered Congress
and prohibited the states.216 This debate is notjust of historical importance;
the Supreme Court relied on Garfield and Farnsworth's analysis in its
restrictive interpretation of Section Five in City ofBoerne v. Flores.217
Bingham's position has been substantially supported by scholars.
Michael Zuckert wrote a detailed examination of the voting patterns and
arguments of those in Congress in both 1866 and 1871, concluding that
Bingham's position was consistent with the majority of those who were
216 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 83 (1871).
217 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 521-22 (1997). Indeed, the Court in
Boerne arguably went farther than rejecting an expanded role of Congress under
Section Five and read the drafting changes to support its own restriction of
congressional action, so that instead of applying the traditional McCulloch
"necessary and proper" test to the validity of congressional action, the Boerne
Court demands that, under Section Five, such action be congruent and proportional
to the power under Section One. Id. at 519. See generally Caminker, supra note 6;
Engel, supra note 70. It is a truly odd reading of the historical record to conclude
that a Congress as doubtful of the post-Dred Scott Supreme Court's constitutional
interpretations as was the 39th Congress would decide to grant itself less
interpretive power under the Fourteenth Amendment than it has under Article I,
choosing instead to rely on the wisdom of the Justices. See Caminker, supra note
6, at 1163; Engel, supra note 70, at 128-29; Fox, supra note 24, at 512-13;
McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation, supra note 6, at 182 (Boerne is a
"dubious reading" of the historical record); Nowlin, supra note 182, at 443-44
("period fromDred Scott through Reconstruction was an era of intense Republican
disillusionment with--and often outright hostility toward-the federal courts"). It
also places the Court in the awkward position of interpreting congressional powers
under the identical Enforcement provisions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments significantly differently. See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 6, at
822-23.
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present at both periods.2"8 At the very least, the argument that the draft was
rejected because it granted too much power to Congress is not adequately
supported. It is more likely that Garfield and others were themselves re-
writing history in an effort to back away, for political reasons, from the
more radical approach of the Republicans of the 1860s. 2 19
Thus Bingham's views in 1871 probably provide a more reliable guide
to the original ideas behind the Fourteenth Amendment than do the views
of those who criticized the Enforcement Act of 1871; they also offer us an
interpretation of the Amendment in the context of congressional
particularization of the Amendment's generalities. Bingham believed that
the Reconstruction Amendments expanded protection of civil rights:
"[these Amendments] vest in Congress a power to protect the rights of
citizens against States, and individuals in States, never before granted. 22°
He described Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment as a "grant of
power" that was "full and complete, 22' and argued that the privileges and
immunities of American citizenship (quoting verbatim first eight Amend-
ments) "may be enforced under existing laws of Congress, and such other
laws for their better enforcement as Congress may make., 222 Bingham thus
asserted a congressional power to make laws to secure the privileges and
immunities of national citizenship. On the content of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, however, Bingham remained close to a textualist
reading that incorporated the Bill of Rights (which he repeatedly refers to
in the speech), but did not add any further rights. For this reason, those
218 See Zuckert, supra note 209. See also Fox, supra note 24, at 506-13;
Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism, supra note 82, at 914-15. Notably,
Garfield and Farnsworth eventually votedfor the Enforcement Act, even though
it contained language directed against private individuals. Zuckert, supra note 209,
at 148 (Garfield and Farnsworth voting); id. at 150 (private conduct scope of act).
219 KACZOROWSKI, POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at
163-65. Eric Foner observes that Republican support for civil rights waned after
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, in part because, according to Garfield, the
vote placed African-Americans' "fortune in their own hands." FONER, supra note
114, at 449 (quoting Garfield). On the shift of some members of the Republican
Party away from Radical Reconstruction and toward Gilded-Age Liberalism
(including the formation of the Liberal Republican Party and alliance with the
Democratic Party in 1872), see id. at 486-511. See also PAMELA BRANDWEIN,
RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRODUCTION
OF HISTORICAL TRUTH 81-85 (1999).
220 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 83 (1871).
221 Id.
2 Id. at 84.
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scholars who focus on incorporation of the Bill through the Privileges or
Immunities Clause highlight his speech, and rightly so. 223 But they do not
address Bingham's focus on congressional empowerment. I do not believe
that Bingham affirmatively rejected broader readings of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, 24 and that even if he had, his emphasis on congressio-
nal empowerment reflects his concern with the need for federal legislation
to enforce the Privileges or Immunities Clause to make real the promises
of the Amendment. It indicates that the real work of the Amendment was,
for him, not so much "incorporation," as what Congress would do with
incorporation. The bulk of his speech (coming as it does as argument
favoring the Enforcement Act) addressed this question of federal legislative
powers and duties: "The people of the United States are entitled to have
their rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution of the United States,
protected by national law." '225
The version of the Enforcement Act discussed by Shellabarger and
Bingham was revised, however, so that instead of criminally punishing
conspiracies to violate "rights, privileges, or immunities of another person,"
the final Act prohibited conspiracies to deprive people of "the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the
laws." '226 Some congressmen objected that the original Bill was overbroad
in that it might supersede state laws, but were willing to vote for the final
version which enforced an equality of those state laws (although both
versions addressed private action).227 As Shellabarger stated in presenting
this Amendment, the purpose of the amendment was "to confine the
223 See, e.g., AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 24, at 183; CURTIS, No
STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 24, at 161-62; Newsom, supra note 3, at 698.
224 At the end of his speech, Bingham suggests an expansive interpretation of
liberty: "It is the liberty, sir, to work in an honest calling and contribute by your toil
in some sort to thesupport of yourself, to the support of your fellow men, and to
be secure in the enjoyment of the fruits of your toil." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1 st
Sess. app. 86 (1871). Bingham's invocation of the right to labor as a fundamental
liberty sounds much like Justice Bradley's dissent in Slaughter-House and echoes
a Lincolnian free labor vision. Similarly, Bingham introduced the list of the Bill of
Rights by stating that the privileges and immunities of citizens were "chiefly
defined in the first eight amendments ..... Id. at 84. The use of "chiefly" indicates
that there were other possible sources for privileges and immuiities. I thank
Richard Aynes for this latter point.225 Id. at 85.
226 Id. at 68-69 with Enforcement Act, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). See also Zuckert,
supra note 209, at 148-50.
227 Zuckert, supra note 209, at 148-54.
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authority of this law to the prevention of deprivations which shall attack the
equality of rights of American citizens; that any violation of the right, the
animus and effect of which is to strike down the citizen, to the end that he
may not enjoy equality of rights as contrasted with his and other citizens'
rights, shall be within the scope [of this law]. '28 Thus it appears that
Congress decided to address the deprivation of equality in privileges and
immunities and not the deprivation of privileges and immunities per se.
This change may, and Shellabarger and others seem to have understood
it to, limit the scope of what was protected, but it is not clear what the
practical effect of this change could be. Representative Williard, who
opposed the original version on constitutional grounds, yet accepted the
revision, asserted that the original version would have given the United
States jurisdiction over all crimes, whereas the revised version gave
jurisdiction only over denial of equal privileges and immunities and equal
protection. 9 The basic point was to prevent the Act from enabling federal
prosecution for all crimes. However, a conspiracy to prevent voting denies
both the privilege of voting and the equal application of the privilege to the
victim vis-a-vis other voting citizens. Moreover, the change in favor of the
equality language was made to the criminal portion of Section Two of the
228 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 478 (1871).
229 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 188 (1871). Others who com-
mented after the change continued to set forth a broad view of the Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment. Representative Wilson asserted that the privileges
protected by the Act were "fundamental" privileges, including those articulated in
the Constitution (freedom from slavery and right to vote) and even those not so
clearly within the Constitution, such as the right to seek employment in a state.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1 st Sess. at 482, 484. Representative Cook asserted that
Congress could "protect and enforce every right secured to American citizens by
the Constitution," and that the "right to support and advocate the election of any
qualified person to any office under the United States Government" was a right of
American citizenship. Id. at 485-86. Similar statements were made in the Senate.
Senator Frelinghuysen contended that the Fourteenth Amendment established
"fundamental rights" and privileges and immunities which the federal government
could enforce, and, more strongly, that "[t]he fourteenth amendment goes much
further than establishing 'equality' between blacks and whites [which the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 did]. It asserts United States citizenship and defines some of
its privileges and immunities." Id. at 500. Some of the opposition to the Bill by
Democrats reflects their persistent effort to minimize the effect of the Amendments
that they opposed in the first place. Naturally, they sought to limit the scope of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and also to narrow congressional powers under
Section Five. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 47-48 (1871)
(statement of Rep. Kerr) (limiting Privileges or Immunities Clause to the sojourn
protection of Article IV and the simple equality of citizens within a state).
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Act addressing private conspiracies, but not to Section One addressing state
officers. The change was also not made to the civil portion of Section Two
where the Act stated that anyone "injured in his person or property, or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States" because of the acts in furtherance of the conspiracy would
have an action for damages.2 3' Thus, both the state actor provisions and the
civil damage portion of the Act seem to indicate that a deprivation of rights
and privileges per se, not just a deprivation of equality of those rights and
privileges, is covered by the Act, and Congress was simply limiting the
criminal portion of the Act as applied to private actors. Nonetheless, the
congressional debates can fairly be read to reflect a general understanding
that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to vest the federal
government with authority over all criminal acts, but only to focus on the
denial of those things protected by the Constitution, including fundamental
privileges and immunities. 231 As Professor Curtis has observed, "[f]or the
federal government to take over the vast domain of state law was unaccept-
able. For states to violate or leave unprotected the basic rights of citizens
was equally unacceptable to Republicans. The Fourteenth Amendment had
sought to reconcile these two competing interests. 232
In 1871, Congress was struggling to resolve, in legislation, these
competing interests.233 Congressional debates over how Congress could
230 See Enforcement Act, 17 Stat. 13, 14; see also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1 st
Sess. 477 (1871).
23 Alternatively, one could argue that the shift from "rights, privileges, or
immunities," to "privileges or immunities under the laws," was designed to shift
away from Shellabarger's original enforcement of fundamental privileges to a more
limited protection of privileges established in "laws," perhaps meaning statutes.
There is no clear indication that this was the purpose of the change, however.
Shellabarger himself asserted that the privileges and immunities covered by the
final version were the "rights of American citizens" and "citizens' rights," which
seems to encompass both fundamental rights and rights established by statute and
case law. It is possible that the revised version was intended to protect only those
privileges and immunities clearly established in law rather than those that a federal
court might "create" on its own in an enforcement action. According to this
reading, "fundamental" privileges would be protected to the extent that they had
protection already at law but a court could not assert a new protection on its own.
Note, however, that this latter interpretation only restricts the courts in "creating"
privileges of citizenship; a privilege created by statute would still be protected.
232 CuRTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 24, at 157.
233 This tension is evident in Representative Hoar's comments on the Enforce-
ment Act:
I believe in the right to exercise the national power for the protection of the
fundamental right of the citizen. I believe that was the purpose of the
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address the violence of the Ku Klux Klan reflect an important effort to
develop, jurisprudentially and politically, the new post-war federalism of
the Reconstruction Amendments, especially the Fourteenth. Shellabarger
spoke initially about a dual sovereignty; the debates among Republicans
over the changes to the Bill focused on how to create federal enforcement
without completely overtaking state law.234 As Michael Zuckert percep-
tively observed several years ago, the resolution to this question, offered by
John Bingham and others, was the de Tocquevillian realization that
America had "centralized government, decentralized administration": the
Constitution establishes uniform laws and rights of Americans, and states
localize the law.235 According to Zuckert, Bingham believed:
[T]he states need not cease making the laws that secure and regulate the
privileges and immunities of citizens, the life, liberty, and property of
persons. The states ... although retaining the primary care for all these
matters, yet are to be subject to the national standards as defined in the
Constitution and applied by courts and Congress.236
Constitution, to put the fundamental civil rights of the States beyond the
power of any lesser power to destroy them.
... I do not favor interference in any degree by the national Government
with the local administration.
CONG. GLOBE, 42 Cong., 1st Sess. app. 117 (1871).
234 See Hyman & Wiecek, supra note 97, at 471; cf Benedict, supra note 82, at
47-53 (discussing the Reconstruction Congress' efforts to balance federalism and
nationalism, and arguing that Congress in fact sought to preserve states' rights).
235 Zuckert, supra note 209, at 139-41 (citing Bingham in CONG. GLOBE, 42d
Cong., 1st Sess. app. 84-85 (1871)).
236 Id. at 141. See also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1871) (state-
ment of Rep. Hoar):
Another error... is to suppose that Congress ... must either let the State
alone altogether, or take entire possession of all its powers and instrumen-
talities of government.... But there is nothing in the Constitution that for
a moment favors that idea. We have a right to limit our interference to the
extent of the evil. If a particular class of persons are denied their civil rights
permanently and as a rule in any State, we have a right to interfere simply
to protect those rights ....
Id. The debate between Senator Trumbull, who supported the Fourteenth
Amendment but voted against the Enforcement Act, and Senator Carpenter, who
later represented the government in Slaughter-House, is also instructive on this
point. Trumbull generally takes the position (contrary to his statements from 1865-
66) that the Fourteenth Amendment did not change the Constitution with respect
to individual rights; Carpenter advocates in favor of congressional powers to
protect citizens rights. See id. at 576-78. Cf. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
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Thus, we see in the debates among those who favored the Enforcement
Act of 1871, an effort to address the issue that so perplexed Justice Miller
in Slaughter-House, and continues to perplex the Slaughter-House
revisionists: does abroad interpretation of privileges and immunities render
state sovereignty obsolete? Interestingly, Justice Bradley's circuit opinion
in the Slaughter-House Cases, which the Supreme Court overturned, was
cited favorably by advocates of the Enforcement Act for its interpretation
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.237 Advocates of the Act therefore
had some awareness of the potentially broad understanding of the
Amendment that the Slaughter-House dissenters would latter advocate, and
yet they saw it as consistent with their own interpretation of the Amend-
ment.
The debates over congressional powers regarding the Enforcement Act
do not by any means resolve the issue. Nor could we expect them to resolve
it. The scope of federal powers in a dual, overlapping sovereignty was then,
and likely will always be, nettlesome and unsettled, and the Forty-second
Congress was the first generation to attempt to implement the potentially
enormous changes wrought by the war. To expect a clear answer that
adequately addressed the concerns of both over-centralization and the non-
protection of citizens' rights would be to expect the impossible. Nonethe-
less, the debates reveal a range of considerations prevalent within Congress
regarding the Fourteenth Amendment.
First, there was a general understanding among supporters of the Act
that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment granted Congress power to
protect citizens in their privileges and immunities. In a sense- this
observation is tautological, since Congress would be expected to think it
had the power to pass the Act that it passed. Notably, however, the final
Act included a proscription on private conduct, thus indicating congres-
77 (1865) (in supporting the 1866 Civil Rights and Freedmen's Bureau Bills,
Trumbull declared that the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress the power "to
protect every person in the United States in all the rights of persons and property
belonging to a free citizen."). On Trumbull's about-face on the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, see KACZOROWSKI, POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 164 and n.69.
237 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 500 (1871) (statement of Sen.
Frelinghuysen); id. at 334 (statement of Rep. Hoar). After citing Bradley's opinion,
Representative Hoar further argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
"comprehends all the privileges and immunities declared to belong to the citizen
by the Constitution itself. Most clearly, also, it seems to me, it comprehends those
privileges and immunities which all Republican writers of authority agree in
declaring fundamental and essential to citizenship." Id.
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sional assertion of power over private conduct affecting privileges and
immunities.
Second, the main supporters of the Act understood themselves to be
promoting a new version of federalism authorized by the Reconstruction
Amendments, one that accepted overlapping jurisdiction between state and
federal governments over the privileges and immunities of citizens. This
conception of federalism recognized states as the primary implementers and
protectors of privileges and immunities, but also recognized a constitutional
obligation for Congress to step in where the state governments were
unwilling or unable to implement and protect the privileges and immunities
of their citizens.
Finally, both of these principles beg the question: What were privileges
and immunities? On this, the record of the 1871 Congress remains
ambiguous. As stated above, Bingham focused on the rights contained in
the Bill of Rights, although he did not clearly limit privileges and immuni-
ties of national citizenship to those. Shellabarger spoke of fundamental
rights in a way reminiscent of the natural rights approach of many members
of the Thirty-ninth Congress, and others cited Justice Bradley's natural
rights approach favorably. Representative Willard argued that Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment gave only "equality of rights under the laws
of the several States in matters within the jurisdiction of such states" and,
like the Civil Rights Act of 1866, gave "no absolute rights. . except the
right to equality of privileges and immunities."23 Ultimately, however, it
was not necessary for Congress to resolve (or even fully air the views on)
this question, since the legislation at issue simply asserted protection of
privileges and immunities and did not attempt to define or particularize
them.239 That would be a task for proposed legislation being debated
concurrently, and seemingly perpetually, which would eventually become
the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
D. Civil Rights Act of 1875: Pre-Slaughter-House
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 originated in 1870. Drafted, proposed,
and promoted by the dean of the radical, racial egalitarian wing of the
Republican Party, Charles Sumner, the original bill went through several
years of amendments and complex legislative bargaining and maneuvering,
238 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 189 (1871).
239 See, e.g., id. at 475-76 (statement of Rep. Dawes). It is also important to note
that much of the debate over the Enforcement Act involved issues of state action.
See CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 24, at 158-60.
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eventually being passed in a relatively weak form by a lame-duck Republi-
can Congress after Sumner's death.24 Nonetheless, the debates over the
Bill and the strong support the Bill maintained through 1874, especially
among those who had voted in favor of the Fourteenth Amendment, reveal
a strong commitment to congressional powers to interpret the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and implement its interpretation. As we shall see, the
debates also reveal that the Slaughter-House Cases dampened congressio-
nal exploration of the potential of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
causing some Republicans to de-emphasize fundamental privileges in favor
of a general privilege of equality.
The supporters of the Bill in the early 1870s generally viewed the
constitutional basis for the legislation as the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: it was an implementation, using
Congress' Section Five powers, of the privileges of United States citizen-
ship.241 The proposed Bill itself continued the theme of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 in that it asserted the right to equal treatment. Sumner's original
Bill extended the context of such equal treatifient, however, to common
carriers, inns, licensed theaters and public amusements, schools, churches,
and cemeteries.242 Thus, the same issue we saw under the 1866 Act
24 For an excellent review of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act, see
McConnell, Originalism, supra note i13, at 1049-86. See also Alfred H. Kelly,
The Congressional Controversy over School Segregation, 1867-1875,64 AM. HIST.
REV. 537 (1959). James McPherson's 1965 article also remains a valuable resource
on the history of the Civil Rights Act. James McPherson, Abolitionists and the
CivilRights Act ofl1875, 52 J. AM. HIsT. 493 (1965). See also John Hope Franklin,
The Enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 6 PROLOGUE 225 (1974).
24' See Kelly, supra note 240, at 548-49; McPherson, supra note 240, at 504.
Supporters of the Bill also spoke in terms of equality before the law in ways that
sound, to the modem ear, much like equal protection analysis. E.g., CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 2d Sess. 241-43 (1871) (debate between Sens. Sumner and Hill). Prior
to the Slaughter-House opinion, arguments based on equality appear to be founded
both on the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.
Sumner in particular remained imprecise on the specific Constitutional textual
support for the Bill. See McConnell, Originalism, supra note 113, at 997.
242 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3434 (1870). In introducing this Bill,
Sumner expressly identified it as "supplementary to" the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Id.
For a full text of the Bill as first fully debated by the Senate in 1872, see CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 244 (1872). The 1872 citation has the complete text
of the Bill when introduced as a rider to the Amnesty Bill, which was enacted to
provide amnesty to southerners who retained political disability under the
Fourteenth Amendment. On the complex political reasons for the pairing of
Sumner's Bill with the Amnesty Bill, see McPherson, supra note 240, at 501-03.
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regarding whether the asserted privilege was simply equality or whether it
was the privilege to have the thing that whites had, reappears with the 1875
Act and its drafts.
At least with one aspect of the Bill, this question was perhaps not
relevant: there simply could not be an issue (before automobiles) of
whether the railroads or steamboats would cease to operate and achieve
equality by equal denial. Public transportation was a public necessity and
once the technology had been developed and enterprises established under
government grants and incorporations, the question was not one of
eliminating the provision for all, but of who gets access to what. This point
cannot be overstated. Much of the opposition to the Bill centered on the
states' powers to eliminate the subject privileges, such as public school.
This argument becomes a non-sequitur with rail travel; however, since the
states were in no position to eliminate it. To the extent we can harmonize
the inclusion of each subject within the Bill, it probably makes more sense
to assume that the supporters viewed each topic as a guaranty, in law or in
practice, to state citizens.
As to the other elements of the Bill the question is more complicated.
Inns, for instance, are not so clearly a necessity, and certainly not inns in
the publicly regulated sense. Sumner himself drew a distinction between a
public inn and a boarding house, the latter being private and not covered by
his bill.243 It is on this point that Sumner's argument about equality before
the law did most of its work. The idea was that as long as particular
institutions were "legal" institutions, in the sense that they were created or
regulated by law, Congress could impose an obligation of equal treatment
on the institution. Interestingly, Sumner connected this rationale to the
privileges of citizenship: "Equality before the Law; nor more nor less; that
is, that condition before the Law in which all are alike-being entitled
without any discrimination to the equal enjoyment of all institutions,
privileges, advantages, and conveniences created or regulated by law."
'2"
Here the law is seen as granting privileges wherever it operates. But for
Sumner the question was not so lawyerly as defining constitutionally
precise language. The purpose of the Reconstruction Amendments was a
grander one of fundamental political philosophy and the foundation of
Republican government: it was the elimination of caste and creation of
equality across all public spheres, defined as those "institutions, privileges,
See also FONER, supra note 114, at 504-05. A substantially similar bill was
introduced in the House in 1872. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1116 (1872).
243 McConnell, Originalism, supra note 113, at 993.
244 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 381 (1872).
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advantages, and conveniences created or regulated by law." The overriding
privilege of United States citizenship, under this view, was equal treatment
throughout public life.
One problem is that each of the areas addressed in the Bill had a
distinct claim to being a privilege of citizenship. As to public inns and
common carriers, supporters of the Bill emphasized the long common law
tradition of the requirement of innkeepers to take all comers.245 The
citations to the grand heritage of the common law are strikingly similar to
the common law basis for the rights protected in the 1866 Act. In citing the
Elizabethan Chronicles of Holingshed for the proposition that "every man
may use his inn as his own house in England," Sumner was accessing a
history of a right to use the inns in a sense similar to the right to contract.246
In this sense, the right of access to inns and conveyances was itself seen as
a fundamental right.247 The innkeeper and common carriers owed a duty, it
was claimed, to serve all equally; where there was a duty there was a
corresponding right to obtain the service so long as the customer had the
money and acted with propriety. Others supported this position.248 While
245 E.g., id. at 383 (statement of Sen. Sumner).
246id.
247 One can connect this right of access for the traveler to the more general (and
closely related) rights of mobility and commerce identified by Justice Washington
in Corfield. If there is a right to travel on the highways and to conduct business
throughout a state, there need also be a right to travel on public conveyances using
those highways and to eat and board in the inns on those highways. In this respect
consider the points made by Sumner's reading of letters from African-Americans
supporting the Bill: H.M. Turner, an African-American state legislator in Georgia,
describing how a female African-American school teacher had been unable to eat
at the railroad eating houses for the entire trip from Washington, D.C. to Alabama,
making her long trip to her place of employment enormously difficult. Id. at 430.
Similarly, W.H. Grey of Arkansas stated that "the colored people of Arkansas...
are subjected to untold inconveniences daily, thereby materially crippling their
intercommercial intercourse... ." Id. at 431. In this respect, the right of access to
common carriers and inns is a corollary to a meaningful right to travel and conduct
business. Cf. CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 304 (1874) (statement of
Sen. Alcom).
248 E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 843-44 (1872) (statement of Sen.
Sherman):
What is a public inn? It is every man's home.... [T]he only laws that can
be passed to exclude any one from a public inn are laws which involve
order, decency, and quiet; not distinctions of race, color, or anything of that
kind .... [T]he right to travel on your public highways, the right to travel
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the actual historical protection of a right to access may be less clear,2 49
certainly those who supported this access in the 1870s viewed it as having
a long established place in the common law and common law principles
were, for some Republicans, a key source for defining the privileges of
federal citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment.25 °
As to theaters and other places of public amusement, Sumner did not
have a parallel common law rule of equal treatment. He claimed, rather,
that such places were "kindred to inns or public conveyances, though less
noticed by jurisprudence" and it would be logically inconsistent to treat
them differently.251 In a sense, he was placing certain activities into the
same category as the inns; he was claiming a right for Congress to identify
a fundamental activity. He also placed public, or common, schools in this
category. Schools had no common law heritage of access, but because they
existed through public taxation, were for the benefit of the community, and
were to teach the principles of republican government, Sumner asserted that
schools had a very strong claim to being in the category of public access
facilities.25 2 Sumner's defense for his inclusion of churches and cemeteries
was the thinnest, stating that insofar as they are "public in character and
organized by law, they must follow the general requirement." '253
Still, the question remained concerning how far Congress could
legitimately go in regulating activities traditionally regulated by the states.
This question of the extent of federal powers arose during the Enforcement
Act debates and carried over to the debates on Sumner's Bill. Soon after
Sumner's long defense of the Bill, Senator Frelinghuysen broached this
topic. He argued that Congress did not have the authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment to overtake the regulation of carriers, inns, etc., but
that Congress did have the power to ensure that "every citizen shall be
on your public improvements, is a privilege that belongs to him as a citizen
not only of the State, but of the nation.
Id.
249 See Joseph William Singer, No Right To Exclude: Public Accommodations
and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283, 1303-48 (1996).
211 See supra note 248.
251 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1872).
252 Id. at 383-84. Sumner argued that the purpose of schools is to prepare
children for the duties of life in a democratic republic, and that children taught in
an unequal (segregated) school system based on caste could, almost definitionally,
not be taught republican principles. See also id. at 844 (statement of Sen.
Sherman).253Id. at 384.
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treated as a citizen" and that denial of access to rails and inns was a denial
of the "equal rights of American citizenship."254 For Frelinghuysen, the key
language of the Amendment was therefore the Citizenship Clause, and
Section Five gave Congress authority to protect citizens qua American
citizens, including their right to access inns and carriers.
Consider, for instance, the debate between Senators Thurman and
Morton. Thurman, opposing the Bill, observed that the law sought to
establish a privilege to access the listed facilities and institutions, and then
adopted a version of the state action argument later used by the Supreme
Court in finding the law unconstitutional.255 Senator Morton pointed out
that this argument did not deny that the subject areas of the bill were
privileges and immunities of national citizenship. Morton then asserted the
power of the Congress to enforce national privileges and immunities:
If the right of a man to the equal enjoyment of the privileges of traveling
belongs to him because he is a citizen of the United States, and that
citizenship is created by the Constitution of the United States, then the
protection of that privilege belongs to the Government of the United
States.
256
Morton further argued that the Fourteenth Amendment contemplates
primarily congressional, rather than court, enforcement and that state
"action" is not necessary for congressional action, although it might be for
court action. Otherwise, the Amendment amounted to surplusage. Morton
supported this position by observing the Amendment specifically autho-
rized congressional enforcement, that a state law specifically denying rights
would not require congressional action because the courts would have the
power to overturn such laws, that therefore, for Section Five to have
independent meaning, Congress must have the power to act absent state
laws (or action). 257 According to this theory, Congress possesses a power
to address state failure, or inaction, in a way the courts might not.258
254 Id. at 436.
51 Id. at 496.256 Id. at 524-25.
2571 d. at 525.
258 Thurman responded by denying that Section Five added anything to the
Constitution (it was only a restatement of congressional power generally) and that
the whole weight of the rights protection of Fourteenth Amendment rested on a
prohibition of state action. Id. at 526. Thurman also considered the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 to be unconstitutional, at least in part. Id. at 527. Thurman's position
represented the northern Democrat interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Morton also argued, however, that the Amendment "does not create a
new privilege or immunity" but simply asserts a national citizenship and
right to pre-existing privileges and immunities.259 This was a common point
in the debates, and runs somewhat counter to Sumner's implicit assumption
that Congress could identify facilities not having a common law right of
access and create such a right itself. The supporters of the Bill did not fully
grapple with this problem, however, and it is hard to know how they
resolved the issue. Perhaps they believed that the right of equal access
existed broadly and was not based solely on common law principles, and
so was not wholly created by Congress. Whatever the underlying reasoning
of the Bill's supporters, it appears to have been necessary for many to have
believed that they were not creating privileges but were rather implement-
ing the broad concepts of the Amendment.26°
The statements of Senator Carpenter are particularly revealing
considering his shifting positions and relationship to the Slaughter-House
cases. In 1873, Carpenter argued for a restrictive interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment in his capacity as counsel to the Louisiana
Slaughter-House company in Slaughter-House and opposed the eventually
enacted (and weaker) bill after Slaughter-House. In 1872, and before the
Slaughter-House arguments or decision, however, Carpenter supported a
significant portion of Sumner's Bill.26' He argued that the Reconstruction
Although the Democrats had opposed the battle over the Amendment, they
eventually won the interpretive war before the Supreme Court. See also Balkin &
Levinson, supra note 128, at 1098. See generally BRANDWEIN, supra note 219, at
30-37, 62, 140-41.
259 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 525 (1872).
260 This may reflect the rhetorical complexity of legislating on such broad
principles. The political speaker often needs to engage the historical importance of
the topic in order to assert successfully its implementation in the present. The
political actor thus 'positions the changes as historically required (and the thing to
be changed as inconsistent with history). Such "forensic" history is common for
American politicians,judges, and lawyers. See John Phillip Reid, Law and History,
27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 193, 204 (1993) (discussing judicial uses of history to
support judicial activism). Contrary to Professor McConnell's belief, it is therefore
not at all surprising that supporters of this 1875 Act did not assert their power to
"create" privileges, but rather asserted that their position was consistent with
common law history. See McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation, supra note
6, at 174.
261 Carpenter disagreed with Sumner over the coverage of churches and jurors
and the definition of public entity. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 759-63,820-
21, 825-27, 843 (1872). Tension is evident in this debate between Carpenter and
Sumner over Carpenter's proposed amendment to Sumner's Bill.
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Amendments reconceived federalism because "[t]he sensitiveness that
existed about interfering with States when the original Constitution was
adopted had been drowned in blood."262 The Enforcement Clauses of the
Reconstruction Amendment, therefore, did more than Senator Thurman
claimed, because they permitted Congress to "enforce, by positive
enactments, the principles intended to be secured by these amendments. 263
This enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment, Carpenter
argued, included the power to enforce national privileges and immunities,
because the assertion of national citizenship and the mention of national
privileges and immunities implied their existence. It is in this way that
Section One accomplished far more than did the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV.
21
As to the subject of enforcement, Carpenter asserted a broad theory of
national privileges that sounds remarkably like the arguments of his
opposing counsel and the dissents in Slaughter-House (and, of course,
remarkably like Carpenter's 1873 argument on behalf of Myra Bradwell's
admission to practice law in Illinois):
The fourteenth amendment provides that no State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of any
citizen. It has been asked in our recent debates what those words mean.
The best definition I know is that given by the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the case of Cummings v. The State of Missouri. The
Court Say:
"The theory upon which our political institutions'rest is, that all men
have certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness; and that in the pursuit of happiness all avocations,
all honors, all positions, are alike open to every one, and that in the
protection of these rights all are equal before the law ......
... [I]t may safely be affirmed that the privilege of practicing law, if
a man can meet the test and pass the necessary examination in the courts;
the right of preaching the gospel, if employed and settled according to the
usages of a particular church; the right of giving instruction in the public
schools-all these are privileges of American citizens, and why can they
not be taken away from him in a particular State? They might under the
old Constitution, but not under the fourteenth amendment, because this
262 Id. at 761.
263 id.
264 Id. at 762.
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amendment goes into every State and declares "You shall neither make
hereafter, nor enforce, if you have it at present, any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United States."
26
One would be hard pressed to find a broader definition of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, in the congressional debates of either 1866 or the 1870s.
Notably, Carpenter also recognized the importance of balancing this
broad interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause with the
continued importance of a sphere of state autonomy.21 This is consistent
with the point made above in discussing the 1871 Enforcement Act, that
Republicans were trying to define a new understanding of an overlapping
federalism. Once again, the contours of this new federalism were still not
clear, but Carpenter, as of February 1872, believed they included congres-
sional power to enforce equal access to a wide range of privileges.
Supporters outside Congress likewise described the purpose of the Bill.
Writing in 1872, Frederick Douglass argued:
the black man is not a free American citizen in the sense that a white man
is a free American citizen; he cannot protect himself against encroach-
ments upon the rights and privileges already allowed him in a court of
justice without an impartial jury, [nor] can it be denied that the forcing of
colored men to pay for what they do not get by railroad corporations or
the refusal to allow the same accommodation to them as to other citizens
...is an invidious discrimination amounting to an abridgement of
citizenship rights.267
Douglass, as was his style, raised several critical arguments in this short
excerpt. First, he asserted the white-rights-as-baseline theory of equality
and freedom that was seen as one possible interpretation of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. Then, he observed that the already established rights and
privileges of citizenship, such as the right to access the courts, established
in the 1866 Act, were figmentary without subsidiary protections such as
5 Id. (citations omitted).
'66 Id. at 763.
267 Frederick Douglass, Give Us the Freedom Intendedfor Us, NEW NATIONAL
ERA, Dec. ,5, 1872 (quoted in McPherson, supra note 240, at 503). See also
McPherson, supra note 240, at 500 (quoting an abolitionist writing against public
accommodation segregation and arguing that "[i]t is necessary and proper that the
law be appealed to, and that respectable, well-behaved persons of color are
accorded the rights which belong to them as citizens").
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jury service and composition. In this way, he established that the privileges
that the Bill sought to enforce were valid for federal action because they
were necessary for protection of the established privileges. Finally, he
asserted that economic and social discrimination (requiring black purchas-
ers of first-class tickets to ride on second-class railcars) itself abridged
citizenship rights. Thus, Douglass set the Bill in the context of the
establishment of national citizenship and the assertion of national privileges
and immunities by the Fourteenth Amendment.268
As this discussion suggests, in the initial debates over the Civil Rights
Bill, supporters understood the Fourteenth Amendment to enable Congress
to enforce equality in a wide range of public activitybecause such activities
were themselves privileges of national citizenship.269 The interpretive
theory behind this argument, as evident in some of the supporters'
statements, suggested that the privileges of national citizenship were not
limited to the Bill of Rights but were found in the fundamental rights of the
common law and the nature of government provisions, such as public
schools.27° Moreover, Congress had the important power and responsibility
to articulate the specifics of these privileges based on its own reading of the
common law and government activities. The Privileges or Immunities
Clause required an investigation into the fundamental rights of citizens, and
Section Five placed Congress in charge of the inquiry.
27
268 See also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 429 (1872) (letter of Resolu-
tions (read by Sen. Sumner) from an assembly of four thousand black and white
citizens of Georgia, asserting that "we can never be complete American citizens
until such a law is enacted," and that daily degradations in public highways and
institutions would be common "so long as we are denied the full rights of
citizenship").
269 For some other discussions of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in this
context, both pro and con, see id. at 843-45 (statement of Sen. Sherman); id. at app.
25-26 (statement of Sen. Thurman); id. at app. 41-42 (statement of Sen. Vickers).
270 See, e.g., Senator Sherman's grand statement:
What are those privileges and immunities? Are they only those defined in
the Constitution, the rights secured by the amendments? Not at all. The
great fountain head, the great reservoir of the rights of an American citizen
is in the common law, the old charters that were wrenched by our ancestors
five hundred years ago and two hundred years ago from English kings. Our
rights are not limited to those given by the Constitution. What are those
rights? Sir, they are as innumerable as the sands of the sea. You must go to
the common law for them.....
Id. at 843.
271 By saying that Congress was "in charge" of the inquiry, I mean that
Congress (and not the Court) had the primary obligation to explore meanings and
applications of meanings. I do not mean that Congress was the sole authority on the
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Importantly, the failure of the Bill at this point cautions against a
simple conclusion that Republican interpretations of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause had overwhelming support. But while the pre-Slaughter-
House Congress did not pass Sumner's Bill, the Bill received significant
support in the Senate, especially among those who voted in favor of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Of the twenty-two members of the Forty-second
Congress who voted for the Fourteenth Amendment, twenty-one supported
the Civil Rights Bill; only Senator Trumbull, who was backsliding to his
Democratic roots, opposed it.272 Trumbull's defection is particularly telling
since he was aligned by this point in time with a small but increasingly
powerful group of moderate-conservative Republicans who formed or
supported the rival Liberal Republican Party and, allying themselves with
Democrats, opposed President Grant in the 1872 election.273 Indeed, the
very fact that Trumbull opposed the Bill may support the consistency of the
constitutional interpretation of the other Republican supporters. The
moderate-conservative wing of the party had begun shifting away from
positions on equality, rights, and federal powers that its own members
asserted just half a decade earlier.274 That people such as Senator Trumbull
were objecting to the Bill while simultaneously associating themselves with
the people and party that opposed the Reconstruction Amendments and
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In this regard, I am sympathetic
to Professor McConnell's position that Congress has interpretative powers that
entitle it to deference, but not "substantive" powers that render the Court's position
irrelevant. See McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation, supra note 6, at 169-76.
I am not convinced, however, that one can distinguish "interpretative" and
"substantive" so easily with regard to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.2
1
2 See McConnell, Originalism, supra note 113, at 1054 (on Senate consider-
ation of Sumner's rider); id. at 1062 (House consideration of parallel bill). Vice-
President Colfax, who supported the Fourteenth Amendment as Speaker of the
House in 1866, also voted in favor of Sumner's Rider. Id. at 1054.
273 McPherson, supra note 240, at 502-03. The failure of the Bill in the Forty-
second Congress may well be attributable to Trumbull's opposition, since, as
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Trumbull was able to stymie
Sumner's plans. See Kelly, supra note 240, at 546. One of the significant ironies
of the period was Sumner's support for Trumbull's wing which formed its own
party, the Liberal Republicans, to oppose President Grant in 1872. Sumner had
opposed Grant's effort to annex the Dominican Republic, and Grant had helped
force Sumner out of the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
-The breach between Sumner and Grant forced Sumner into the odd position of
supporting main opponents of his beloved Civil Rights Bill. See FONER, supra note
114, at 494-511.274 See sources cited supra note 219.
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legislation, may counsel more in favor of seeing the Bill as a logical
extension of the "true" Reconstruction intent. At the very least it does not
justify the counter-argument that these moderate-conservative Republican
positions could themselves stand for the intent of the framers and support-'
ers of the Reconstruction Amendments.275
The initial debates over the Civil Rights Bill thus reveal important
aspects of the congressional interpretations of both the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and congressional powers under Section Five. On the
specific subjects of the Bill--public conveyances, public accommodations,
public schools, etc.-4here was significant support for the proposition that
these were inherently privileges of citizenship and that equal access to them
was therefore required. Moreover, Congress saw itself as possessing the
power to determine the content of the Clause, and it did so by exploring the
fundamental rights of citizenship through the common law and other
sources. Indeed, some in Congress argued for a very broad view of the
possible content of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which would,
combined with congressional powers of interpretation, enable Congress to
define a broad range of federal rights of citizenship. 276 Thus, as the Court
prepared to decide the Slaughter-House Cases, there had already been a
significant exploration of the meaning of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause within Congress. A significant portion of the Congress (including
Senator Carpenter, who would argue in favor of a restricted view of the
Fourteenth Amendment in his role as counsel to the Slaughter-House
corporation) contended that the Clause meant more than mere incorporation
275 Cf McConnell, Originalism, supra note 113, at 1105-07 (discussing possible
views of the changes in opinions from 1866-1875).
276 Senator Sherman was perhaps the most forceful advocate for this position.
He argued that the privileges of federal citizenship were innumerable and were
based on common law rights and the Declaration of Independence, and that the
potential breadth of the rights was supported by the invocation of rights retained
by the people in the Ninth Amendment. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app.
at 26 (1872). Here, Sherman was also responding to the conservative position of
Senator Thurman that the Clause did no more than incorporate the first eight
amendments. Id. at 25-26. Thurman argued that the rights retained by the people
were not citizenship rights, but rights as against the federal government. Id. at 26.
Citizenship rights are certainly not limited to those that do not restrain the
government (else the rights of first eight amendments would not be citizenship
rights either). On this dispute between Thurman and Sherman, see Maltz, The
Concept ofIncorporation, supra note 55, at 526-27. On the fact that incorporation
was a conservative position during this period, see generally Wildenthal, The Lost
Compromise, supra note 4. See also Maltz, The Concept of Incorporation, supra
note 55, at 527-30.
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of the Bill of Rights, that the common law was a significant source for
citizenship privileges, and that the Amendment enabled Congress to
particularize the meaning of the Clause. Furthermore, some in Congress
had advanced a potentially broader understanding of the Clause, in which
both the Declaration of Independence (Senator Sherman's point) and
evolving principles of government activities (Senator Sumner's implicit
point regarding public schooling) were sources for determining privileges
of citizenship. The range of interpretation was quite wide indeed.
E. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 Post-Slaughter-House
Regardless of how much weight one might accord the arguments of
supporters of the Bill from 1870-1873, it remains significant that the Bill
was understood within the context of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
at the same time that the Supreme Court was considering the Slaughter-
House Cases. The Slaughter-House revisionists,, in concentrating on the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights, overlook the more actively debated
contemporaneous issue of congressional powers to enforce the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. A Court writing in 1873 could not have been
ignorant of how its own interpretation of the Clause, even in a case not
raising question of congressional powers, would affect such debates within
and without Congress; nor could the advocates arguing the case have been
ignorant, in particular Senator Carpenter, who argued for the Slaughter-
House corporation on the side supported by the Court's decision.
Congress did take notice.277 The Court decided Slaughter-House on
April 14, 1873.278 When the Civil Rights Bill was reintroduced to the House
in the Forty-third Congress in December of that year, Congressman Beck
opposed the Bill with new ammunition: Justice Miller's opinion for the
Court. He argued that the Court decided that "these rights pertaining to the
rights of corporations, and inferentially to common schools, are not
embraced in the powers confided to Congress by the constitutional
amendments. Under the authority to enforce the amendments by appropri-
ate legislation, these are not rights about which Congress has authority to
legislate."279 He quoted at length from Miller's opinion on the definition of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and concluded that:
277 For other analyses of the congressional response to Slaughter-House, see
Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 24, at 679-81; McConnell,
Originalism, supra note 113, at 998-1005.
278 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 57 (1872).
279 CONG. REc., 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 342 (1873).
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[T]he whole spirit and bearing of the decision is against the constitutional-
ity of the lawnow proposed, matters of regulation as to education, local
corporations, and their rights and privileges being subjects which bear
only on the individual as a citizen of the State, and not as a citizen of the
United States.2"'
Even though Slaughter-House itself did not involve questions of congres-
sional powers, its restrictive interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause had an immediate impact on congressional debates because, as
Representative Beck argued, if corporate regulation remained an exclusive
question of state citizenship privileges, one logical implication was that
regulation of other traditional state functions-schools, inns, and common
carriers-did as well. Other opponents cited Slaughter-House to the same
effect.2"'
Supporters responded to this constitutional attack in a number of ways.
Some dealt with the decision directly. Senator Frelinghuysen provided an
extensive post-Slaughter-House defense of thq Bill and argued that the
Court's limitation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was irrelevant
because the Court held that "freedom from discrimination" remained a right
of national citizenship. Frelinghuysen argued that the privileges to access
to inns, schools, railroads, etc., were not at issue in the Bill, but only the
equality of access for all citizens.282 Frelinghuysen. sought a way to
harmonize the Court's limitation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
with the equality goal of the Civil Rights Bill. His position, though partially
consistent with some of the pre-Slaughter-House arguments in Congress,
still represented a more conservative movement because it avoided any
implication that the rights of access at issue were themselves fundamental
on a national scale.283 Even among the more forceful defenders of the Bill,
2 80 id.
21
1 Id. at 453 (statement of Rep. Atkins); id. at 4086-87 (statement of Sen. Thur-
man); CONG. REC., 43d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 2-3 (1873) (statement of Rep.
Southard); CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., 2d Sess. 948-49 (1875) (statement of Rep.
Finck).
282 CONG. REc., 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 3453-54 (1874).
283 For example, compare Frelinghuysen's post-Slaughter-House position to his
earlier statement about the Fourteenth Amendment: "The [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment goes much further than establishing 'equality' between blacks and
whites [which the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did]. It asserts United States citizenship
and defines some of its privileges and immunities." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1 st
Sess. 499-500 (1871). In his 1874 speech, Frelinghuysen was clearly uncomfort-
able with his equality-as-privilege-and-immunity position, for later in the speech
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therefore, Slaughter-House effected a rhetorical shift away from a
fundamental or natural rights position and toward a mere equality approach
to the Privileges or Immunities Clause.2 4
Frelinghuysen's invocation of equality as a privilege of United States
citizenship also reflected another tact taken by Republican supporters of the
Bill in order to address Slaughter-House: a movement away from the
Privileges or Immunities Clause and toward the Equal Protection Clause.285
This argument was articulated by Representative Elliott who, after
discussing Slaughter-House, stated:
[I]t is under this clause of the [F]ourteenth amendment that we place the
present bill, no State shall 'deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.' No matter, therefore, whether his rights are
held under the United States or under his particular State, he is equally
protected by this amendment.
The distinction between the two kinds of citizenship is clear, and the
Supreme Court has clearly pointed out this distinction, but if it has
nowhere written a word or line which denies to Congress the power to
prevent a denial of equality of rights, whether those rights exist by virtue
of citizenship of the United States or of a State.286
This move allowed the supporters of the Bill to call on other positions in
Miller's opinion to contrast the Bill with the issue in Slaughter-House.
Elliott argued, for instance, that the only basis for denying equal protection
was the legitimate use of the police power: regulation of slaughter-houses
clearly was within the police power and discrimination on the basis of race
was not. Moreover, the Court expressly linked the Reconstruction
Amendments generally, and the Equal Protection Clause specifically, to
racial injustice and had alluded to congressional powers to legislate against
he regressed to his earlier argument by quoting approvingly Justice Bradley's lower
court opinion in Slaughter-House: "'[The Fourteenth Amendment] not merely
requires equality of privileges, but it demands that the privileges and immunities
of all citizens shall be absolutely unabridged, unimpaired."' CONG. REC., 43d
Cong., 1st Sess. 3454 (quoting Live Stock Assoc. v. Crescent City Live Stock Co.,
15 F. Cas. 649 (C.C. La. 1870)).284 See supra notes 92-119 and accompanying text.
285 See McConnell, Originalism, supra note 113, at 1001.
286 CONG. REc., 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 408-09 (1874).
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discrimination. 27 By this interpretation of the case, African-Americans
could benefit from the Equal Protection Clause in ways that the New
Orleans butchers could not. The Bill's supporters were attempting to turn
Miller's restrictions of the Amendment into affirmative support for
congressional actions within what they defined as the remaining scope of
the Amendment.288
Moreover, as Professor McConnell has pointed out, Section One of the
Bill itself was revised to reflect the shift away from the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and toward the Equal Protection Clause: "Whereas the
Sumner Bill had begun with the words 'no citizen of the United States
shall,' the [revised] bill applied to 'all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States.' , 289 This point is not quite as strong as McConnell asserts,
however, because the revised Bill (and eventual Act) reflects the uncer-
tainty within Congress regarding the ongoing shift in constitutional
rhetoric. Section Two of the Act, which enforced the general principles of
Section One, retained the citizenship language.29° Whether this difference
in language was intended to have legal impact is unclear, but it does reveal
the confusion engendered by the Court's Slaughter-House decision.
Despite the frequent discussions of Slaughter-House within the halls
of Congress, many supporters seem to have ignored the Court's potentially
devastating interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and
remained convinced that the Privileges or Immunities Clause enabled
legislation of traditionally state areas and that fundamental rights were still
protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Representative Butler, for
example, upon the reintroduction of the Bill after Slaughter-House (but
before a full congressional discussion of the case) argued that all state
legislation "that seeks to deprive a well-behaved citizen of the United
States of any privilege or immunity to be enjoyed, and which he is entitled
to enjoy in common with other citizens, is against constitutional enact-
ment. 291 Similarly, when Senator Thurman spoke at length against the Bill,
weaving in his interpretation of Slaughter-House, supporters of the Bill
217 See, e.g., id. at 3454 (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen) (1874) (quoting
Slaughter-House). See also CONG. REc., 43d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 358-59
(statement of Sen. Morton) (quoting Slaughter-House).
288 See also id. at 360-61 (statement of Sen. Morton).
289 McConnell, Originalism, supra note 113, at 1070.
290 Civil Rights Act, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
29 CONG. REc., 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1873). Cf. CONG. REc., 43d Cong.,
1st Sess. app. 304-06 (statement of Sen. Alcom) (connecting access to inns and
common carriers to the right to travel).
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rejected his reading. Thurman argued that the Court had cited Corfield in
order to distinguish between fundamental rights such as those mentioned
in Corfield (interpreting Article IV), which were privileges of State
citizenship only, and those other rights which were national privileges. The
debate continued:
[Mr. THURMAN.] ... Now the question comes, what are those privileges
and immunities that appertain to men as citizens of the State? If they
appertain to them as citizens of the State, they are not those peculiar
privileges that appertain to them as citizens of the United States, but they
are privileges and immunities that belong to them in virtue of their State
citizenship. The first definition was by Justice Washington in the case of
Corfield v. Coryell.
[Mr. MORTON.] I wish to call the attention of the Senator to the fact that
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the State, spoken of in the
article of the Constitution he has just read [Article IV], are treated as
being identical with the privileges of citizens of the United States under
the [F]ourteenth [A]rticle, and the judge [Justice Miller] reads from the
case of Coryell to show that those rights were identical in their character.
[Mr. THURMAN.] There is nothing in the world to show that under the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment they are treated as identical at all, but on the
contrary this very case decides that they are not identical....
[Mr. MORTON.] The Senator does not understand me. The court draws
a distinction between the privileges of citizens of the United States and of
citizens of a State, but the privileges meant by the original article referred
to are those which are now treated as the privileges of a citizen of the
United States.
[Mr. THURMAN.] Yes, in this Hall, but in no court.
[Mr. MORTON.] In that decision.
[Mr. THURMAN.] No, sir; not a bit of it.292
Morton balked at Thurman's more accurate reading of Miller's opinion;
Morton's position that the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalized into
national citizenship the fundamental rights of Corfield is the argument of
the dissenters in Slaughter-House, not the majority. Indeed, when Thurman
then asserted that Slaughter-House plainly rendered the Bill unconstitu-
tional and that it was "the decision of the highest judicial tribunal of this
country, clothed, as we all admit, with the final determination of what is the
law and Constitution of this land" Senator Edmunds interjected, "I do not
292 CONG. REC., 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 4087 (1873).
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admit it."'293 Edmunds simply refused to admit that the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was either correct or the law of
the land. And Senator Morton, while adopting an equal protection
argument,294 also asserted that a citizen of the United States had a right, as
a U.S. citizen, to attend a public theater.295
The Republican supporters of the Bill not only asserted an alternative
interpretation of Slaughter-House, they also (as Senator Edmunds'
interjection suggests) asserted their own authority to interpret the Constitu-
tion. Thus Senator Morton argued that:
[I]f it be conceded now... that colored children cannot be denied the
benefit of common schools without a violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment, and that Congress has the power to enforce that amendment by such
legislation as in the judgment of Congress and not of the courts is suitable
and proper for that purpose, then the argument is at an end .... 296
Morton here argued, both explicitly and implicitly, for an interpretive
role for Congress. Explicitly, he suggested that once the topic came within
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress had the exclusive
interpretive power to determine how to enforce the Amendment through
legislation. He also implicitly assumed for Congress a significant, though
not necessarily exclusive, power to decide that the Amendment guaranteed
access to public education. While the opponents of the Bill had a reason-
able argument that Slaughter-House (rightly or wrongly) did not allow for
a congressional role in determining the privileges and immunities of
national citizenship, the Court had not addressed the former issue of
congressional power to fashion enforcement legislation as it saw fit. Thus,
the Republican tactic transformed into an effort to assert equality as a
privilege (and alternately focus on equal protection) and also to assert
congressional power to create enforcement legislation.
297
Another similar, but distinct, approach to the Privileges or Immunities
Clause after Slaughter-House was taken by Senator Boutwell. He viewed
the Court's apparent division of privileges and immunities into two
separate camps-State and Federal-as a "great mistake," and instead
2931 d. at 4088.
294 CONG. REc., 43d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 358-59 (1873).
29 Id. at 360 (debate between Sens. Morton and Merrimon).
296 Id. at 359.
297 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., 2d Sess. 980 (1875) (statement of Sen.
Hale).
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argued for equality as "the first right" of United States citizenship. He then
connected the two spheres of citizenship by claiming that the federal
privilege of equality meant that States, in granting state-based privileges,
had to do so equally.29 This intermingling of federal privilege with state
privileges enabled Boutwell and other supporters to further justify the Bill
within the rhetoric employed by the Court in Slaughter-House.99
This position did, however, render uncertain Republican claims that
various substantive grants were themselves fundamental privileges.
Whereas prior to Slaughter-House some Republican supporters of the Bill
argued forjoint federal and state jurisdiction over fundamental, Corfieldian
privileges, Slaughter-House made them coy. Thus, Boutwell and Morton
both danced around the question of whether states could simply withdraw
the state-based privileges altogether. Morton refused to answer this precise
question from Senator Merrimon, and instead simply asserted that theaters
were places of public amusement and therefore had to be open to all.3"'
Similarly, Boutwell spoke of education as fundamental to democracy and
as a basic privilege, albeit one granted by the state.310' Senator Howe argued
that the Bill "proposed that a citizen shall have a right to travel along the
public thoroughfares if he pays his fare, and shall have a right to send his
children to the public school if he meets the charges, although he is not
white."3 2 In each instance, the speaker assumed that the privilege at issue
did exist and would continue to do so. But whereas before Slaughter-House
there seemed to be two rhetorical positions for Republicans favoring the
Civil Rights Bill---one of equality and another of fundamental national
privileges-Slaughter-House forced supporters of the Bill to emphasize
equality and to limit these stronger claims, which urged subjects such as
education and access to common carriers to be deemed fundamental
national privileges.
Because Republicans were able to rely on the equality justification for
the Civil Rights Bill, the rhetorical shift away from substantive privileges
had only a small impact, if any, on the success of the Bill within
Congress.30 3 Once the Bill was stripped of its more politically sensitive
29 Id. at4116.
299 Compare Boutwell's position to Professor Curtis' similar interpretation of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See generally Curtis, Resurrecting the
Privileges, supra note 68; Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note 144.
300 CONG. REC., 43d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 360-61 (1873).
301 CONG. REC., 43d Cong. 1st Sess. 4116 (1873).
3o2Id. at 4147.
303 One important exception was Senator Carpenter, who switched from support
to opposition once Slaughter-House was decided. His opposition appears to have
been based on his belief that courts would overturn the Act after Slaughter-House.
[VOL. 91
RE-READINGS AND MISREADINGS
provisions, especially equal access to education (a compromise made pos-
sible in part by Charles Sumner's death), and once a lame-duck Republican
Congress could act with lessened concern for political consequences, the
Bill was finally passed and signed in 1875.
Nonetheless, Slaughter-House effected the subtle elimination of
fundamental privileges of national citizenship from the congressional and
national political discourse over the Fourteenth Amendment and Recon-
struction. Congress no longer sought to explore the entitlements of national
citizens under the Privileges or Immunities Clause, or to explore its own
duties to enforce and protect those privileges. This is not to say that the
rhetorical shift determined this denouement for congressional action under
the Privileges or Immunities clause. Certainly the political effects of the
elections of 1874 and 1876 had a devastating effect on both the power and
the positions of the "radical" Republican Party of Reconstruction.3° Yet we
cannot fully perceive the impact and meaning of Slaughter-House without
attention to its effect not just on Supreme Court doctrine, but on the
constitutional discourse and actions of Congress as well. As we can see,
Slaughter-House may well have helped cripple the nascent congressional
efforts at creative legislation designed to implement the Privileges or
Immunities Clause. We should not undertake a revisionist reading of
Slaughter-House (or for that matter a revival of the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause) without attention to whether the Court's holding and interpreta-
tion of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, quite aside from the incorpora-
tion of the Bill of Rights, comport with either the text or its complex and
multifaceted history.
IV. THE CIVIL RIGHTS CASES:
DENOUEMENT FOR CONGRESSIONAL POWERS
While the decision in The Slaughter-House Cases may have altered the
rhetoric behind the Civil Rights Act of 1875, it did not itself compel any
particular answer to the Act's constitutionality. Slaughter-House had not
addressed congressional enforcement powers, and the privileges claimed
by the plaintiffs and rejected by the Court did not include those protected
by the Civil Rights Act. The case did suggest, however, that only a very
limited collection of privileges were truly federal under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and thus "enforceable" by Congress, as the opponents
of the Act were eager to point out. It would have been quite plausible for
See McConnell, Originalism, supra note 113, at 1004-05.
304 FONER, supra note 114, at 549-50, 564-87.
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the Court, in considering the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of
1875, to have rested upon Miller's interpretation, and to have declared the
Act as encompassing subjects beyond the powers of the federal govern-
ment.
The Court did not do so. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court instead
focused on the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and
found that the Act, by addressing conduct engaged in by private parties,
went beyond the scope of the Amendment. °5 This move can be explained
in a number of ways. First, the state action rationale addressed both
possible justifications for the Act under Section One: the Privileges or
Immunities and Equal Protection clauses. As was explained, Slaughter-
House caused a shift in the rhetoric of constitutional justification for the
Act, and the Equal Protection Clause could arguably do the work of its
cousin, the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Both clauses are introduced
and modified by the "No State shall" language of Section One.306 By
defining state action so as not to include the possible connections between
the state and the facilities covered by the Act, the Court was able to clip the
wings of both clauses with a single doctrinal edge.
Second, Justice Bradley wrote the opinion. Although he lost the battle
for an expansive judicial reading of the Privileges 6r Immunities Clause in
Slaughter-House, it is not likely that he would readily employ the reasoning
of Slaughter-House, which he disliked, if other reasons existed. Moreover,
it may not have been Bradley's distaste for Miller's argument that caused
Bradley to rely on the state action rationale; Bradley may well have been
implementing his own version of the bounds of the new federalism that was
different from Miller's. Recall that the question for reconstructed federal-
ism was "how far?" Bradley may have viewed federal powers as expansive
enough to allow the federal courts to overturn state legislation restricting
individual rights but not expansive enough to allow congressional legisla-
305 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-19 (1883). The Court also rejected
an argument based on the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 20-25. While I address this
briefly below, the Thirteenth Amendment was not the primary basis for congressio-
nal action cited by Congress itself; the argument also does not directly implicate the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as I am discussing it in this Article. There are,
however, important potential connections between conceptions of citizenship under
the Privileges or Immunities Clause and conceptions of liberty and labor under the
Thirteenth Amendment.
306 The Privileges or Immunities Clause is introduced by "No State shall." The
Due Process Clause comes in the second part of the sentence and is introduced by
"nor shall any state." The Equal Protection Clause comes in the third portion of the
sentence, introduced by "nor deny."
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tion over private conduct not directly affected by state action. Such a view
would be consistent with a Lochnerian perspective, maximizing individual
freedoms from government restraint, because it would allow for the greatest
opportunity to strike down state legislation restricting individuals while
simultaneously prohibiting federal legislation restricting individuals. To
this extent, perhaps the Civil Rights Cases and the Slaughter-House
dissents are indeed compatible.
There is some doubt, however, as to the depth of Bradley's convictions
on these points and as to the motivations for his decision. Not only had
Bradley dissented in Slaughter-House, he had also written opinions prior
to 1876 vigorously defending federal powers over civil rights issues. In
Blyew, Bradley dissented from the Court' s judgment that, although the right
of black witnesses to testify in court was protected by the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, it was unenforceable in that case because the witnesses were not
parties to the murder case (a prosecution of a white man for killing several
African Americans). Bradley rejected the formalistic reasoning of the Court
and relied instead on the underlying purpose of the Act. In ringing language
Bradley declared:
I have no doubt of the power of Congress to pass the law now under
consideration. Slavery, when it existed, extended its influence in every
direction, depressing and disfranchising the slave and his race in every
possible way. Hence, in order to give full effect to the National will in
abolishing slavery, it was necessary in some way to counteract these
various disabilities and the effects flowing from them. Merely striking off
the fetters of the slave, without removing the incidents and consequences
of slavery, would hardly have been a boon to the colored race. Hence,
also, the amendment abolishing slavery was supplemented by a clause
giving Congress power to enforce it by appropriate legislation. No law
was necessary to abolish slavery; the amendment did that. The power to
enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation must be a power to do
away with the incidents and consequences of slavery, and to instate the
freedmen in the full enjoyment of that civil liberty and equality which the
abolition of slavery meant.
307
Bradley reiterated this position in the circuit opinion in Slaughter-
House, arguing in favor of congressional powers to define and implement
the privileges of citizenship and reaffirming the legitimacy of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, even though that Act was not itself implicated in the
301 Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 601 (1872).
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case." 8 Bradley continued this reasoning in his circuit opinion in United
States v. Cruikshank, written shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in
Slaughter-House, where he wrote, "I am inclined to the opinion that
congress has the power to secure that right not only against the unfriendly
operation of state laws, but against outrage, violence, and combinations on
the part of individuals, irrespective of state laws."309 One commentator has
argued that, at the time of writing the Cruikshank opinion, Bradley viewed
race as the factor that converted criminal violence subject to exclusively
state law into violations of federal law. 0 Thus the riotous violence against
blacks at issue in Cruikshank transformed the acts from those subject to
state law alone to those subject to federal regulation and prosecution.
It is hard to view this line of Bradley's reasoning as in any way
consistent with his opinion in the Civil Rights Cases. The Civil Rights Act
of .1875 plainly addressed problems of racial discrimination. If racial
discrimination arising out of slavery could convert the subjects of state law
into the subjects of federal law in Cruikshank, why could they not also in
the Civil Rights Cases?3 ' Similarly, if the Enforcement Clause of the
Thirteenth Amendment logically imbued Congress with broader powers
308 State ex rel. Belden v. Fagan, 22 La. Ann. 545, 1870 WL 92 (La. Nov. 1870)
(No. 2508).
" United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707,713 (C.C.D. La. 1874). See also
John Anthony Scott, Justice Bradley's Evolving Concept of the Fourteenth
Amendment from the Slaughterhouse Cases to the Civil Rights Cases, 25 RUTGERS
L. REv. 553, 558-59 (1971). The Supreme Court's opinion in Cruikshank is also
important for understanding the Court's use of congressional power under Section
Five. See United States v. Cmikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). On Cruikshank, see
Maltz, The Concept of Incorporation, supra note 55, at 529-33; Newsom, supra
note 3, at 712-20; Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise, supra note 4, at 1147-60.
Maltz identifies Cruikshank and not the Civil Rights Cases as the origin of the shift
away from congressional power under the Amendment. See Maltz, The Concept of
Incorporation, supra note 55, at 533.
310 See Scott, supra note 309, at 559 (citing Justice Bradley's diary from this
period).
.311 One could perhaps draw the distinction between racial violence and racial
segregation and argue that Bradley believed racial violence constituted a violation
of federal rights in a way that segregation might not. Bradley did not adopt the
distinction explicitly. Such a distinction may not explain his support for the 1866
Civil Rights Act in his Blyew dissent and his Slaughter-House circuit opinion.
However, it is notable that while the civil right to testify was the main issue in
Blyew, protection of the right was, on the facts of the case and in many other
similar cases, necessary to punish whites who committed violent acts against
blacks.
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than formalistic implementation of the letter of the substantive clause, then
the same Enforcement Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment logically could
allow Congress to interpret more broadly the state action limitation of the
first clause of the Amendment.
One possible answer to this inconsistency is to admit the inconsistency
and seek a non-doctrinal explanation. The best candidate here would be
Bradley's efforts to implement the Compromise of 1877. Bradley was
the pivotal member of the Electoral Commission appointed by Congress
to resolve the disputed electors from three states in order to deter-
mine whether Hayes or Tilden would be President. He was appointed to
a commission otherwise evenly divided between seven Republicans and
seven Democrats. He then cast the deciding votes awarding all the
disputed electors to Hayes, the Republican. As part of the agreement
between the parties to have Hayes become President, Republicans had
agreed to end federal supervision of race relations in the South. 12 Thus
Bradley, it has been suggested, found it essential to limit the reach of the
federal government in order to implement the agreement made possible by
his votes.31 3
This rather Machiavellian view of Bradley's own little "switch in
time" '314 is not without its critics. Michael Collins recently countered that
Bradley's judicial opinions are consistent. Collins contends that Bradley
consistently advocated protection against private interference of rights that
were established by the Constitution, particularly those in the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments, and protection only against governmental interference
of rights that originated in the common law.315 Collins identifies this as a
distinction between newly-conferred rights and pre-existing rights, with the
strict state action requirement imposed by Bradley in the Civil Rights Cases
applying only to the latter. Collins offers a sensitive reading of Bradley's
lower court opinion in Cruikshank, where the Justice indicated that
congressional powers to enforce rights might well depend on the right
312 See Scott, supra note 309, at 567-69.
313 See id. at 569. See Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional
Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 115, 138 (1994) [hereinafter McConnell, The
Forgotten Constitutional Moment]. Cf CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra
note 24, at 179 (arguing that Bradley indeed changed positions, but dating the
change at 1874, prior to the 1876 election crisis).
3 4 See also McConnell, The Forgotten ConstitutionalMoment, supra note 313,
at 138 (comparing the Republican shift in the 1870s to the infamous switch in time
of the New Deal).
311 See Michael G. Collins, Justice Bradley's Civil Rights Odyssey Revisited,
70 TUL. L. REv. 1979, 1987-2000 (1996).
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being protected. 16 According to this view, the privileges of citizenship
protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment could plausibly be considered pre-existing in the sense that
states were expected to protect those privileges prior to the Amendment,
and that all the Amendment did was allow the federal government to step
in where the state failed to protect-the privileges.
Collins' view stumbles on the Thirteenth Amendment, however. Even
if Bradley could be interpreted as invoking a consistent interpretation of the
Fourteenth, he refused, in the Civil Rights Cases, to agreethat, as Justice
Harlan argued in dissent, segregation in public accommodations was a
badge of servitude that Congress had the power to prevent under the
Thirteenth Amendment. Bradley had argued just this in Blyew, where he
recognized congressional power to legislate for the elimination of the
"incidents and consequences" of slavery.317 Similarly, as Collins percep-
tively highlights, in Cruikshank, Bradley suggested that Congress had the
power to punish white individuals for preventing black citizens from
leasing and cultivating a farm because "it would be a case of interference
with that person's exercise of his equal rights as a citizen because of his
race."1 For Bradley to draw the line of congressional powers under the
Thirteenth Amendment at leasing and cultivating land, but not accessing
public accommodations while travelling to the location where one would
lease the land, seems less related to the distinction between "newly-
established" and "pre-existing" rights than Collins would have us
believe.31 9
A better explanation for Bradley's decisions is that Bradley, like many
of his contemporaries, did not believe that "social" rights were protected
bythe Reconstruction Amendments. Historians have argued that in the mid-
nineteenth century there was a widely-held tripartite distinction among
political, civil, and social rights. Civil rights included rights to contract, to
hold and lease property, and to access the courts (all covered under the
1866 Civil Rights Act); political rights included the right to vote (the
316 United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707, 708 (C.C.D. La. 1874) ("One
method of enforcement may be applicable to one fundamental right, and not
applicable to another.").
17 See Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 601 (1872).
318 Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. at 712; Collins, supra note 315, at 1991.
319 Collins recognizes that the Thirteenth Amendment analysis presents the main
obstacle to his interpretation. Collins argues that the identification of race as the
key factor was what made the Thirteenth Amendment "newly-established." See
Collins, supra note 315, at 1998. The problem is that the Amendment, like Section
One of the Fourteenth, is not, by its language race-based.
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Fifteenth Amendment); and access to public accommodations (at issue in
the 1875 Act) were arguably a species of social rights. Bradley, it could be
argued, viewed only the former two as protected by federal constitutional
law. 2° This would explain his support for the 1866 Act and not for the
1875 Act. It is also consistent with Bradley's language in the Civil Rights
Cases. Bradley went to great pains to argue that although the Thirteenth
Amendment established "universal civil and political freedom" and
"clothe[d] congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for
abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States," it did
not encompass public accommodations.32" ' This was because Bradley
refused to admit that segregation from public accommodations was a badge
or incident of slavery, despite its origin in the Black Codes of the era of
slavery. He then explicitly distinguished "those fundamental rights which
are the essence of civil freedom" and "appertain to the essence of citizen-
ship," which he claimed were protected by the 1866 Act and the Thirteenth
Amendment, from the "social rights of men and races in the community,"
which were the subject of the 1875 Act and outside the ambit of the
Thirteenth Amendment.322
The social rights distinction, however, does not explain why Bradley
chose the state action doctrine in the Civil Rights Cases. If he thought that
social rights were not protected, they would be unprotected by the
Privileges or Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses as well as the
Thirteenth Amendment. He could have adopted a version of Miller's view
and held the subjects at issue in the Act as inherently not part of the Federal
Privileges or Immunities. Instead, he expressly refused to decide whether
the right to public accommodations was "one of the essential rights of the
citizen" under the Fourteenth Amendment, perhaps indicating a lack of
agreement within the majority of the Court on the issue.323 Bradley further
suggested that the Fourteenth Amendment has the broader substantive
scope-it may cover the denial of "the right to pursue any peaceful
avocations allowed to others" 32"--but narrower congressional empower-
ment, while the Thirteenth Amendment has a narrower scope-limited to
abolition and the relief of civil and political disabilities based on race as
had already been enacted-but a broader empowerment for Congress.3 25
320 See id. at 1999 n. 106; HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 97, at 394-402.
321 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-22 (1883).
322 d. at 22.
323 Id. at 19.
324 Id. at 23. Here Bradley seems to attempt to reinsert ideas from his Slaughter-
House dissent and also to forget his Bradwell concurrence.
325 id.
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Ultimately it may have been a complex combination of patent and
latent rationales-including the civil-political-social rights division, the
"newly-established" versus "pre-existing" distinction, a particular concern
with racial violence, and a growing frustration with and disregard for
Reconstruction--that motivated Bradley's various judicial opinions
through 1883.326 Whatever the reasons, his Civil Rights Cases opinion
thoroughly stunted the development of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
and congressional interpretive enforcement precisely because he greatly
restricted congressional enforcement powers under Section Five. Even if
there had been room to maneuver within the substantive straight jacket of
Slaughter-House, the Civil Rights Cases effectively ended the prospect for
subsequent judicial reception of congressional action in the area.327
The sole remaining voice on the Court in favor of broader interpreta-
tions of the Reconstruction Amendments and congressional powers under
them belonged to Justice Harlan. In one of his earliest significant
dissents,32 Harlan advanced many of the same arguments for the Act's
constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment as were put forward by
the Republican congressional supporters of the Civil Rights Act a decade
earlier. For instance, Harlan, like Senator Sumner and others, argued that
there was a long common law history behind open access to public
accommodations, particularly at inns and in transportation.329 He also
argued that licensing of public establishments provided the necessary
connection to governmental action to satisfy any state action requirements
326 Cf. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham, supra note 93, at 102 (Bradley's
change mirrored the national mood) (citing Ruth Whiteside, Justice Joseph Bradley
and the Reconstruction Amendments (1981) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Rice
University) (on file with author)).327 Of course, after the Election of 1876, Congress was notlikely to develop an
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause on civil rights issues. This
does not mean, however, that if the Court had accepted congressional actions in the
Civil Rights Cases that later Congresses might not have been more willing to
explore legislation under the Clause.
328 Harlan dissented in several cases prior to the Civil Rights Cases. See, e.g.,
Ruggles v. Illinois, 108 U.S. 526 (1883) (on the issue ofjudicial review of railroad
rate regulation). None of the cases were as significant, nor were the dissents as
strongly worded. It was his dissents in the Civil Rights Cases and Hurtado v.
California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), that first gave him notoriety as a Justice. See
LOREN P. BETH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: THE LAST WHIG JUSTICE 151 (1992).
See also LINDA PRZYBYSZEWSKI, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN MARSHALL
HARLAN 90-96 (1999).
329 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 37-47.
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of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 ' Each of these arguments reveals that if a
distinction among civil, political, and social rights was in fact commonly
accepted, it was by no means clear that access to public accommodations
was wholly a social right; the categorization of public accommodation
access was the contested ground in the late Reconstruction period.31 Harlan
argued that the right to access the public highways was no more a social
right than the right to use the public market, post office, or court room.332
Bradley's jettison of public accommodation access into the nether
region of social rights was not so obviously correct, particularly for
Republicans familiar with the debates of the 1860s and 1870s. Indeed,
given the strong Republican support for the privilege of public accommoda-
tions in the early 1870s, what is surprising is not that Harlan dissented in
the Civil Rights Cases, but that no other Republican Justice sided with him
(although the retired Justice Swayne, a Slaughter-House dissenter, did send
Harlan a letter complimenting Harlan on the Civil Rights Cases dissent).333
Bradley's shift away from a rhetoric supporting civil rights to a rhetoric
surprisingly hostile to it 334 reflects (whether or not it was directly the result
of) a deeper transition in the Republican Party and the nation generally
away from civil rights and federal legislative protection of the rights of
blacks, a transition forged in the congressional debates over the legislation
implementing the Reconstruction Amendments in the early 1870s, and the
330 Id. at 41.
33 ' Harlan apparently accepted the legitimacy of the civil/political/social cate-
gories; for example, he seems to have been ambivalent about whether public
schooling was more properly categorized as a civil or social right and was thus
ambivalent about integrated public education. See PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note
328, at 99-101.
332 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 59-60. Linda Przybyszewski argues con-
vincingly that Harlan was protesting against what in effect was civil slavery similar
to what free blacks, North and South, had endured prior to the Civil War. She also
argues that Bradley and others simply could not grasp the significance of this idea.
PRZYBYSZEWSKI, supra note 328, at 92-94. Bradley's dissent in Blyew, however,
makes it seem at least possible for him to have understood the meaning of "civil
slavery." Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 585 (1871).
333 See Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom, supra note 24, at 676 n.359.
334 Bradley's Civil Rights Cases opinion is notable in large part for his
aggressive rejection of a constitutional obligation to support civil rights for
African-Americans: "[For blacks who have] emerged from slavery... there must
be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws." Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. at 61. See supra note 307 and accompanying text to compare the tone and
substance of his CivilRights Cases opinion to his dissent in Bylew v. United States.
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formation of the Liberal Republican Party in 1872."' The political and
social shift away from the energies that enabled some early congressional
interpretive legislation under the Privileges or Immunities Clause is not a
reason, however, to allow the Court's doctrinal enforcement of the shift to
blind us to the possibilities for future constitutional interpretations.
V. CONCLUSION
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANINGS AND HISTORICAL THREADS:
CONGRESS AS INTERPRETER OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
The recent re-readings of The Slaughter-House Cases by Kevin
Newsom and Professor Wildenthal focus on the wrong misreading. While
it may be true that scholars and courts have misread Justice Miller's
opinion for the Court in Slaughter-House to have prevented the incorpora-
tion of the Bill of Rights to the states, the more important problem with
Miller's opinion is not its position on incorporation, but its misreading of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause. Miller
wrongly relegated the fundamental privileges of citizenship, which were
extensively discussed by the drafters of the Amendment and subsequent
Congresses, to state privileges and immunities. In doing so, the Court
greatly inhibited the ongoing congressional debates over specific defini-
tions of the Clause in the context of congressional enforcement powers
under Section Five of the Amendment. Slaughter-House thus became a
two-pronged attack on the Amendment, preventing both judicial definition
of federal privileges and congressional definition through enforcement.
When combined with the still vigorous perspective of The Civil Rights
Cases,336 which diminishes the interpretive role of Congress under Section
Five, such revisionism, despite its apparent expansion of the Clause,
produces a remarkably thin clause indeed.
The Slaughter-House revisionists are too quick to adopt Miller's
treatment of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. They unnecessarily fear
Miller's monster of an untamed federal government swallowing up all
safeguards of federalism and states' rights. In doing so they fail to account
for the development of an alternate interpretive path-congressional
development and protection of the privileges of citizenship-which might,
if given enough time, implement more fully the fundamental privileges
desired by many framers of the Amendment and retain concurrent state
powers over those privileges as well. By considering congressional actions
"I See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text.336 See, e.g., City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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and debates between the time of the drafting of the Amendment and the
decision in Slaughter-House, we learn what the revisionists overlook: the
Reconstruction Congresses, which included many who voted for the
Amendment, were well aware that congressional enforcement of the
Amendment included an interpretive power and that many in these
Congresses understood that their legislation on civil rights was based on
their own implementation of fundamental privileges of citizenship through
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Such historical investigations raise critical issues for any contemporary
revival of the Privilege or Immunities Clause. First, Slaughter-House
should not continue to be guiding authority, even with an incorporationist
spin, because the Court simply ignored significant evidence supporting a
broader understanding of the Clause. Second, the historical record about the
"intended" content of the Clause contains sufficient ambiguity that we must
confront the possibility that natural or fundamental rights beyond the Bill
of Rights could be encompassed by the Clause; this choice is not one
dictated by oracles of original intent or Court precedent, but rather must be
made openly by modem interpreters through a dialogue with the past.
Third, modem interpreters can engage with the interpreters of the past to
help test and refine current views, and such a process should include an
investigation of congressional interpretations from the Reconstruction
period. Finally, there are significant indications in the historical back-
ground of the Amendment that Congress was to play an important
interpretive role in developing the law surrounding the Clause. Indeed, the
role Congress played during Reconstruction suggests a theory of interpre-
tive enforcement whereby Congress, in enforcing the broad concept of
privileges and immunities, also interprets the Clause by particularizing it.
Given the historical basis for this view and the textual support in Section
Five of the Amendment, such congressional power should not be rebuffed
too lightly. Congress may indeed be the most appropriate body, historically
and institutionally, to implement the specifics of citizenship privileges and
immunities, and such may prove a more fruitful path for future legal and
scholarly development than a restructuring of the foundation of the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights.
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